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Legal scholars describe Article V of the U.S. Constitution, which sets
forth rules for amending the document, as an uncommonly stringent and
speciﬁc constitutional provision. A unanimous Supreme Court has said
that a “mere reading demonstrates” that “Article V is clear in statement
and in meaning, contains no ambiguity, and calls for no resort to rules
of construction.” Although it is familiar that a small set of amendments,
most notably the Reconstruction Amendments, elicited credible challenges
to their validity, these episodes are seen as anomalous and unrepresentative. Americans are accustomed to disagreeing over the meaning of the
constitutional text, but at least in the text itself we assume we can ﬁnd
some objective common ground.
This paper calls into question each piece of this standard picture of
Article V. Neither the language nor the law of Article V supplies a determinate answer to a long list of fundamental puzzles about the amendment process. Legally questionable amendments have not been the
exception throughout U.S. history; they have been the norm. After detailing these descriptive claims, the paper explores their doctrinal and theoretical implications. Appreciating the full extent of Article V’s ongoing
ambiguity, we suggest, counsels a new approach to judging the validity
of contested amendments, undermines some of the premises of originalism
and textualism, and helps us to see new possibilities for constitutional
change. Because the success or failure of attempted amendments turns
out not to be exclusively or even primarily a function of following the
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INTRODUCTION
One of the distinctive features of the original U.S. Constitution was its
capacity for lawful change. In George Washington’s words, the
Constitution “contain[ed] within itself a provision for its own amendment.”1 That provision was and is Article V, which instructs that an amendment shall become “Part of this Constitution” when “propose[d]” by “two
thirds of both Houses” of Congress and “ratiﬁed by the Legislatures of
three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof.”2 The Supreme Court gave voice to the standard view of Article V
when it wrote in 1956 that “[n]othing new can be put into the Constitution
except through the amendatory process. Nothing old can be taken out
without the same process.”3
Constitutional theorists have challenged or complicated this view in a
variety of ways. Akhil Amar has suggested that the Constitution may be
amended by a national popular referendum.4 Some have proposed that
norms without a foothold in the canonical document may nevertheless
attain “constitutional” status.5 And many have emphasized the extent to
1. George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in 1 A Compilation of the
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1907, at 213, 217 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1908); see also Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and
Practice in Europe and America 138 (4th ed. 1968) (“[T]he clear recognition and deliberate organization of the amending power was an achievement of the American revolution.”);
Sanford Levinson, Introduction: Imperfection and Amendability, in Responding to
Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment 3, 4 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 1995) [hereinafter Responding to Imperfection] (“It was a fundamental
breakthrough in American constitutional theory . . . that the ‘rules of government’ would
be decidedly ‘alterable’ through a stipulated legal process.” (quoting Willi Paul Adams, The
First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the Making of the State
Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era 139–44 (1980))).
2. U.S. Const. art. V. Article V also permits “the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States” to apply to Congress to “call a Convention for proposing Amendments,” which
then go to the states for ratiﬁcation. Id. No such convention has yet been called. See infra
section III.M.
3. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956); see also, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar,
The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 Colum. L.
Rev. 457, 458 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Consent of the Governed] (“The conventional
reading of Article V sees it as the exclusive mechanism of lawful constitutional amendment . . . .”); Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in
Responding to Imperfection, supra note 1, at 145, 147 [hereinafter Schauer, Amending the
Presuppositions] (“Article V appears on its face to exhaust the possibilities for amending
the Constitution consistent with the Constitution itself . . . .”).
4. See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 3, at 462–94; Akhil Reed Amar,
Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1043, 1044–76 (1988) [hereinafter Amar, Philadelphia Revisited].
5. See, e.g., Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1079,
1129 (2013) [hereinafter Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality] (explaining that “small-c”
constitutional theorists insist that “the text of the written Constitution” is not a necessary
“basis for a rule’s constitutionality”); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the
Constitution, 117 Yale L.J. 408, 410 (2007) (“[T]he American ‘constitution’ consists of a
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which new propositions of supreme law, including propositions that
depart sharply from prior understandings, may emerge and become
entrenched in the absence of formal amendment.6 Virtually all constitutional lawyers, however, take as given that conformity with Article V’s
“amendatory process” has determined ever since the Founding what is and
is not “put into” the written Constitution, and therefore what its text does
and does not say.7
This paper questions Article V’s capacity to perform that function.8 It
is by now familiar that the perceived clarity of the constitutional text is
“constructed” to a signiﬁcant degree by norms of legal argument and
other social practices.9 We endeavor to show that what counts as the
constitutional text in the ﬁrst place is also constructed to a signiﬁcant degree
by such practices.10 Part of the reason is that the ultimate rule of recognition in any system is a matter of official and popular acceptance, rather
much wider range of legal materials than the document ratiﬁed in 1789 and its subsequent
amendments.”).
6. See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Formal and Informal Amendment of the United States
Constitution, 66 Am. J. Compar. L. 243, 260 (2018) [hereinafter Kay, Formal and Informal
Amendment] (“It is fair to say that most of what now goes under the caption ‘constitutional
law’ in the United States is attributable to extraconstitutional, ‘off-the-books’ developments.”); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conﬂict and
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1323, 1327 (2006)
(arguing that social “movements regularly succeed in changing the Constitution without
amending it”).
7. Even the most radical Article V revisionists do not necessarily dispute this. Although Amar contends that the Constitution may lawfully be amended by a popular referendum or comparable mechanism, he never suggests that such an amendment has in fact
occurred. See, e.g., Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 3, at 457–61. Likewise, although Bruce Ackerman advances an elaborate theory of constitutional change outside
Article V, he never suggests that new words have been put into the Constitution’s text by a
procedure that does not purport to follow Article V. See, e.g., 2 Bruce Ackerman, We the
People: Transformations 15–31 (1998) [hereinafter Ackerman, We the People].
8. Although this piece is technically an “Article,” it will be referred to as a “paper”
throughout to avoid confusion with references to Article V.
9. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the
Constitutional Text, 64 Duke L.J. 1213, 1216 (2015) (“The perceived clarity of the text . . .
is often partially constructed by [interpretive] practice.”); Peter Jeremy Smith, Commas,
Constitutional Grammar, and the Straight-Face Test: What if Conan the Grammarian Were
a Strict Textualist?, 16 Const. Comment. 7, 17 (1999) (discussing “all-too-common”
situations in which “we are confronted by [constitutional] text that, according to established
rules of grammar, does not actually say what we all know it to mean”).
10. Amar has made a conceptually similar, but empirically narrower, point about the
original Constitution. While most assume that the parchment Constitution in the National
Archives is the authoritative document, a printed version with minor differences was transmitted to and ratiﬁed by the states. See Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution:
The Precedents and Principles We Live By 63–68 (2012) [hereinafter Amar, America’s
Unwritten Constitution]. That latter version is probably the legally operative one. Id. But
there would be no way to ascertain which version is legally operative simply by studying the
documents themselves. Id.; cf. Laurence H. Tribe, The Invisible Constitution 6 (2008)
[hereinafter Tribe, The Invisible Constitution] (“[N]othing in the visible text can tell us
that what we are reading really is the Constitution . . . .”).
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than constitutional design. Even an amending clause that looks itself like
the system’s “supreme criterion of law”11 owes its efficacy, and indeed its
legality, to extratextual forces.12 But another, more U.S.-speciﬁc part of the
reason—and the one on which this paper focuses—is that neither the
language of Article V nor subsequent constructions of Article V specify the
amendatory process in enough detail to establish in many cases which
amendments are valid and which are not. Article V continues to be
shrouded in a remarkable amount of legal uncertainty, which further
attenuates the link between its contents and the failure or success of any
given amendment effort.13
Leading scholars have characterized Article V as an unusually clear
and constraining constitutional provision.14 The Supreme Court has said
that a “mere reading demonstrates” that “Article V is clear in statement
and in meaning, contains no ambiguity, and calls for no resort to rules of
construction.”15 Yet, as we explain, the text of Article V leaves open
numerous fundamental questions, from the time limits (if any) on an
amendment’s pendency to the substantive limits (if any) on an amendment’s subject matter to the role (if any) of the President and state governors in the amendatory process to the respective roles (if any) of Congress
and the courts in deciding whether an amendment has been validly
adopted.16 Debates during the drafting and ratiﬁcation of the Constitution
11. Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 Mich. L. Rev.
621, 632 (1987) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Rule of Recognition].
12. See infra Part I.
13. A “successful” effort to enlist Article V, for purposes of this paper, is one that results
in a new amendment widely understood to have become part of the written Constitution.
In other words, we equate success with sociological legitimacy. And we contend that amendment success is not exclusively or even primarily a function of following the rules laid out in
Article V.
14. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory
of Legal Interpretation 270 (2006) [hereinafter Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty]
(listing the “rules governing . . . constitutional amendment” as an example of “clear and
speciﬁc constitutional text[]”); Richard Albert, Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The
Case of Article V, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1029, 1035 (2014) [hereinafter Albert, Constitutional
Disuse or Desuetude] (“The simplicity and clarity of Article V’s enabling clause allow us to
identify when the Constitution has been formally amended . . . .”); David R. Dow, The Plain
Meaning of Article V, in Responding to Imperfection, supra note 1, at 117, 117 (“The meaning of Article V . . . is an example of yet another text the meaning of which is essentially
clear.”); John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 375, 457–61 (2001) (depicting Article V as privileging “clarity” and “certainty” over
other values).
15. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 730 (1931).
16. See infra section II.A. This is by no means the ﬁrst work to observe that Article V is
vague or underspeciﬁed in certain respects. See, e.g., Richard B. Bernstein with Jerome
Agel, Amending America: If We Love the Constitution So Much, Why Do We Keep Trying
to Change It? 248 (1993) (“The procedures outlined in Article V pose a host of unresolved
difficulties.”); Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the
Amendment Process, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 386, 432 (1983) [hereinafter Dellinger, Legitimacy
of Constitutional Change] (acknowledging that “[t]he spare language of article V leaves
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shed hardly any light on these questions.17 More than two centuries later,
post-ratiﬁcation practice has done little to resolve them, or to establish
much of anything concerning the never-used amendment-through-convention procedure. As a result, the overwhelming majority of amendments
added to the Constitution since 1787 have faced credible challenges to
their validity—challenges that were beaten back by proponents at the time
but that in many respects have never been deﬁnitively dispelled—while
other amendments have plausibly satisﬁed Article V’s formal criteria yet
nevertheless failed to gain widespread acceptance.18
Charles Black once advised Congress that “[f]undamental law should
be not merely of arguable, but of clear legitimacy,” and that accordingly
the “legitimization of constitutional amendments” is an area “where, perhaps more than anywhere else, square corners should be cut.”19 The actual
experience of constitutional amendment throughout U.S. history has
been far messier. Article V contains so many ambiguities and lacunae that
it can be expected to yield, and in fact has yielded, amendments of only
“arguable” legal legitimacy at the time of their adoption.20 Consider, in
this regard, that no fewer than twenty-six of our twenty-seven recognized
amendments failed to comply with a requirement of presidential approval
that Black himself found “plain” on the face of the Constitution.21
open critical questions,” yet contrasting Article V with “open-textured provisions of the
Constitution”). And “some scholars have cited difficulties arising out of the ratiﬁcation of a
handful of constitutional amendments.” Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Of Synchronicity
and Supreme Law, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1220, 1270 n.267 (2019) [hereinafter Prakash, Of
Synchronicity]. So far as we are aware, however, this is the ﬁrst work to document all of the
major unresolved legal questions raised by Article V and to explore their collective signiﬁcance for constitutional law, politics, and theory.
17. See Thornton Anderson, Creating the Constitution: The Convention of 1787 and
the First Congress 161 (1993) (explaining that “the consideration of amending procedures
was one of the least adequate of the Convention debates”); Carlos A. González,
Representational Structures Through Which We the People Ratify Constitutions: The
Troubling Original Understanding of the Constitution’s Ratiﬁcation Clauses, 38 U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 1373, 1444 (2005) (“To the extent that Article V was discussed during the
Philadelphia drafting convention and in the subsequent ratiﬁcation process, only Article V’s
federalism and entrenchment [implications]—whether Article V made amendment too
difficult—were mentioned.”).
18. See infra Part III.
19. Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82
Yale L.J. 189, 190, 209 (1972).
20. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787,
1794–801 (2005) [hereinafter Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution] (deﬁning legal
legitimacy and contrasting it with sociological and moral legitimacy). As this paper uses the
term, an amendment enjoys “legal legitimacy” at the time of its adoption if the amendment’s proposal and ratiﬁcation complied with Article V. A constitutional amendment, or
for that matter an entire constitution, may come to be accepted as authoritative notwithstanding defects under then-existing law in the process by which it was created. See id. at
1803–06.
21. Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 of the Constitution states that “[e]very Order,
Resolution, or Vote” of Congress “shall be presented to the President” and must be
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Recent controversies over the Twenty-Seventh Amendment and the
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) underscore just how many questions
about Article V remain unsettled at this late date.22 The Twenty-Seventh
Amendment was “ratiﬁed” by the requisite number of states nearly 203
years after it was proposed by Congress alongside the amendments that
became the Bill of Rights. As the Supreme Court opined in the 1921 case
Dillon v. Gloss, there is a serious objection that this violates an implicit condition of Article V that ratiﬁcation take place within a reasonable time
frame.23 The Dillon Court speciﬁcally stated that it was “quite untenable”
to think that what is now the Twenty-Seventh Amendment could be revived
“by some future generation.”24 And the Justice Department’s Office of
Legal Counsel disagreed with members of Congress over whether the
Archivist of the United States was required to refer the amendment to
Congress prior to its official certiﬁcation.25
Meanwhile, the ERA has not, at this writing, been accepted by the
legal community as part of the Constitution because several state
ratiﬁcations occurred after a deadline imposed by Congress, among other
complications, even though the amendment seems to have checked all of
the boxes for validity indicated on the face of Article V. In addition to the
ERA, ﬁve amendments have been proposed by Congress but never ratiﬁed
by a sufficient number of states.26 Or, at least, so goes the conventional
wisdom. A recent lawsuit contends that the other amendment proposed
by Congress alongside the current Twenty-Seventh and the Bill of Rights,
regarding congressional apportionment, did receive the requisite number
of ratiﬁcations in the eighteenth century.27 These unsuccessful amendments dwell in a kind of legal purgatory due to the apparent acceptance

approved by the President before it “take[s] Effect.” According to Black, this instruction
would seem to mean, “if plain words can have plain meaning,” that once passed by Congress
a proposed amendment must be approved by the President. Charles L. Black, Jr., On Article
I, Section 7, Clause 3—And the Amendment of the Constitution, 87 Yale L.J. 896, 899 (1978)
[hereinafter Black, On Article I]. Only one amendment has ever received a presidential
signature prior to state ratiﬁcation: President Abraham Lincoln’s on the Thirteenth. See
Harrison, supra note 14, at 389 n.79; infra note 130. The so-called Corwin Amendment,
proposed by Congress in 1861 but never ratiﬁed, was “inadvertently presented” to and then
signed by President James Buchanan. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 630 (1865) (statement of Sen. Trumbull); see also Bernstein with Agel, supra note 16, at 91. The presentment
issue is discussed in detail infra section III.B.
22. For more extensive discussion of both amendments, see infra sections III.K, III.L.3.
23. 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921) (“We conclude that the fair inference or implication from
Article V is that the ratiﬁcation must be within some reasonable time after the proposal.”).
24. Id.
25. See Cong. Pay Amendment, 16 Op. O.L.C. 85, 99–105 (1992); Richard B.
Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment,
61 Fordham L. Rev. 497, 540–41 (1992).
26. See H.R. Doc. No. 110-50, at 29–31 (2007) (listing unratiﬁed amendments).
27. See LaVergne v. U.S. House of Representatives, 392 F. Supp. 3d 108, 114 (D.D.C.
2019) (three-judge court). The dispute hinges on whether Connecticut validly ratiﬁed the
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of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment after its long dormancy. Even more
striking, there is a colorable argument that enough states have “applied”
for a constitutional convention to obligate Congress to call one—even
though few, if any, members of Congress appear to realize this.28
Beyond its intrinsic interest, Article V’s ambiguity carries signiﬁcant
doctrinal and theoretical implications. On the doctrinal side, it points
toward a new defense of, and twist on, the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Coleman v. Miller that Congress has the power to “promulgate” or “proclaim” constitutional amendments after ratiﬁcation.29 Many commentators have criticized Coleman on textual and historical grounds, but the
persistent controversy over the validity of amendments suggests a distinct
prudential rationale for allowing one organ of government to resolve the
status of a new amendment more quickly and democratically than the
Court is capable of. Congress, we suggest, is the branch best suited for this
task—and could further bolster its comparative competence through the
use of subconstitutional mechanisms such as special commissions and
advisory referenda.
On the jurisprudential side, our account informs multiple debates
about constitutional change through and beyond Article V. Because the
success or failure of an attempted amendment bottoms on social
acceptance, which throughout U.S. history has not turned on punctilious
adherence to a set of rules, all constitutional amending in an important
sense takes place “outside” as well as “inside” Article V. Textual and extratextual considerations are entwined right from the start of the law-recognition process. Article V, in consequence, may have more play in the joints
than is typically realized. Given the extreme antidemocratic potential of
the double-supermajoritarian Article V formula, there is a strong case for
what might be called Article V Thayerianism: an interpretive presumption
favoring ease of amendability on those (many) questions that Article V
does not clearly resolve. Vicki Jackson has warned that “sociocultural
beliefs in the difficulty of amendment . . . may contribute to the difficulty
of amendment today,” as claims about the impossibility of amendment
“can become self-fulﬁlling.”30 Our descriptive analysis of Article V bears
out this warning, while our proposed adaptation of Thayerianism furnishes a practical tool for breaking out of the vicious cycle that Jackson
identiﬁes. At the same time, our showing of the constructedness of the
constitutional text holds lessons for constitutional interpretation more

amendment when each house of its legislature approved the amendment seven months
apart, during different legislative sessions. See infra notes 280–288 and accompanying text.
28. See infra section III.M.
29. 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939); see infra section IV.B.
30. Vicki C. Jackson, The (Myth of Un)Amendability of the US Constitution and the
Democratic Component of Constitutionalism, 13 Int’l J. Const. L. 575, 576–77 (2015)
[hereinafter Jackson, The (Myth of Un)Amendability] (emphasis omitted).
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generally, as it undermines some of the positivist premises of originalism
and textualism.31
The paper proceeds in ﬁve parts. Part I sets the general jurisprudential stage by explaining the inherent limits of Article V, or any constitution’s amending clause, to determine which efforts at constitutional
change will be seen as legally valid. Part II catalogs the many questions
about the amendment process that the text of Article V fails to answer, and
it explains that these uncertainties are striking both from a comparative
perspective and because of Article V’s unique function as the gateway to
the constitutional text. Part III provides a historical review of amendment
efforts, which reveals that legally plausible contestation over amendment
validity is the norm in U.S. practice, not the exception, and that many
important questions about the amendment process remain unsettled.
Parts II and III are the empirical centerpiece of the paper. Taken together,
they confound any notion that Article V is a clear32 or “straightforward”33
guide to amendment, even though there is arguably no more fundamental
issue in U.S. law than what is or is not inscribed in the constitutional text.
Moving from deconstruction to reconstruction, Part IV considers doctrinal
implications of this account and argues, in particular, that it provides a
stronger basis for Coleman than the reasons given by the Court. Finally, Part
V explores broader implications for constitutional theory and
interpretation.
I. “EXTERNAL” LIMITS TO ARTICLE V’S (OR ANY AMENDING CLAUSE’S)
RESOLVING POWER
The main descriptive burden of this paper is to demonstrate that
Article V of the U.S. Constitution is signiﬁcantly less clear and constraining, and therefore signiﬁcantly less determinative of the success or failure
of attempted amendments, than is generally assumed. But before turning
to those claims, let us imagine a hypothetical country, Sovereignia, with an
amending clause in its written constitution, known as Article X, that is as
precise as a legal directive can be, spelling out in meticulous detail and
with meticulous care the requirements for any amendment to be added.
Would the requirements of Article X, in themselves, dictate which
attempted amendments are considered part of the supreme law of
Sovereignia?
They would not be capable of doing this for at least two reasons. First,
in the terminology of Friedrich Waismann, the sort of language used in

31. On all points previewed in this paragraph, see infra Part V.
32. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Constitutional Change and Constitutional
Legitimation: The Example of German Uniﬁcation, 31 Hous. L. Rev. 1027, 1088 (1994)
(“Article V sets out a relatively straightforward process for changing the Constitution.”).
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any amending clause might be “open texture[d].”34 Even the most “carefully delimited empirical terms,” according to Waismann, “might nevertheless produce uncertainty in the face of unforeseen and virtually
unimaginable instances.”35 And because legal rules are written in and
dependent on “empirical” language, law might necessarily be open textured as well—not just in a system that treats legal rules as defeasible but
also in one that treats the literal meaning of rules as binding in all cases,
without exceptions or modiﬁcations to avoid absurd or unjust outcomes.36
If this is right, then no matter how detailed the drafting of Article X or
how rigid Sovereignia’s interpretive culture, the potential for future
uncertainty based on unanticipated developments will remain. When such
developments arise, the plain meaning of Article X will run out; any resulting disputes as to the validity of an amendment will have to be resolved
with reference to something other than the internal resources of Article
X.37
Second, and more fundamentally, even if no confusion ever arises as
to the meaning of Article X, nothing contained within Article X or any
other clause of Sovereignia’s constitution can explain why Article X is
treated as the authoritative means of amending the constitution—or
ensure that it will continue to be treated this way in the future. It is always
possible that the citizens and officials of Sovereignia will decide one day to
interpret Article X in a less literal manner; or to recognize alternative
amendment rules as equally authoritative; or to deny the validity of an
amendment that indisputably satisﬁed the requirements of Article X; or to
ignore the requirements of Article X altogether (as the Founding generation of Americans effectively did with the amendment procedures in the

34. Friedrich Waismann, Veriﬁability, in Logic and Language: First and Second Series
117, 119–20 (Antony Flew ed., 1951).
35. Frederick Schauer, On the Open Texture of Law, 87 Grazer Philosophische
Studien 197, 198 (2013) [hereinafter Schauer, Open Texture] (discussing Waismann’s
ideas); see also Stewart Shapiro & Craige Roberts, Open Texture and Analyticity, in
Friedrich Waismann: The Open Texture of Analytic Philosophy 189, 192 (Dejan Makovec
& Stewart Shapiro eds., 2019) (describing open texture as “a kind of semantic indeterminacy” that cannot be ruled out in advance “since we do not know where the indeterminacy
comes from”). Waismann was not entirely clear what he meant by associating open texture
with “empirical” terms and concepts, see Joost Jacob Vecht, Open Texture Clariﬁed,
Inquiry, July 2020, at 4, but no one seems to dispute that codiﬁed legal language qualiﬁes
as empirical in his sense.
36. See Schauer, Open Texture, supra note 35, at 202 (“If Waismann’s idea is sound,
then open texture is indeed an ineliminable feature of law . . . precisely because it is
ineliminable in language.”).
37. Although we ﬁnd his formulation helpful, we do not mean to endorse all of
Waismann’s ideas or to wade into debates about open texture in the philosophy of language.
The point here is simply that even the clearest amendment rule conceivable may give rise
to legal underdeterminacy.
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Articles of Confederation38); or to ignore their written constitution altogether. That the people of Sovereignia treat Article X as the exclusive gateway to constitutional amendment is a contingent social fact, subject to
change whether or not Article X itself changes. All constitutions and all
constitutional provisions, as Frederick Schauer and others following
H.L.A. Hart have detailed, “owe their ‘constitutionality’ to logically and
politically antecedent conditions” that “are not themselves legal or constitutional in any important sense.”39 Article X may inform the rule of recognition in Sovereignia with respect to the validity of constitutional
amendments.40 But the ultimate rule of recognition determining what is
and is not considered the law of Sovereignia, or any other system, is
predicated on public acceptance.41
None of the above is meant to be controversial. The practical-minded
reader might fairly ask, though, how much these conceptual caveats matter. In countries such as the United States, one particular amending clause
has been treated as the gateway to the constitutional text. While many

38. The Articles of Confederation required any amendment to “be agreed to in a
Congress of the United States, and be afterwards conﬁrmed by the legislatures of every
State.” Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. XIII, para. 1. On the Constitution proposed
by the Philadelphia Convention as a violation of this requirement, see Bruce Ackerman &
Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 475, 479–80 (1995); Richard
S. Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 Const. Comment. 57, 67–70 (1987). Even a constitution that purported to make itself “unalterable,” such as the constitution for the
Carolinas drafted by John Locke, Fundamental Consts. of Carolina of 1669, art. 120, could
in practice be amended if there were sufficient public and official support.
39. Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions, supra note 3, at 160–61; see also, e.g.,
Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Rules of Recognition, Constitutional Controversies,
and the Dizzying Dependence of Law on Acceptance, in The Rule of Recognition and the
U.S. Constitution 175, 192 (Matthew Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009) (noting
“the unavoidable dependence of law on the nonlegal environment in which it exists, not
simply to decide how law should be interpreted . . . but more broadly to determine just what
is to count as law and what is not”); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously:
Reﬂections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221,
1291 (1995) (“Ultimately, one must step outside the Constitution—as with any legal text—
to identify criteria for legitimating that body of law . . . .”).
40. But cf. Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the
Extraconstitutional Rule of Recognition, in The Rule of Recognition and the U.S.
Constitution, supra note 39, at 69, 73 (observing that “one must look outside the
Constitution itself for the rules and standards governing how amendments are recognized
as having satisﬁed the criteria” of an amending clause).
41. See Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions, supra note 3, at 150 (“The ultimate
rule of recognition is a matter of social fact, and so determining it is for empirical investigation rather than legal analysis.”); Young, supra note 5, at 422 (describing the ultimate rule
of recognition as “predicated on social acceptance”); see also H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of
Law 97–120 (1961) (discussing the “ultimate rule of recognition” in similar terms). We
bracket the questions of exactly how and by whom a norm must be “accepted” to qualify as
legally valid or sociologically legitimate. Cf. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, supra
note 20, at 1805 (“elid[ing]” the same questions).
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argue that the small-c constitution, or the “constitution in practice,”42 has
been updated through judicial rulings, framework statutes, and more, no
one seriously suggests that the big-C or written Constitution has been
revised through a process that does not purport to comply with Article V.43
The requirements of a clear and concrete amending clause, widely seen as
the deﬁnitive route to formal constitutional change, could go a very long
way toward determining which attempted amendments are accepted as
valid and which are not.
In principle, then, the success or failure of attempted amendments
rests unavoidably on extralegal or prelegal foundations. But in practice,
such success or failure might, in certain systems, be tightly tied to the rules
of an amending clause, so that the sociological legitimacy as well as the
legality of amendments is in effect a function of their ﬁt with those rules.
Alternatively, an amending clause might contain vague language yet nonetheless give rise to a body of law that supplies determinate legal answers to
the vast majority of real world questions raised by amendment efforts.44
Is either true of the United States?
II. “INTERNAL” LIMITS TO ARTICLE V’S RESOLVING POWER: TEXT
The short answer is no. This Part ﬁrst tours the many ambiguities and
lacunae in Article V’s text, before discussing why these underdeterminacies are so signiﬁcant.45 The next Part then surveys the history of successful constitutional amendments to show that the lived experience of
Article V has been, and continues to be, beset by legal uncertainty.
A.

Interpretive Puzzles
Article V provides in full:

42. David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 Harv. L. Rev.
1457, 1459 (2001) [hereinafter Strauss, Irrelevance of Amendments] (noting the distinction
between “the small-‘c’ constitution—the fundamental political institutions of a society, or
the constitution in practice—and the document itself”); see also Primus, Unbundling
Constitutionality, supra note 5, at 1082 (associating the small-c constitution with “the web
of documents, practices, institutions, norms, and traditions that structure American
government”).
43. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text.
44. See Kent Greenawalt, How Law Can Be Determinate, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 56–62
(1990) (discussing circumstances in which “open-ended” constitutional directives can yield
determinate legal answers).
45. We describe Article V as “underdeterminate,” rather than “indeterminate,”
because it does have a core of relatively clear meaning. Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, On the
Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 462, 473 (1987) (distinguishing between underdeterminacy and indeterminacy in law). Essentially every reader of
Article V agrees, for instance, that the “Houses” of Congress referenced therein are the U.S.
Senate and House of Representatives rather than, say, the personal residences of individual
members.
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The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on
the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several
States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes,
as Part of this Constitution, when ratiﬁed by the Legislatures of
three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratiﬁcation may
be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment
which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight
hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the ﬁrst and fourth
Clauses in the Ninth Section of the ﬁrst Article; and that no State,
without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the
Senate.46
This run-on sentence immediately presents a host of puzzles that, the
next Part shows, are not clearly resolved by context. Bracketing for the
moment all issues regarding how “a Convention for proposing
Amendments” is supposed to work, consider the following questions
raised by each clause in order.
• “two thirds of both Houses”: Does this voting rule require the support
of two-thirds of each chamber, voting separately, or two-thirds of
the total membership of Congress, voting together?47 And does it
require the support of two-thirds of all members of the House and
Senate or only the support of two-thirds of those present, assuming
there is a quorum? Or two-thirds of those present and voting, such
that abstaining members can contribute to the quorum without
46. U.S. Const. art. V. The text reproduced here and in other quotations of the
Constitution is drawn from the parchment version on display in the National Archives. As
noted above, a distinct version of the Constitution was printed and distributed to the states,
which may be more authoritative because it was voted upon by state ratifying conventions.
See supra note 10; see also Denys P. Myers, For a Master File of the Constitution, in S. Doc.
No. 87-49, at 67, 70–71 (1961) (noting “slight” discrepancies among the texts that were
voted on by the state conventions). These two versions contain numerous differences in
capitalization and punctuation; for a list of all the variations in Article V, see Philip Huff,
The Constitution of the United States: A Variorum 21–22 (Apr. 15, 2017), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2778049 [https://perma.cc/947X-52J9] (unpublished manuscript). In addition, a
third version of the Constitution was printed on September 18, 1787, “at the Philadelphia
Convention’s behest,” and “formed the basis for the earliest newspaper printings of the
Constitution.” Philip Huff, How Different Are the Early Versions of the United States
Constitution? An Examination, 20 Green Bag 2d 163, 165 (2017). That version contained a
signiﬁcant typo in Article V. It said that Congress could not regulate the slave trade prior to
the year 1708 rather than 1808—rendering the provision inoperative. Id. at 171–72. The
typo was corrected in most, but not all, early newspaper and pamphlet printings
disseminated to the public as the debates over ratiﬁcation began. See Leonard Rapport,
Printing the Constitution: The Convention and Newspaper Imprints, August–November
1787, Prologue, Fall 1970, at 69, 82–83. This all goes to show yet again that the literal identity
of “the constitutional text” rests on extratextual foundations.
47. See Dow, supra note 14, at 118 (noting this ambiguity); Kay, Formal and Informal
Amendment, supra note 6, at 244 (same). In several other places, the Constitution uses the
clearer phrase “Each House.” E.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cls. 1–3.
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counting in the denominator for the two-thirds calculation?48 Must
both chambers vote on an amendment within a single session? If
not, does an amendment passed by one chamber remain pending
and available for approval by the other chamber indeﬁnitely?
Once an amendment has cleared the two-thirds hurdle (however
understood) and been “propose[d]” to the states, may Congress
rescind it?49 If so, does rescission likewise require two-thirds supermajorities?50
“shall deem it necessary”: What does it mean for an amendment to
be “necessary”? Is Congress required to make any kind of ﬁnding
of necessity in the process of promulgating an amendment?51 Is
such a ﬁnding, whether express or implicit, a legal determination
reviewable by a court?
“Amendments”: Is there any limitation on the scope of permissible
constitutional reforms implicit in this term? Could an entirely new
Constitution be passed through Article V’s procedures, or would
that no longer constitute an “Amendment”? Does the choice of
the term “Amendment” suggest that constitutional changes pursued through Article V must be incremental and limited to a “perfecting” role?52

48. See Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 361, 409 (2004) (“The framers . . . blundered by leaving open the critical interpretive question whether the express majority quorum for ordinary majority voting still
obtains where the Constitution requires a supermajority of the votes cast.”). An additional
set of puzzles, not speciﬁc to the amendment process, concerns how to calculate a quorum
if a large proportion of Congress is incapacitated or deceased. See Howard M. Wasserman,
Continuity of Congress: A Play in Three Stages, 53 Cath. U. L. Rev. 949, 959 (2004) (“The
Constitution does not deﬁne whether the quorum requires a majority of authorized seats in
a house or a majority of occupied seats, of living, selected, and sworn members of that
house.”).
49. Compare, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 456 (2005)
[hereinafter Amar, America’s Constitution] (yes), with John Alexander Jameson, A Treatise
on Constitutional Conventions: Their History, Powers, and Modes of Proceeding 634 (4th
ed. 1887) (no).
50. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The
Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 Yale L.J. 677, 728–29 (1993)
[hereinafter Paulsen, A General Theory] (arguing in the affirmative while noting alternative
possibilities).
51. See 1 Annals of Cong. 430 (1789) (statement of Rep. Vining) (contending that
both houses must agree that an amendment is “necessary” before deliberating on a
proposal).
52. See Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change,
88 Mich. L. Rev. 239, 300–01 (1989) (arguing that most Framers and ratiﬁers envisioned
amendments as limited to a “perfecting” role); see also Thomas M. Cooley, The Power to
Amend the Federal Constitution, 2 Mich. L.J. 109, 118 (1893) (“[A]n amendment . . . in the
very nature of the case, must be in harmony with the thing amended, so far at least as concerns its general spirit and purpose.”); Walter F. Murphy, Merlin’s Memory: The Past and
Future Imperfect of the Once and Future Polity, in Responding to Imperfection, supra note
1, at 163, 177 (“The word amend . . . means to correct or improve; amend does not mean ‘to
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“ratiﬁed”: When and how must a state legislature “ratify” an
amendment for that ratiﬁcation to be effective? Is there a time
limit? Must both houses of a bicameral state legislature approve an
amendment in the same legislative session? Must they adopt a simple majority voting threshold, or can they set their own voting procedures?53 Does it matter if those procedures are contained in the
state constitution? And must each state legislature vote on the
identical text, or can differences in punctuation or wording defeat
ratiﬁcation of an amendment?
“Legislature”: What is a “Legislature” for purposes of Article V? If
the people of a state participate directly in the process of making
laws, can they qualify as the “Legislature”?54 May a state hold an
advisory or binding referendum on ratiﬁcation? If the state governor plays a role in the normal legislative process, must the governor play the same role in the Article V process?55 If the lieutenant
governor may break a tie in the state senate for other matters, like
the Vice President does at the federal level, may the lieutenant
governor cast a tiebreaking vote for ratiﬁcation?56
“three fourths”: How should “three fourths” be understood in circumstances where the denominator is not cleanly divisible by
four?57 If a state initially rejects a proposed amendment, can the

deconstitute and reconstitute,’ to replace one system with another or abandon its primary
principles.”); Roman J. Hoyos, Article V and the Law of Constitutional Conventions 28–29
(2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3723119 [https://perma.cc/74ZL-3FA9] (unpublished
manuscript) (maintaining that “the 1787 convention’s decision to use the term amendment
rather than alteration suggests that Article V does not envision a general revision power”).
53. See Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1304 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (three-judge court)
(“[T]he Constitution is totally silent with respect to the procedure which . . . each state legislature . . . should follow in performing its ratifying function.”). This question is important
because of the wide variety of procedures followed by states to ratify an Article V amendment. See Matt Gehring, Rsch. Dep’t, Minn. House of Reps., United States Constitutional
Amendment Process: Legal Principles for State Legislators 15–37, 52–55 (2016), https://
www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/conamendlegal.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU3G-HQ6W]
(collecting state constitutional provisions and legislative rules).
54. Cf. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 813–
24 (2015) (answering in the affirmative in the Elections Clause context).
55. See Herman V. Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States During the First Century of Its History, in 2 Annual Report of the American
Historical Association for the Year 1896, at 5, 297 (1897) (“There has been a great lack of
uniformity in the actual practice by the governors of the States in this respect.”).
56. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 447 (1939) (dividing equally on whether this
question is justiciable).
57. In the First Congress, a Senate committee apparently took the position that “nine
states out of thirteen had sufficed to ratify the Bill of Rights,” even though three-fourths of
thirteen is 9.75. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789–
1801, at 208 (1997) [hereinafter Currie, The Federalist Period] (citing 6 Annals of Cong.
1537 (1797)). South Carolina Representative Robert Goodloe Harper countered with the
arresting claim that “there must be twelve ratifying States to be three-fourths [of fourteen],
as intended by the Constitution, because that number would be three-fourths of sixteen,
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state later change its mind and be counted toward three-fourths
(and, if so, how)? Conversely, once a state has ratiﬁed an amendment, can it subsequently rescind its ratiﬁcation (and, if so, how)?
What if only one house of the state legislature votes to rescind ratiﬁcation? If new states join the Union while an amendment is
pending, do they necessarily affect the numerator and
denominator?
• “Conventions”: If an amendment is ratiﬁed by state conventions
rather than legislatures, who chooses the process to be followed—
Congress or each state? Are there any limits or requirements
regarding how a convention is to operate? How are the delegates
to such conventions selected? Can a statewide referendum or
other plebiscitary process qualify as a “convention”?
• “one or the other Mode of Ratiﬁcation”: Does Congress have complete
discretion in specifying which mode of ratiﬁcation shall be followed? Or are there certain sorts of amendments that must be ratiﬁed pursuant to certain modes? When choosing a mode of
ratiﬁcation, may Congress put a time limit on it (and, if so, how)?
Once in place, may such time limits be extended (and, if so, how)?
For example, does the imposition or modiﬁcation of a deadline
require a two-thirds vote?
These are some of the uncertainties that are apparent on the face of
Article V and, as the next Part details, have given rise to legal controversy.
If one burrows into the text’s silences and elisions, the uncertainties
compound. For instance, is Article V the sole method of amendment consistent with the Constitution, or does the Constitution preserve for “We
the People” the option to amend the text through other routes, such as a
national referendum?58 Apart from the procedures used, are there substantive limits on acceptable amendments implicit in the constitutional
structure or in the concept of popular sovereignty?59 For example, could
which was the nearest number to fourteen capable of four equal divisions.” 6 Annals of
Cong. 2281 (1797).
58. The most famous argument for an unenumerated constitutional “right” to amend
the document outside Article V belongs to Amar. See supra notes 4, 7 and accompanying
text. As Amar notes, Article V “emphatically does not say that it is the only way to revise the
Constitution.” Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 3, at 459. Amar concedes that
government officials are stuck with Article V; his argument applies only to “People-driven”
amendment efforts. Id. at 460. For a prominent rebuttal of Amar on textual and historical
grounds, see Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and
Constitutional Amendment, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 121, 130–73 (1996).
59. For illustrative discussions of this issue, see Richard Albert, America’s Amoral
Constitution, 70 Am. U. L. Rev. 773, 786 (2021) (arguing that “nothing in America’s modern Constitution is legally immune to change”); Douglas Linder, What in the Constitution
Cannot Be Amended?, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 717, 733 (1981) (arguing that the amending power
remains limited by Article V’s express prohibition against restructuring the Senate and by
an implied prohibition against amendments that “create any new limitations on the amending power” itself); Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. Cal. L.
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the First Amendment be repealed, or is it too fundamental to the republican underpinnings of the constitutional project?60 Could an amendment
change the amendment process or make itself unamendable? If not, does
it follow that the one unexpired substantive limit stated in the text of
Article V—the ﬁnal clause providing that no amendment shall deprive a
state of “equal Suffrage” in the Senate without its consent—is void?61
An additional set of uncertainties involves the legal role of the
President. There is no express mention of the executive branch in Article
V. But Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 of the Constitution seems to demand
that every order, resolution, or vote requiring the concurrence of the
House and Senate be presented to the President for approval.62 Must every
Article V amendment, then, be presented to the President before being
transmitted to the states for ratiﬁcation? If so, does the President have the
power to veto a proposed amendment?
Yet another fertile source of uncertainty is the provision for a stateinitiated convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, which
has never been successfully invoked.63 Article V says virtually nothing about
how this process works. How does a state submit an “application” to
Congress?64 May a state rescind an application once submitted? Do applications for a convention remain pending in perpetuity, or do they expire
after some period of time? Can the states call a “limited” convention to
craft amendments for a particular purpose, or even to propose a speciﬁc
Rev. 703, 754–57 (1980) (arguing that amendments must be consistent with human dignity
to be valid); John R. Vile, Limitations on the Constitutional Amending Process, 2 Const.
Comment. 373, 380–87 (1985) [hereinafter Vile, Limitations on the Amending Process]
(disputing Linder’s and Murphy’s positions).
60. See, e.g., John Rawls, Political Liberalism 239 (expanded ed. 2005) (suggesting that
an “amendment to repeal the First Amendment and replace it with its opposite” should be
deemed “invalid” by the Court); Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 3, at 505 (contending that repealing the core of the First Amendment would be “unconstitutional . . .
despite formal compliance with Article V”).
61. See Linder, supra note 59, at 722–28 (reviewing arguments to this effect); see also
Vile, Limitations on the Amending Process, supra note 59, at 379 (explaining that some
members of Congress argued in the period leading up to the Civil War “that the equal suffrage provision is not legally binding” but rather “a mere declaration”). The other substantive limit stated in the text of Article V (“no Amendment which may be made prior to [1808]
shall in any Manner affect the ﬁrst and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the ﬁrst
Article”) has been a legal nullity since 1808.
62. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 3; see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
63. For broad attempts to think through many of these uncertainties, see generally
Russell L. Caplan, Constitutional Brinksmanship: Amending the Constitution by National
Convention (1988); John R. Vile, Conventional Wisdom: The Alternate Article V
Mechanism for Proposing Amendments to the U.S. Constitution (2016); Arthur Jacobson,
John C. Maloney, Jr. & Kenneth F. Ripple, Article V and the Proposed Federal Constitutional
Convention Procedures Bills: Report and Recommendation to the New York State Bar
Association by the Committee on Federal Constitution, 3 Cardozo L. Rev. 529 (1982).
64. Cf. Harisay v. Clarno, 474 P.3d 378, 379 (Or. 2020) (determining, as “an issue of
ﬁrst impression,” that Oregonians’ “initiative power” does not “authorize the people to
directly apply for a federal constitutional convention”).
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amendment, or would a convention have plenary power to devise any
amendments it wants?65 If a limited convention is permissible, how similar
must the various state applications be to trigger such a convention? Does
Congress have any discretion in determining whether a convention should
be called or in specifying its procedures and the scope of its authority?
How would delegates to such a convention be apportioned and selected?
What internal procedures would the convention follow to draft and
approve amendments? Would the delegates vote by state, as in the
Philadelphia Convention, or according to some population-based formula? Whatever the answer to these questions, note that the product of
any such convention would be submitted to the states, thus layering on top
of these uncertainties all of the uncertainties regarding the state ratiﬁcation process cataloged above.
The ﬁnal lacuna in Article V, which Part IV revisits, is in some ways
the most fundamental. Given the myriad puzzles raised by the text, it will
often be unclear whether the requirements of Article V have been
satisﬁed. Who decides, then, whether an amendment has been validly
promulgated? If there is a disagreement among the branches, does any
branch have the ultimate say? And does an amendment become effective
as soon as the ﬁnal state needed to reach three-fourths ratiﬁes it, or only
when ratiﬁcation has been conﬁrmed by the appropriate federal organ?
B.

Putting These Puzzles in Perspective

There are many provisions of the Constitution that are vague or
underdeterminate in certain respects and many questions of constitutional law that have not yet been resolved by the Supreme Court. What is
special about the case of Article V? Two things, we think: the extent of the
underdeterminacy and the function of Article V in our constitutional order.
The sheer number of questions about constitutional amendment that
Article V leaves open is striking. The questions, moreover, are not limited
to subsidiary or minor matters. The silences and ambiguities of Article V—
How many members of Congress must vote on an amendment? How long
may an amendment remain pending? How is a state ratifying convention
to be constituted? Does the President have a role? Is there anything an
65. See Robert G. Natelson, Proposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention:
Rules Governing the Process, 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 693, 715 (2011) (“Perhaps no Article V question has been debated so ﬁercely, on so little evidence, as whether applying states may limit
the scope of a convention for proposing amendments.”). Compare Michael B. Rappaport,
The Constitutionality of a Limited Convention: An Originalist Analysis, 81 Const. Comment.
53, 56 (2012) (contending “that the original meaning of the Constitution allows for limited
conventions” and “forbids runaway conventions”), with Michael Leachman & David A.
Super, Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, States Likely Could Not Control Constitutional
Convention on Balanced Budget Amendment or Other Issues 2 (2017), https://
www.cbpp.org/sites/default/ﬁles/atoms/ﬁles/7-16-14sfp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/22GZM389] (“There is no guarantee that a convention could be limited to a particular set of
issues . . . .”).
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amendment cannot change?—go to the heart of the amendment process
and the conception of popular sovereignty that it embodies.
It is difficult to nail down the extent to which Article V, or any legal
directive, is underdeterminate. But perhaps some headway can be made
by drawing two comparisons. The ﬁrst is to other structural provisions of
the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution devotes more than six times the
number of words to presidential eligibility and elections as it does to constitutional amendments, going into such niceties as what constitutes a
quorum and how electoral votes are to be transmitted to the capital.66 The
Constitution devotes nearly three times as many words to the rules for dealing with presidential vacancies and disabilities.67 Both of these other processes have generated high-proﬁle legal controversies of their own,
including in and around the 2020 presidential race.68 But much more
often, they have generated legally uninteresting compliance, whether
because their language is more determinate than that of Article V, because
frequency of usage enhances legal clarity over time, or both. At a minimum, the Constitution’s treatment of presidential change, as compared to
its treatment of constitutional change, shows that its authors were capable
of greater procedural speciﬁcity when they wished.
Moreover, the legal uncertainty associated with Article V is not just a
product of a spare text and limited precedent. It also follows from the
absence of an authoritative interpreter. For most provisions of the
Constitution, as every U.S. law student learns, the federal judiciary is widely
understood (and understands itself) to enjoy interpretive supremacy.69
When the judiciary has recognized exceptions to this rule, it is generally
on account of “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department.”70 Thus, while the Constitution
is vague about many details of the impeachment process, the Supreme
Court accepts that the Senate has “the sole Power to try all
Impeachments.”71 By contrast, the Court, Congress, and the executive
66. Compare U.S. Const. art. V (143 words), with id. art. II, § 1, cls. 1–5, (479 words),
and id. amend. XII (398 words).
67. Compare id. art. V (143 words), with id. amend. XXV (388 words).
68. See Ann Gerhart, Election Results Under Attack: Here Are the Facts, Wash. Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/elections/interactive/2020/election-integrity/ (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Mar. 11, 2021) (compiling Electoral College
challenges pursued by the Trump campaign and allied groups); Brett Samuels, Pence
Rejects Calls to Invoke 25th Amendment to Remove Trump, Hill (Jan. 12, 2021),
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/533957-pence-rejects-calls-to-invoke-25thamendment [https://perma.cc/YVL6-F9Q9] (describing House Democrats’ claims that
President Trump was unable to discharge the duties of the office).
69. See David E. Pozen & Adam M. Samaha, Anti-Modalities, 119 Mich. L. Rev. 729,
769–70 (2021) (documenting this feature of the U.S. system). This is not to deny that “many
different government bodies and civil-society groups contribute to the long-run development of constitutional law.” Id. at 770.
70. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
71. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229–38 (1993).
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branch have each, at times, claimed interpretive primacy over the question
whether an amendment has become part of the Constitution.72
The second comparison that throws some light on the extent of
Article V’s underdeterminacy is to amending clauses in other democracies’ written constitutions. Consider Canada. As Walter Dellinger has
observed, the “detailed provisions” of the “Canadian amendment procedures . . . answer several perplexing questions that Article V of the
American Constitution has left to speculation.”73 The Canadian text makes
clear that a “proposed amendment lapses unless ratiﬁed by the requisite
number of assemblies within three years of the adoption of the resolution
which initiated the amendment procedure.”74 The approval of an amendment may be revoked at any time before the amendment is proclaimed.75
The amendment process is not itself amendable, except with the agreement of every province and the federal parliament.76 Pursuant to an
“intricate” framework elaborated across a dozen subsections, “[e]ach of
Canada’s ﬁve formal amendment procedures is specially designated for
amending speciﬁc constitutional provisions.”77
Canada’s amendment scheme may be particularly well reticulated,
but many other constitutions around the world specify time limits for
ratiﬁcation of amendments,78 substantive limits on their content,79 and
distinct procedures for different categories of amendments.80 Within the
72. See infra notes 265–272 and accompanying text; infra section IV.B.
73. Walter Dellinger, The Amending Process in Canada and the United States: A
Comparative Perspective, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1982, at 283, 298 [hereinafter
Dellinger, A Comparative Perspective]. Canada’s amendment rules are laid out in
Procedure for Amending Constitution of Canada, Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
74. Dellinger, A Comparative Perspective, supra note 73, at 299. This time limit applies
to one of Canada’s ﬁve amendment procedures. See Richard Albert, The Structure of
Constitutional Amendment Rules, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 913, 944–45 (2014) [hereinafter
Albert, Structure of Amendment Rules].
75. Dellinger, A Comparative Perspective, supra note 73, at 299.
76. Id. at 299–300.
77. Albert, Structure of Amendment Rules, supra note 74, at 921, 945.
78. See id. at 952 (explaining that “temporal limitations” on the amendment process
“are commonly entrenched in written constitutions”).
79. See Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments—The Migration
and Success of a Constitutional Idea, 61 Am. J. Compar. L. 657, 660 (2013) (discussing “the
global trend . . . towards accepting the idea of limitations—explicit or implicit—on constitutional amendment power”).
80. See Markus Böckenförde, Int’l Inst. for Democracy & Electoral Assistance,
Constitutional Amendment Procedures 13 (2d ed. 2017), https://www.idea.int/sites/
default/ﬁles/publications/constitutional-amendment-procedures-primer.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5AT7-JCFS] (“In an attempt to identify the right balance between rigidity and ﬂexibility in constitutional amendments, many constitutions offer different thresholds for different parts of the constitution.”). There is a burgeoning literature comparing
the design of constitutional amendment rules. See, e.g., Albert, Structure of Amendment
Rules, supra note 74; Joel Colón-Ríos, Introduction: The Forms and Limits of Constitutional
Amendments, 13 Int’l J. Const. L. 567 (2015); Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Amendment
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United States, most state constitutions likewise have amending clauses that
are signiﬁcantly more detailed and precise than Article V.81 Other
democracies’ amending clauses, meanwhile, seem less perplexing than
Article V not because their procedures are more detailed and precise but
rather because they are simpler and more streamlined—employing what
Richard Albert calls a “comprehensive single-track framework.”82
This is far from a complete survey, of course, and textual comparisons
across constitutions of different ages and lengths are vexed. Our point is
merely that the revision rules in many other constitutions seem on their
face to raise fewer interpretive puzzles than does Article V. Even the most
carefully crafted amending clause cannot foreclose future uncertainty, as
Part I explains, and disputes about the meaning of such clauses are bound
to arise sooner or later in Canada and elsewhere.83 But we think it is fair to
say that, both globally and domestically, the U.S. Constitution stands out
in just how many questions about the amendment process it leaves to
“speculation.”84
The fact that Article V is so underdeterminate would not necessarily
matter much if it were addressed to some obscure issue of governance. But
the topic of Article V could hardly be more important. Unlike other vague
provisions in the Constitution, Article V sets out the rules of formal constitutional change and thereby constitutes the constitutional text itself. As
Bruce Ackerman explains, Article V can be seen as “the most fundamental
text of our Constitution, since it seeks to tell us the conditions under which
all constitutional texts and principles may be legitimately transformed.”85
In Gordon Wood’s words, Americans “institutionalized and legitimized
revolution” by enabling sweeping social change through a preestablished

Rules: A Comparative Perspective, in Comparative Constitutional Law 96 (Tom Ginsburg &
Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011).
81. For a thorough inventory of every U.S. state’s constitutional amendment rules,
see
Amending
State
Constitutions,
Ballotpedia,
https://ballotpedia.org/
Amending_state_constitutions [https://perma.cc/5TJ4-QRRS] (last visited Aug. 5, 2021).
The amending clause in our home state of New York, for example, is over ﬁve times as long
as Article V. N.Y. Const. art. XIX (807 words).
82. See Albert, Structure of Amendment Rules, supra note 74, at 937–39 (categorizing
ten of the thirty-six democracies in his study as adopting such a framework and noting that
it “has the virtue of clarity”).
83. Cf. Otto Pfersmann, Comparative Hermeneutics of Constitutional Revision Clauses
and the Question of Structural Closure of Legal Systems, 40 Cardozo L. Rev. 3191, 3194–96
(2019) (discussing “interpretative problems” common to all constitutional revision clauses).
84. Dellinger, A Comparative Perspective, supra note 73, at 298.
85. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale L.J.
1013, 1058 (1984) [hereinafter Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution].
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legal process.86 Constitutions are often described as focal points that coordinate expectations87 and “channel disputes.”88 The underdeterminacy of
Article V threatens these coordination and channeling functions by eliciting reasonable disagreement not just about the Constitution’s meaning
but also about its very terms.
During the Constitutional Convention of 1787, James Madison made
a similar observation. He urged that the amendment process be made
clearer because “difficulties might arise as to the form, the quorum &c.
which in Constitutional regulations ought to be as much as possible
avoided.”89 This is not just an American instinct. The European
Commission for Democracy Through Law (known as the Venice
Commission), which advises the Council of Europe on constitutional matters, concluded in its 2009 report on constitutional amendment procedures that “[r]ules and procedures on constitutional amendment should
be as clear and simple as possible, so as not to give rise to problems and
disputes of their own.”90
It is an interesting question whether and under what circumstances
this conclusion should be qualiﬁed on account of the potential beneﬁts of
uncertainty. Ackerman, for instance, has suggested that wise constitutional
drafters will follow the U.S. Framers in recognizing “the limited extent to
which they [can] legitimately specify the higher lawmaking procedures to
be followed by succeeding generations.”91 As Part V discusses, some play
in the joints may help keep the amendment process from thwarting
change that is overwhelmingly desired by the people. Regardless, the point
remains that signiﬁcant amounts of legal uncertainty concerning a purportedly exclusive constitutional amendment clause raise very different—
and potentially more destabilizing—issues than such uncertainty
surrounding, say, a rights guarantee.92

86. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787, at 614
(1969). Note that Wood’s characterization of Article V implicitly rejects the idea that amendments are limited to an incremental, “perfecting” role. See supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
87. See Pozen & Samaha, supra note 69, at 793 n.313 (collecting sources).
88. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,
42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373, 427 (2007).
89. 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 630 (Max Farrand ed., 1937);
see also supra note 19 (quoting Charles Black to similar effect). Madison was talking specifically about the convention procedure, but his general point—that the amendment rules
ought to be as clear as possible—applies equally to the whole of Article V.
90. Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Final Draft Report on Constitutional
Amendment Procedures 46 (2009), https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/
default.aspx?pdffile=CDL(2009)168-e [https://perma.cc/9PUH-C8SZ].
91. Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, supra note 85, at 1058.
92. Cf. Cong. Pay Amendment, 16 Op. O.L.C. 85, 95 (1992) (“The very functioning of
the government would be clouded if Article V, which governs the fundamental process of
constitutional change, consisted of ‘open-ended’ principles without ﬁxed applications.”).
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III. “INTERNAL” LIMITS TO ARTICLE V’S RESOLVING POWER: PRECEDENT
A skeptic may respond at this juncture: Even if one can conjure up an
array of interpretive puzzles when squinting at the text of Article V in isolation, surely most of the important issues have been cleared up by a quarter millennium of historical practice and judicial doctrine. The law of
Article V, in other words, might be considerably clearer than the language
of Article V. We turn in this Part to that body of law and demonstrate that
the skeptic’s response misses the mark. Ever since the Founding, amendments of uncertain legal validity have been the norm in the United States,
not the exception. According to the conventions of mainstream constitutional reasoning, the overwhelming majority of recognized amendments
had signiﬁcant arguable legal inﬁrmities at the time of their adoption.93
And still to this day, the “gloss” of judicial and nonjudicial precedent has
not cleared up many of the uncertainties regarding the operation of
Article V that the previous Part discusses.
The best way to establish these points, we believe, is to review the history of debates over the validity of amendments that are widely seen to
have become part of the constitutional text. If anything, focusing on successful efforts to amend the Constitution ought to bias our results toward
suggesting greater clarity and settlement about the Article V process than
really exists. But even the successful amendments, it turns out, have left a
legacy of legal contestation and confusion.
A.

The Bill of Rights

The story of legally dubious amendments begins at the beginning,
with the Bill of Rights.94 The most serious concern with the procedure used
for these amendments is that the First Congress did not present them to
President Washington for his consideration before they went to the states
93. A qualiﬁer such as “arguable” is unavoidable here because one cannot adjudicate
all of these issues without a full-blown theory of constitutional interpretation, about which
people will disagree. Cf. infra note 323 (discussing limitations of this paper’s approach).
Past Article V inﬁrmities do not necessarily mean that an amendment is presently inﬁrm,
insofar as longstanding acceptance can cure or render irrelevant earlier legal concerns. See
Greenawalt, Rule of Recognition, supra note 11, at 640–42; see also supra note 20; infra note
424.
94. The ten amendments that comprise the Bill of Rights were not the ﬁrst ten amendments sent to the states. Congress’s ﬁrst proposed amendment would have changed the
apportionment formula for the House, but it fell just short of ratiﬁcation. See Akhil Reed
Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1137, 1143 n.52 (1991)
[hereinafter Amar, The Bill of Rights]. Congress’s second proposed amendment prohibited
a congressional salary increase without an intervening election. Id. at 1145. That amendment also fell short in the eighteenth century and was left for dead—until revived in the
twentieth century as the Twenty-Seventh Amendment. Recent litigation has similarly sought
to revive the “ﬁrst” ﬁrst amendment. We come back to both of these developments later.
See infra sections III.K–L. We mention them here to highlight that legal controversy over
amendment validity dates back to, and indeed continues to involve, the very ﬁrst amendments proposed by Congress.
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for ratiﬁcation, notwithstanding Article I, Section 7’s language on presidential approval.95 “The Annals reveal no discussion of this important
question” in either the House or Senate.96 The next section considers this
issue in more detail in conjunction with the Eleventh Amendment, which
prompted Hollingsworth v. Virginia.97 For now, it suffices to say that there is
a serious argument that presidential presentment is mandated by the plain
terms of the Constitution. The most signiﬁcant counterargument, even by
the time of Hollingsworth, is based on historical practice—but of course that
argument was not available the very ﬁrst time Article V was enlisted.
A second concern involves the role of new states. Article V says nothing about what to do with states that join the Union after an amendment
has been submitted to the states but before the amendment has been ratiﬁed. Nor is the answer to this question obvious as a matter of policy or
political morality. Excluding new states from ratiﬁcation might unduly
privilege their predecessors; including them might disrupt and delay an
ongoing process. When the Bill of Rights was proposed by Congress, the
Union contained eleven states. Nine ratiﬁcations were therefore required
to reach three-fourths.98 By 1791, three more states had joined the Union,
increasing the necessary number of ratiﬁcations to eleven.99 Thomas
Jefferson declared the Bill of Rights part of the Constitution in 1792,
counting the new states in both the numerator and denominator.100 We
are not aware of any discussion as to why this position was taken. But if one
only counts states that are part of the Union at the moment an amendment
is proposed, constitutional history would look “dramatically different”:
The ﬁrst amendment proposed by Congress, on congressional apportionment, would be ratiﬁed, and the Bill of Rights would not have made it into
the document until the twentieth century.101
A ﬁnal legal objection to the Bill of Rights is that there were discrepancies in the instruments of ratiﬁcation sent by the states to the federal
95. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
96. Currie, The Federalist Period, supra note 57, at 115. Delaware Representative John
Vining raised a separate objection: that, under the language of Article V, both Houses of
Congress had to concur by a two-thirds vote that a proposed amendment was “necessary”
before proceeding to consider it. 1 Annals of Cong. 430 (1789). This objection did not carry
the day and apparently was not pursued further. See Edward S. Corwin & Mary Louise
Ramsey, Constitutional Law of Constitutional Amendment, 26 Notre Dame L. Rev. 185, 191
(1951).
97. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
98. See Cong. Pay Amendment, 16 Op. O.L.C. 85, 107 (1992).
99. Id. But cf. supra note 57 (noting controversy in the First Congress over how to
construe the “three fourths” requirement for state ratiﬁcation).
100. See Jol A. Silversmith, The “Missing Thirteenth Amendment”: Constitutional
Nonsense and Titles of Nobility, 8 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 577, 597 (1999).
101. See id. at 598–99. This assumes, perhaps implausibly, that such a change in counting method would not otherwise have changed the course of amendment history. It also
elides the question whether Massachusetts and Virginia should have had to re-ratify because
the new states of Maine and West Virginia were carved out of their respective borders.
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government. Take the Second Amendment as an example. In its 2008
opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court quoted the text
as follows: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.”102 This is the version of the Second Amendment that was proposed by Congress and ratiﬁed by Delaware (though “arms” was uncapitalized).103 But according to their ratiﬁcation resolutions, New Jersey
ratiﬁed a Second Amendment with no commas;104 New York, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and South Carolina ratiﬁed a version with only the middle
comma;105 and Maryland and North Carolina ratiﬁed a version with the
middle and last commas.106 Thomas Merrill, in an unpublished paper, has
similarly documented an evolution in how the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause is punctuated.107
This may be more than constitutional ﬂyspecking. After all, “punctuation is a permissible indicator of meaning.”108 Judge Laurence Silberman
102. 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008).
103. Resolution of Congress Proposing Amendatory Articles to the Several States (Mar.
4, 1789), in 2 Documentary History of the Constitution of the United States of America,
1786–1870, at 321, 322 (1894) [hereinafter Documentary History]; Delaware Ratiﬁcation
Resolution (Jan. 28, 1790), in Documentary History, supra, at 347, 349. This documentary
compilation was derived from official records held at the Department of State. We have not
independently conﬁrmed that the compilation in fact reﬂects the original documents on
ﬁle.
104. New Jersey Ratiﬁcation Resolution (Aug. 3, 1790), in Documentary History, supra
note 103, at 325, 327.
105. Rhode Island Ratiﬁcation Resolution (June 15, 1790), in Documentary History,
supra note 103, at 363, 364; New York Ratiﬁcation Resolution (Mar. 27, 1790), in
Documentary History, supra note 103, at 357, 359; Pennsylvania Ratiﬁcation Resolution
(Mar. 10, 1790), in Documentary History, supra note 103, at 352, 354; South Carolina
Ratiﬁcation Resolution (Jan. 19, 1790), in Documentary History, supra note 103, at 340, 342.
106. North Carolina Ratiﬁcation Resolution (Dec. 22, 1789), in Documentary History,
supra note 103, at 335, 337; Maryland Ratiﬁcation Resolution (Dec. 19, 1789), in
Documentary History, supra note 103, at 330, 332. There were also differences in capitalization in the various states. For an overview of all these differences, see Ross E. Davies, Which
Is the Constitution?, 11 Green Bag 2d 209, 210–11 (2008).
107. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitution and the Comma 15–18 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (unpublished manuscript).
108. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
161 (2012). It is debatable what the Founding generation thought about the signiﬁcance of
punctuation. On the one hand, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that “the construction of
a sentence in a legislative act does not depend on its pointing [i.e., punctuation].” Black v.
Scott, 3 F. Cas. 507, 510 (C.C.D. Va. 1828); see also Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L.
Rev. 225, 258 n.102 (2000) (discussing the “relatively casual attitude toward punctuation”
taken by British and American legal authorities at the time of the Founding). On the other
hand, during the Constitutional Convention, the Committee on Style apparently tried to
effect a major change in congressional power through punctuation (the insertion of a semicolon) until it was caught in the act. See Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship:
Institutional Review Boards, 2004 Sup. Ct. Rev. 271, 317 n.112 (describing an attempt to
create a separate spending power by adding a semicolon to the ﬁrst paragraph of Article I,
Section 8).
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began the merits portion of his D.C. Circuit opinion affirmed in Heller with
a reference to the “provision’s second comma.”109 Justice Antonin Scalia’s
opinion for the Court in Heller divided the amendment into two clauses
and cited a source that seemed to place weight on the same comma.110
Merrill has argued that the punctuation of the Takings Clause could very
well affect its modern meaning.111 If Congress proposes and some of the
states (but not three-fourths) ratify a text that most objective observers at
the time would understand to mean X, while other states ratify a slightly
different text that most would understand to mean Y, it is not at all clear
that either text should be seen as part of the Constitution.112 And if punctuation can change the meaning of a legal text, it does not seem farfetched to insist that states ratify an identical text.113
B.

The Eleventh Amendment

In the 1793 case Chisholm v. Georgia,114 the Supreme Court held that
Georgia could be sued without its consent by a citizen of another state.
The day after the decision was announced, a constitutional amendment to

109. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
110. Justice Scalia wrote that the “Second Amendment is naturally divided into two
parts: its prefatory clause and its operative clause.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 577 (2008). For support, he cited a “Linguists’ Brief” that had suggested the second
comma was signiﬁcant, as it “marks the customary separation of an adverbial clause . . . from
a main clause.” Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English Dennis E. Baron et al. in
Support of Petitioners at 5–6, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290).
111. Merrill, supra note 107, at 8–11.
112. William W. Van Alstyne, A Constitutional Conundrum of Second Amendment
Commas: A Short Epistolary Report, 10 Green Bag 2d 469, 475–76 (2007). This scenario is
distinguishable from, though related to, one in which states ratify an identical text with
divergent understandings of that text’s communicative content. Cf. Cong. Pay Amendment,
16 Op. O.L.C. 85, 95 n.13 (1992) (reserving the question whether ratiﬁcation would be valid
if the public meaning of a proposed amendment changed while it was pending); David
Pozen, E.R.A. Puzzles, Balkinization (Feb. 27, 2020), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/
02/era-puzzles_27.html [https://perma.cc/XG6Z-7QHH] (discussing this issue with
respect to the ERA).
113. Another signiﬁcant question that arose in Congress as it debated the Bill of Rights
concerned the placement of amendments. Speciﬁcally, should amendments be woven into
the text of the original Constitution, or should they appear as supplements at the end of an
unchanged original text? James Madison favored the former approach; Roger Sherman was
the leading proponent of the latter. See Jonathan Gienapp, The Second Creation: Fixing
the American Constitution in the Founding Era 177–90 (2018). Sherman prevailed, of
course. Id. at 189. According to Jonathan Gienapp, this decision “numbers among the most
important milestones in the entire sweep of American constitutional history” by fostering
the perception of “the original Constitution as a ‘sacred’ text,” ﬁxed for all time, rather than
an “organic, evolving” project. Id.; see also Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendments:
Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions 231–33 (2019) [hereinafter Albert,
Constitutional Amendments] (reviewing the Madison–Sherman debate).
114. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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overrule Chisholm was introduced in the House.115 In its ﬁnal form, the
amendment passed the House and Senate by large majorities in 1794, was
ratiﬁed by the requisite number of states in 1795, and was declared part of
the Constitution by President John Adams in 1798.116
As with the Bill of Rights, however, President Washington had never
approved the amendment before it was sent to the states. This fact formed
the basis for a challenge to the amendment’s validity in Hollingsworth v.
Virginia, in which plaintiffs argued that the “amendment ha[d] not been
proposed in the form prescribed by the Constitution” because it “was
never submitted to the President for his approbation.”117 The Supreme
Court tersely rejected this challenge. The report of the decision contains
only the following explanation: “The Court, on the day succeeding the
argument, delivered an unanimous opinion, that the amendment being
constitutionally adopted, there could not be exercised any jurisdiction . . . .”118 During the defendant’s oral argument, though, Justice
Samuel Chase had made the following statement: “The negative of the
President applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation: He has nothing
to do with the proposition, or adoption, of amendments to the
Constitution.”119
Justice Chase’s statement is dubious on its own terms. According to
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution, the veto power extends not only to
“ordinary cases of legislation” but also to “Every Order, Resolution, or
Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of
Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of
Adjournment).”120 A resolution or vote proposing a constitutional amendment seems to fall within the latter category. Perhaps Justice Chase meant
to suggest that Article V sets forth “its own separate higher-lawmaking
track” not subject to the presentment rules of Article I.121 But Congress
and the Court have arguably taken the opposite position with respect to

115. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Third Congress, 1793–
1795, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 35–38 (1996).
116. See John V. Orth, The Judicial Power of the United States: The Eleventh
Amendment in American History 12–29 (1987); see also 1 Charles Warren, The Supreme
Court in United States History 101 n.2 (1922) (discussing “the extremely informal and careless manner in which the ratiﬁcation was promulgated” by President Adams).
117. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 379 (1798).
118. Id. at 382.
119. Id. at 381 n.*. On why Justice Chase’s spoken statement is “clearly not” part of the
Court’s opinion, see Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7,
Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha Was
Wrongly Reasoned, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1265, 1285 (2005) [hereinafter Tillman, A Textualist
Defense].
120. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
121. Amar, America’s Constitution, supra note 49, at 594 n.7 (noting this theory without
endorsing it).
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the quorum rules of Article I,122 and to call Article V a separate track risks
begging the question whether the Presentment Clause applies by its plain
terms to the amendment process.
Another possible view is that presidential presentment is superﬂuous
because Article V already requires a two-thirds vote, which is enough to
override a veto.123 This view is not persuasive. When Presidents veto a bill
or resolution, they must state their “Objections,” and the bill or resolution
must be “reconsidered” by both chambers of Congress in light of those
objections.124 As the Hollingsworth plaintiffs’ counsel pointed out, this
reconsideration requirement presumes a dialogic model of governance in
which the President’s objections might inﬂuence some members of
Congress.125 Even a “Bill” that initially passes by a two-thirds vote in both
chambers still needs presidential approval or repassage after a veto before
it becomes law.126 In addition, if the initial vote in either chamber was
taken with a quorum but less than full membership, a presidential veto
could cause the number of members present and voting to be different
upon reconsideration.127
In short, the Court’s ruling in Hollingsworth is questionable as a matter
of constitutional text and structure. Charles Black has described it as “an
unreasoned decision, uttered in the teeth of plain constitutional language,
and with no really adequate reason even projectable.”128 In 2000, the
Supreme Court of Wyoming invalidated a proposed amendment to its
state constitution on the ground that it had not been presented to the
governor, under a provision that is identical in relevant part to the federal
presentment requirement.129 If Black and the Wyoming high court are correct, then Hollingsworth deserves little if any deference on the merits—and
all thoroughgoing textualists must face the prospect that twenty-six of our
twenty-seven ostensible amendments are void.130
122. See Nat’l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920); David P. Currie, The
Constitution in Congress: The Jeffersonians, 1801–1829, at 61–63 (2001) [hereinafter
Currie, The Jeffersonians].
123. See Amar, America’s Constitution, supra note 49, at 594 n.7 (describing this as the
other “main” theory that has been offered in support of Justice Chase’s contention).
124. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
125. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 379 (1798) (argument by counsel).
126. See Prakash, Of Synchronicity, supra note 16, at 1254 n.180.
127. See Tillman, A Textualist Defense, supra note 119, at 1290 n.64.
128. Black, On Article I, supra note 21, at 898; see also Primus, Unbundling
Constitutionality, supra note 5, at 1110 n.78 (“Justice Chase’s dictum . . . makes not the
slightest gesture toward explaining how the text could be read to accord with [it].”).
129. Geringer v. Bebout, 10 P.3d 514, 523 (Wyo. 2000).
130. See supra note 21 (noting that only the Thirteenth Amendment received a presidential signature). Some have suggested that these twenty-six amendments might be salvaged on the ground that Congress provided copies to the executive branch, and the
subsequent transmittal of the amendments to the states for ratiﬁcation constituted a kind of
constructive approval by the President. See Tillman, A Textualist Defense, supra note 119,
at 1277–83; Sopan Joshi, Note, The Presidential Role in the Constitutional Amendment
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Process, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 963, 992–97 (2013). This suggestion contravenes the contemporaneous understanding of virtually every relevant official involved in the amendment process. In Hollingsworth, the Virginia Attorney General (as well as Justice Chase) argued that
presentment was unnecessary, not that it had occurred. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 381 & n.*. A few
years later, the Senate debated and speciﬁcally rejected a motion to “present” the proposed
Twelfth Amendment to “the President . . . for his approbation.” William Plumer’s
Memorandum of Proceedings in the United States Senate 1803–1807, at 79–80 (Everett
Somerville Brown ed., 1923). After President Lincoln was presented with and approved the
Thirteenth Amendment, the Senate passed a resolution “declar[ing] that such approval was
unnecessary” and “inconsistent with the former practice in reference to all amendments
heretofore adopted, and being inadvertently done, should not constitute a precedent for
the future.” Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 629–30 (1865). President Andrew Johnson,
who opposed the Fourteenth Amendment, noted that the amendment had not been
“submitted by the two Houses for [his] approval” and observed in a letter to Congress that
“the steps taken by the Secretary of State” to transmit the proposed amendment to the states
“are to be considered as purely ministerial, and in no sense whatever committing the
Executive to an approval.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3349 (1866). This
understanding has persisted in Congress and the Supreme Court. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 955 n.21 (1983). Under these circumstances, we do not think it is persuasive
to say that a requirement of presentment and approval, if one exists, was constructively
satisﬁed.
For similar reasons, we do not think it is persuasive to say that the amendments took
effect on account of ten days of presidential inaction. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“If
any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it
shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had
signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return . . . .”). First, it is not
clear, as a textual matter, that the approval-through-inaction mechanism carries over from
Clause 2 to Clause 3 of Article I, Section 7. See Tillman, A Textualist Defense, supra note
119, at 1320 (noting this ambiguity). Second, it seems a stretch to attach any signiﬁcance to
ten days of inaction when neither Congress nor the President contends that the President
has a veto power. Finally, even if one were inclined to invoke this provision, thirteen amendments (the Bill of Rights and the Fifteenth, Eighteenth, and Twenty-Seventh Amendments)
would have been pocket vetoed because they were passed fewer than ten days prior to the
end of a congressional session and therefore would have been ineffective absent approval.
See Joshi, supra, at 994 tbl.1.
Seth Tillman defends the outcome of Hollingsworth based on a creative reading of
Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 (which he calls the “ORV Clause”). He takes the position “that
‘[e]very order, resolution or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and House [is]
necessary’ refers to single-house action taken pursuant to prior authorizing or later ratifying
legislation.” Tillman, A Textualist Defense, supra note 119, at 1364. In other words,
Congress can “delegate lawmaking authority” to a single house, or possibly even a single
committee, and the ORV Clause ensures that such legislation must still be presented to the
President. Id. at 1334 n.144. As Tillman acknowledges, his proposal conﬂicts with the nearunanimous understanding of the ORV Clause from the Founding to the present, including
the views of James Madison, Joseph Story, the Federalist Papers, and the Court in Chadha.
Id. at 1364–65. In any event, even if Tillman’s reading were otherwise correct, it is not clear
why the ORV Clause would not also apply by its plain terms to constitutional amendments.
See Gary Lawson, Burning Down the House (and Senate): A Presentment Requirement for
Legislative Subpoenas Under the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause, 83 Tex. L. Rev.
1373, 1386 (2005) (“Does the ORV Clause also apply to amendment resolutions under
Article V? The answer seems to be yes.”).
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The Twelfth Amendment

Congress’s efforts to pass the Twelfth Amendment, which revamped
the nation’s system for selecting presidents, surfaced a number of novel
legal questions.131 One group of senators argued that Article V could not
be used to “ingraft new principles into the Constitution which will destroy
the rights of individual States, without the consent of those States.”132 The
Senate debated whether a two-thirds majority was required for all votes
respecting constitutional amendments, or only for the vote on the ﬁnal
proposed amendment.133 Most contentiously, the Senate debated whether
Article V requires two-thirds of the full House and Senate to propose an
amendment, or only two-thirds of a quorum. The issue arose because the
Senate had a total membership of thirty-four, and the amendment passed
the Senate by a vote of 22 to 10, with the votes of two senators
unrecorded.134 The amendment thus crossed the two-thirds threshold
among those voting, but not among the whole body, and an objection was
raised on that ground.135
The objection has real force. To revise the Constitution is an extraordinary step, and Article V’s supermajority voting rules demand “a geographically broad and numerically deep consensus” to make it happen.136
Yet, as Senator William Plumer of New Hampshire explained, if two-thirds
of a quorum sufficed to propose an amendment, “it would follow that
twelve senators . . . might propose an amendment contrary to the opinion
& against the will of twenty two senators,” and a “little more than one full
third of the Senate” could “be considered as constitutionally performing
the act that required the concurrence of two thirds.”137 In contrast to
Article V, moreover, the Constitution’s impeachment and treaty clauses
expressly refer to “two thirds of the [senators] present.”138 Of course,
Article I provides that “a Majority of each [House] shall constitute a
Quorum to do Business,”139 and a quorum was present for the vote on the
131. As explained in the preceding footnote, the question of presidential presentment
also resurfaced in the Senate debate. Interestingly, it seems that no senators invoked the
Court’s recent decision in Hollingsworth, much less suggested that it had settled the question.
One senator wrote in his diary that the relevant “precedents [were] established without
debate, or without particular attention to the subject—& therefore they prove nothing.”
Currie, The Jeffersonians, supra note 122, at 58. The Senate nonetheless resolved by a vote
of 23 to 7 that the proposed amendment need not be submitted to President Jefferson for
his approval. Id.
132. 13 Annals of Cong. 738 (1803).
133. See Currie, The Jeffersonians, supra note 122, at 59–60.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 61.
136. Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 893, 960
(1990).
137. Currie, The Jeffersonians, supra note 122, at 61–62 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
a speech by Senator Plumer that was recorded in his diary but not in the Annals).
138. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (emphasis added); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
139. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
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Twelfth Amendment. But the validity of the ﬁrst eleven amendments had
apparently been premised on the proposition that the amendment process
was special and, therefore, not subject to another provision of Article I—
the requirement of presidential presentment.
Ultimately, the objection was overruled in the Senate and the proposed amendment went to the House, where Federalist representatives
“essentially reiterated what Plumer had said” in arguing that the Senate
had not legally approved it.140 The House voted 85 to 34 to take up the
Senate resolution and then 84 to 42—exactly two-thirds of a quorum—to
approve the Twelfth Amendment.141 Over a century later, the Supreme
Court agreed that two-thirds of a quorum was sufficient, in light of
longstanding congressional practice.142 But David Currie, on whose scholarship we have drawn throughout this section, likely spoke for many when
he opined in 2001: “I still have trouble convincing myself that when the
Framers prescribed a two-thirds majority to ensure broad support for
constitutional amendments they meant it could be provided by fewer than
half the members.”143
D. The Reconstruction Amendments
In 1861, Congress approved in its lame-duck session an amendment,
known as the Corwin Amendment, which would have protected slavery in
the South by prohibiting any future amendment giving “Congress the
power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws
of said State.”144 The Corwin Amendment failed to attain ratiﬁcation, but
140. Currie, The Jeffersonians, supra note 122, at 62. Some House Republicans countered with the argument that the ﬁrst ten amendments had been approved only by twothirds of those present. See id. at 63; see also Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276, 281–
82 (1919) (making the same argument). But the historical record is hazy on this point; “it
was entirely possible that [those amendments] had in fact been endorsed by two thirds of
all the members.” Currie, The Jeffersonians, supra note 122, at 63.
141. Currie, The Jeffersonians, supra note 122, at 63–64; David E. Kyvig, Explicit and
Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776–2015, at 116 (rev. ed. 2016). At the
time, the House had 141 members. Currie, The Jeffersonians, supra note 122, at 63 n.186.
142. Nat’l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 248 U.S. at 281.
There is an additional wrinkle: Does Article V require two-thirds of those present, or only
two-thirds of those present and voting? See infra section III.J.
143. Currie, The Jeffersonians, supra note 122, at 64. One might counter that the
Framers operated against a background presumption that a quorum was sufficient for
legislative business, and Article V should be read in that context. But the very existence of
debate in Congress shows that such a presumption was not universally shared by the
Founding generation, at least as applied to amendments. Congress’s resolution of the issue,
moreover, did not quell contemporaneous debate. After Congress proposed the Twelfth
Amendment, the legislatures of three states, “in their resolutions rejecting the amendment,
reiterated the charge of unconstitutionality.” Ames, supra note 55, at 295.
144. See generally A. Christopher Bryant, Stopping Time: The Pro-Slavery and
“Irrevocable” Thirteenth Amendment, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 501 (2003) (reviewing the
history and legacy of the Corwin Amendment).
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it raised two novel Article V questions that were not resolved then and have
not been resolved since: whether an amendment can make itself unamendable,145 and whether a state can choose to ratify an amendment by
convention even if Congress provides for ratiﬁcation by legislatures.146
Another oddity of the Corwin Amendment is that, Hollingsworth notwithstanding, it was presented to President James Buchanan, who promptly
added his signature.147
The next set of amendments to make it out of Congress, aimed at
dismantling rather than entrenching slavery, generated still ﬁercer legal
controversy as the nation emerged from the Civil War. Uniquely among
the Article V disputes recounted in this Part, the disputes associated with
the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments
have received prominent attention in the contemporary constitutional
literature.148 The most substantial objections clustered around three
issues: the composition of Congress, the legitimacy of the state legislatures
that ratiﬁed the amendments, and federal coercion of the states.149
After the Civil War, Article V was pushed to the breaking point by
some stark numerical realities. There were thirty-seven states in the Union
in 1868, meaning twenty-eight states were needed to ratify a constitutional
amendment.150 Eleven states had seceded, or purported to secede, and
formed the Confederacy.151 Ten of those states could block an amendment
by themselves, assuming no defections from the Northern states—which
was not a safe assumption. The former Confederate states would also have

145. See id. at 530–34 (describing the March 1861 congressional debates on this
question).
146. See Philip L. Martin, Convention Ratiﬁcation of Federal Constitutional
Amendments, 82 Pol. Sci. Q. 61, 65 (1967) (noting that Illinois purported to ratify the
Corwin Amendment through a convention that had met to draft a new state constitution).
147. See supra note 21.
148. Throughout this section, we cite what we take to be the leading works in this genre.
149. Other legal issues surfaced as well. One was whether states may rescind their ratiﬁcations. Both New Jersey and Ohio ratiﬁed the Fourteenth Amendment and then tried to
reverse course, but Congress, when it promulgated the Fourteenth Amendment, listed both
of them among the ratifying states. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 448–49 (1939)
(opinion of Hughes, C.J.). There were also quorum questions at the state level in addition
to the federal level. Indiana had a general rule in its state constitution requiring two-thirds
of the legislature to be present to conduct business, but the speaker of its House of
Representatives ruled that a majority of the total membership sufficed to act on the
Fifteenth Amendment. See Lester Bernhardt Orﬁeld, The Amending of the Federal
Constitution 66 n.87 (1942).
150. See Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and the Ratiﬁcation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1627, 1643–44 (2013) This count assumes that former
Confederate states should be included in the Article V “denominator.” But see Christopher
R. Green, Loyal Denominatorism and the Fourteenth Amendment: Normative Defenses
and Implications, 13 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 167, 169–70 (2017) (arguing that rebel
states should be excluded from the Article V denominator).
151. See Colby, supra note 150, at 1644; Harrison, supra note 14, at 422.
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enough clout in Congress to block any amendment proposal.152 Navigating
these obstacles demanded a series of bold legal maneuvers.
First, the Congresses that proposed the Reconstruction Amendments
excluded many of the representatives and senators sent from states that
had been part of the Confederacy, pursuant to each chamber’s power to
“be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualiﬁcations of its own
Members.”153 The Reconstruction Amendments were adopted by twothirds of a quorum composed mostly of Northern Republicans, and it is
exceedingly doubtful that all of the amendments could have passed had
the Southern representatives and senators been seated.154
Second, in proclaiming the Thirteenth Amendment ratiﬁed by threefourths of the states on December 18, 1865, Secretary of State William
Henry Seward included several former Confederate states in the count.155
Two weeks prior, Congress had refused to seat any senators or representatives from those same states.156 How could state “legislatures” validly ratify
constitutional amendments but not elect senators? Moreover, in the First
Military Reconstruction Act of 1867, Congress declared that there were
“no legal State governments” in the South and that existing “civil governments” were “provisional only.”157 President Andrew Johnson argued in
his veto message that, because the bill “denies the legality of the
Governments of ten of the States which participated in the ratiﬁcation of
the amendment . . . abolishing slavery,” the implication is that “the consent of three-fourths of the States . . . has not been constitutionally
obtained” for the Thirteenth Amendment.158
The Southern state governments that ratiﬁed the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, meanwhile, were the products of military reconstruction. The Reconstruction Acts divided the former Confederate states
into ﬁve military districts and instructed the Union Army to register voters,
with universal adult male suffrage, and to hold elections for constitutional

152. See Ackerman, We the People, supra note 7, at 102.
153. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1; see Amar, America’s Constitution, supra note 49, at
366–76; David P. Currie, The Civil War Congress, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1131, 1218–22 (2006);
Harrison, supra note 14, at 380–89, 398–401.
154. See, e.g., Ackerman, We the People, supra note 7, at 102 (“Every student of the
period recognizes that, were it not for the purge of Southern Senators and Representatives,
the ‘Congress’ meeting in June would never have mustered the two-thirds majorities
required to propose the Fourteenth Amendment.”). It is less clear that the Fifteenth
Amendment would have been rejected if Congress were complete, see Kyvig, supra note
141, at 180, though opponents of the amendment effort did object on this ground, see David
P. Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 383, 454–55 (2008) [hereinafter
Currie, The Reconstruction Congress].
155. Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, supra note 154, at 397.
156. Amar, America’s Constitution, supra note 49, at 366.
157. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, pmbl., § 6, 14 Stat. 428–29.
158. 12 The Papers of Andrew Johnson, February–August 1867, at 91 (Paul H. Bergeron
ed., 1995).
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conventions.159 Those conventions yielded ten new governments that
promptly ratiﬁed the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.160 Many
argued then and afterward that these reconstructed governments lacked
legal authority to ratify amendments.161
In addition, the Southern state legislatures were arguably coerced
into ratifying. The Reconstruction Acts provided that these states would be
entitled to representation in Congress only when the Fourteenth
Amendment “ha[d] become part of the Constitution.”162 This pressure to
ratify, according to Ackerman, amounted to a “naked violation[] of Article
V.”163 There is little doubt that the unreconstructed Southern states would
not have ratiﬁed voluntarily, as it “would be difficult to overstate the depth
and breadth of opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment” within their
white populations.164 Southern states still under military supervision
“faced the same pressure to ratify” the Fifteenth Amendment.165
These interrelated legal problems have elicited powerful responses.
John Harrison, for instance, has argued that the amendments were “legally
effective” (even if not strictly speaking “legal”) under the de facto government doctrine, which recognizes that “a government de facto may bind
the state for which it acts despite defects in its claim to power.”166 Amar
has defended the legality of the Reconstruction Amendments on the basis
of Congress’s authority to judge its members’ qualiﬁcations and to guarantee a republican form of government in the states.167 And, stepping
back, it is notable that the Reconstruction Congresses went to such lengths
even to try to adhere to the forms of Article V, given the dire circumstances.168
But wherever one comes out in these debates, the legal legitimacy of
the Reconstruction Amendments at the time of their adoption is at least
contestable—as countless scholars have recognized.169 As Harrison recounts,
159. See Ackerman, We the People, supra note 7, at 110.
160. See Harrison, supra note 14, at 404–09.
161. See Ackerman, We the People, supra note 7, at 110–11; Colby, supra note 150, at
1654–56.
162. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, pmbl., § 5, 14 Stat. 429.
163. Ackerman, We the People, supra note 7, at 111.
164. Colby, supra note 150, at 1644–45.
165. Kyvig, supra note 141, at 181; see also Travis Crum, The Lawfulness of the Fifteenth
Amendment, 97 Notre Dame L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 31--38) (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) (detailing additional Article V problems “unique” to the
Fifteenth Amendment).
166. Harrison, supra note 14, at 379.
167. See Amar, America’s Constitution, supra note 49, at 370–80.
168. See Michael Les Benedict, Constitutional History and Constitutional Theory:
Reﬂections on Ackerman, Reconstruction, and the Transformation of the American
Constitution, 108 Yale L.J. 2011, 2027–31 (1999).
169. See, e.g., Kyvig, supra note 141, at 156; Colby, supra note 150, at 1629; Greenawalt,
Rule of Recognition, supra note 11, at 640; Douglas Laycock, Notes on the Role of Judicial
Review, the Expansion of Federal Power, and the Structure of Constitutional Rights, 99 Yale
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“[a]ll those who participated in reconstruction, including those who were
paying attention to the process of constitutional amendment, knew that
something very unusual and legally doubtful was going on.”170 “The
Republicans . . . got away with something Article V probably was supposed
to prevent.”171
And yet, no one in their right mind would deny that the
Reconstruction Amendments are part of the Constitution today (though
the Georgia General Assembly denied this as late as 1957172), which illustrates our thesis in an especially dramatic fashion. The sociological legitimacy of the Reconstruction Amendments is not a function of their original
legal legitimacy; it does not derive from a judgment about whether Article
V’s rules were followed.173 Rather, it derives from the fact that these
amendments have been accepted by most officials since the 1860s and
have become deeply embedded in the nation’s laws, practices, and
ethos.174 Their authoritative legal status is quite literally beyond dispute in
our political culture, just like the status of the Constitution itself.175
E.

The Sixteenth Amendment

After a long period of disuse, the machinery of Article V creaked back
into motion in the early twentieth century, yielding a spurt of four amendments in a decade. The ﬁrst of these was the Sixteenth Amendment, which
overruled the Supreme Court’s decision in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust

L.J. 1711, 1729 (1990) (book review); see also supra note 20 (explaining this paper’s use of
the term “legal legitimacy”).
170. Harrison, supra note 14, at 409.
171. Id. at 458.
172. S. Res. 39, 129th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1957); see also Colby, supra note
150, at 1661 n.209.
173. See Greenawalt, Rule of Recognition, supra note 11, at 641 (“The present authority
of these amendments may depend more on their acceptance for over a century than on
their actual adoption by a process that may or may not now be thought to conform to what
article V prescribes.”).
174. In this respect, the addition of the Reconstruction Amendments to the
Constitution resembles the addition of Texas to the Union. Both acts were constitutionally
dubious at the time—there is a plausible constitutional argument that new territory must be
annexed through the treaty power, not through congressional resolution—but are now
politically and practically settled. See Mark A. Graber, Settling the West: The Annexation of
Texas, the Louisiana Purchase, and Bush v. Gore, in The Louisiana Purchase and American
Expansion, 1803–1898, at 83, 83–103 (Sanford Levinson & Bartholomew H. Sparrow eds.,
2005).
175. Cf. Henry Paul Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 383
(1981) (“The authoritative status of the written constitution is . . . an incontestable ﬁrst principle for theorizing about American constitutional law.”); David E. Pozen, Constitutional
Bad Faith, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 941–43 (2016) (explaining that mainstream U.S. political
culture effectively prohibits constitutional “atheism,” or a professed lack of faith in and
commitment to the Constitution).
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Co. and expressly authorized a federal income tax.176 The amendment
“sailed through both houses of Congress” in 1909.177 After hitting a few
speedbumps in the states, including the opposition of New York Governor
and future Chief Justice of the United States Charles Evan Hughes, it was
deemed ratiﬁed four years later.178
The most persistent, but by no means the only,179 set of legal challenges to the Sixteenth Amendment involves discrepancies among the
state ratiﬁcation instruments. When Secretary of State Philander Knox certiﬁed the amendment in 1913, just four states had sent him instruments of
ratiﬁcation with the language of the amendment exactly as Congress had
approved it.180 The rest had variations in capitalization and punctuation,
and some even had differences in wording. The instrument from
Oklahoma, for instance, said “from any census or enumeration” instead of
“without regard to any census or enumeration,” Illinois’s said “remuneration” instead of “enumeration,” and Missouri’s said “levy” instead of
“lay.”181
The Office of the Solicitor of the Department of State prepared a
memorandum for Secretary Knox addressing these discrepancies. The
Solicitor’s Office concluded that they were “probably inadvertent” and
that the legislatures in question had “intended . . . to ratify the amendment proposed by Congress.”182 The Office also noted that similar discrepancies had existed with earlier amendments.183 It therefore recommended
that Knox certify the amendment.184 A spate of “tax protester” lawsuits in
the 1980s placed heavy emphasis on this memorandum in challenging the
validity of the Sixteenth Amendment. Courts uniformly rejected these

176. 158 U.S. 601 (1895); see U.S. Const. amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power
to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”).
177. Amar, America’s Constitution, supra note 49, at 409.
178. See Kyvig, supra note 141, at 204–07.
179. See generally Danshera Cords, Tax Protestors and Penalties: Ensuring Perceived
Fairness and Mitigating Systemic Costs, 2005 BYU L. Rev. 1515, 1537–40 (cataloging common tax protestor arguments that the Sixteenth Amendment was not properly ratiﬁed);
Christopher S. Jackson, Note, The Inane Gospel of Tax Protest: Resist Rendering Unto
Caesar—Whatever His Demands, 32 Gonz. L. Rev. 291, 301–07 (1996–1997) (same). Some
argued, for instance, that the amendment was invalid because certain state legislatures
lacked authority under their state constitutions to ratify such a taxation measure, or because
the amendment transgressed federalism-based substantive limits on Article V. See, e.g.,
Raymond G. Brown, The Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 54 Am.
L. Rev. 843, 847–53 (1920).
180. Memorandum from Off. of the Solic., Dep’t of State, Ratiﬁcation of the 16th
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 6 (Feb. 15, 1913) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review).
181. Id. at 7–8 (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 15.
183. Id. at 8–15.
184. Id. at 16.
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claims,185 often imposing sanctions along the way.186 By and large, these
courts relied on the political question doctrine and some version of the
enrolled bill rule, without reaching the merits of the plaintiffs’ Article V
arguments.187
We agree that this litigation is frivolous. The interesting question is
why. The basic answer, in our view, is that the long acceptance and sociological legitimacy of the Sixteenth Amendment make it unthinkable that
a court in the 1980s would or should entertain a challenge to the amendment’s validity—not because the merits of the underlying Article V questions are obvious.188
F.

The Seventeenth Amendment

Throughout the 1890s, “Congress was deluged with petitions and
published appeals for direct popular election of senators.”189 Many
senators were wary of reforming their own institution, and Southern
senators were especially wary of increased federal involvement in elections.190 But the public pressure continued to mount. Thirty-one states
petitioned Congress for change (one short of the number required to trigger a convention);191 and in 1910, after the Senate voted down a popular
election amendment, ten senators who had opposed the measure lost
reelection.192 The Senate approved the amendment in 1911. The text
approved by the Senate, however, was different from the text that the
House had already approved. A conference committee wrangled for nearly
185. See, e.g., United States v. Sitka, 845 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v.
Stahl, 792 F.2d 1438, 1441 (9th Cir. 1986); Sisk v. Comm’r, 791 F.2d 58, 61 (6th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Thomas, 788 F.2d 1250, 1253–54 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Foster,
789 F.2d 457, 463 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wojtas, 611 F. Supp. 118, 121 (N.D. Ill.
1985).
186. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 868 F.2d 236, 242 (7th Cir. 1989); Lysiak v.
Comm’r, 816 F.2d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 1987). This wave of tax protester litigation was
fomented by a popular book, Bill Benson & M.J. Beckman, The Law That Never Was: The
Fraud of the 16th Amendment and Personal Income Tax (1985). See, e.g., Wojitas, 611 F.
Supp. at 119 (describing how the plaintiff’s attorney submitted the book to the court in
support of the plaintiff’s motion). One of the book’s authors was subsequently found to
have engaged in fraud. See United States v. Benson, 561 F.3d 718, 724 (7th Cir. 2009).
187. The enrolled bill rule holds that when “‘the presiding officers’ of the House and
Senate sign an enrolled bill (and the President ‘approve[s]’ it), ‘its authentication as a bill
that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable.’” NLRB v. Noel
Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 551 (2014) (quoting Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672
(1892)). While the enrolled bill rule limits the types of challenges “the judicial department”
may entertain, Clark, 143 U.S. at 672, it does not bear on what is required by Article V.
188. See supra notes 102–112 and accompanying text (explaining why it is at least plausible to believe that states must ratify an identical text).
189. Kyvig, supra note 141, at 209.
190. Id. at 209–12.
191. Not all of the states formally requested a convention; some only asked that
Congress propose an amendment. See Caplan, supra note 63, at 63–65.
192. See Kyvig, supra note 141, at 212.
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a year, until the House ﬁnally caved and voted to send the Senate version
of the amendment to the states.193
This intercameral wrangling led to a thorny Article V question. The
Seventeenth Amendment is one of only two recognized amendments to
have been passed by the House and the Senate in different legislative sessions. Is that permissible? In a recent article, Saikrishna Prakash argues
that, as a matter of constitutional text and structure, it is not, as Article V
implicitly requires that amendments be proposed by both chambers of
Congress in the same legislative session.194 “This reading of the
Constitution,” Prakash notes, “would suggest the rather immodest conclusion that the Thirteenth and Seventeenth Amendments, neither of which
passed in a single session, failed to satisfy the standards of Article V.”195
G. The Eighteenth Amendment
The Eighteenth Amendment, on Prohibition, raised many more legal
questions and led to some of the Supreme Court’s most signiﬁcant pronouncements on Article V. First, the amendment included a novel provision stating that it would “be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratiﬁed . . . within seven years.”196 Opponents argued vigorously that
Congress could not impose a time limit on ratiﬁcation when Article V says
nothing about the matter. In Dillon v. Gloss, however, the Court rejected a
challenge on this ground in concluding “that the fair inference or implication from Article V is that the ratiﬁcation must be within some reasonable time after the proposal.”197 The Court continued:
Whether a deﬁnite period for ratiﬁcation shall be ﬁxed so that all
may know what it is and speculation on what is a reasonable time
may be avoided, is, in our opinion, a matter of detail which
Congress may determine as an incident of its power to designate
the mode of ratiﬁcation.198
In other words, Congress’s power to impose a time limit is either implicit
in Article V or perhaps grounded in the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Second, a wide range of scholars, states, and alcohol-industry groups
argued that the Eighteenth Amendment violated inherent individual-

193. See id. at 213. As Kyvig relates, the “racially fraught issue of state or federal control
of elections blocked agreement” in the conference committee. Id.
194. Prakash, Of Synchronicity, supra note 16, at 1268–71. “As a matter of constitutional
structure,” Prakash explains, “I believe that whatever the rule for the bicameral passage of
statutes, the same period ought to apply to bicameral proposal of an amendment.” Id. at
1270. And “[t]he Constitution, by incorporating the concept of ‘session,’ provided that bills
must be perfected into law in a single session.” Id. at 1264.
195. Id. at 1270.
196. U.S. Const. amend. XVIII, § 3.
197. 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921).
198. Id. at 376.
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rights and federalism limitations on Article V.199 A district court in 1930
endorsed a procedural variant on the federalism objection, holding that
the amendment should have been ratiﬁed by state conventions rather than
state legislatures given the extent to which it transferred power to the federal government.200 As far as we are aware, this is the only instance in which
a federal court has invalidated an Article V amendment. The Supreme
Court reversed.201
Third, the Eighteenth Amendment raised the question whether referenda may play a part in the process of state ratiﬁcation. In Ohio, citizens
concerned about malapportionment in the state legislature decided to
amend the state constitution to require that controversial federal amendments be submitted to a popular referendum after approval by the legislature.202 Soon afterward, the Ohio legislature approved the Eighteenth
Amendment by a wide margin, and the U.S. Secretary of State included
Ohio’s ratiﬁcation in the official count when he proclaimed the
Eighteenth Amendment adopted.203 The people of Ohio, however, narrowly rejected the Eighteenth Amendment in a referendum after this proclamation.204 The Supreme Court held that this referendum was a
constitutional nullity in Hawke v. Smith (No. 1).205 The Court said that the
“legislature,” as used in Article V, is “the representative body which
ma[kes] the laws of the people.”206 The decision was excoriated in the
press,207 and both its reasoning and its “elitist anti-populis[t]” tone continue to garner criticism.208
Shortly after Hawke, the Court rejected an array of other challenges
to the Eighteenth Amendment, including that Congress had not properly
found the amendment “necessary”; that “two thirds” means two-thirds of

199. See Jason Mazzone, Unamendments, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1747, 1815 n.364 (2005) (collecting scholarly sources arguing that the Eighteenth Amendment violated inherent substantive limits on the amending power); Roznai, supra note 79, at 673 n.107 (same).
200. United States v. Sprague, 44 F.2d 967, 981 (D.N.J. 1930), rev’d, 282 U.S. 716
(1931).
201. Sprague, 282 U.S. at 734.
202. See Kyvig, supra note 141, at 242. Speciﬁcally, a ratiﬁcation by the legislature would
not be effective for ninety days. Id. If, during that period, six percent of voters signed a
petition for a referendum, the legislature’s action would not be effective unless approved
by a majority of voters in the referendum. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 243.
205. 253 U.S. 221, 230–31 (1920).
206. Id. at 227.
207. See Kyvig, supra note 141, at 246 (collecting prominent criticisms); see also id. at
245 (“Hawke v. Smith left a large and lasting impression that the Article V amending process
denied democratic choice in the case of national prohibition.”).
208. Vikram David Amar, The People Made Me Do It: Can the People of the States
Instruct and Coerce Their State Legislatures in the Article V Constitutional Amendment
Process?, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1037, 1077–78 (2000).
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the whole membership of Congress, not a quorum; and that the amendment transgressed substantive limits on the amending power.209 The Court
heard an extraordinary ﬁve days of oral argument on these questions and
related ones involving the scope of the amendment and the National
Prohibition Act.210 But the Court issued only a brief per curiam opinion,
stating its conclusions “without an exposition of the reasoning by which
they ha[d] been reached.”211
H. The Nineteenth Amendment
The women’s suffrage amendment was ratiﬁed on the heels of
Prohibition and raised similar procedural issues. A companion case
decided the same day as Hawke held that the Ohio legislature’s ratiﬁcation
of the Nineteenth Amendment could not be overturned by referendum.212
When the case was argued, thirty-ﬁve of the thirty-six states needed to ratify
the amendment had done so. If Hawke had come out the other way, it
would have been a signiﬁcant setback for the amendment effort, as there
were movements afoot to hold referenda in several states.213
Hawke also led indirectly to the ﬁnal ratiﬁcation of the Nineteenth
Amendment, which unfolded in a dramatic scene in Tennessee.214 The
Tennessee Constitution contained (and still contains) a provision
prohibiting the legislature from acting on a federal constitutional
amendment without an intervening election following Congress’s
proposal of the amendment.215 Governor Albert Roberts refused to call a
special session of the legislature to consider the Nineteenth Amendment
before election day, thinking himself constrained by this provision. But
after Hawke and some arm twisting by President Woodrow Wilson, he

209. Nat’l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920).
210. See Kyvig, supra note 141, at 246. Edward Corwin opined at the time that “[n]ot
since the Milligan case was argued in 1866 has a more notable array of counsel stood up
before the court.” Edward S. Corwin, Constitutional Law in 1919–1920. I: The
Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term,
1919, 14 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 635, 651 (1920). For a colorful eyewitness account, see 2 Philip
C. Jessup, Elihu Root 479–80 (1938).
211. Nat’l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. at 388 (White, C.J., concurring); see also id.
(expressing “profound[] regret” over this absence of explanation). Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes wrote elliptically in a letter to then-Professor Felix Frankfurter that there were
“good reasons” for “not giving reasons,” but he did not elaborate. Alexander M. Bickel &
Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Judiciary and Responsible Government 1910–21, at 546 (1984)
(quoting Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (June 22, 1920)). To this day,
the “reasons for not giving reasons that Holmes alluded to remain obscure.” Id. at 546–47.
212. Hawke v. Smith (No. 2), 253 U.S. 231, 232 (1920).
213. See Kyvig, supra note 141, at 244.
214. On this scene, see generally Robert B. Jones & Mark E. Byrnes, The “Bitterest
Fight”: The Tennessee General Assembly and the Nineteenth Amendment, 68 Tenn. Hist.
Q. 270 (2009).
215. Tenn. Const. art. II, § 32.
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convened the legislature, which voted to ratify by a razor-thin margin.216
Opponents of the amendment immediately ﬁled a motion to reconsider,
only to realize that their motion would fail unless they could buy time to
persuade more colleagues. Thirty-seven antisuffrage legislators therefore
decamped to Decatur, Alabama, to deprive the House of a quorum.217
Governor Roberts certiﬁed that Tennessee had ratiﬁed the amendment,
and President Wilson’s Secretary of State in turn certiﬁed the Nineteenth
Amendment.218 But that did not stop the Decatur contingent from
returning; ordering the sergeant-at-arms to amass a quorum; and, with
many prosuffrage members absent from the hall, voting to grant
reconsideration and reject ratiﬁcation.219
This mess came before the U.S. Supreme Court in Leser v. Garnett.220
The Court held that the ratiﬁcation by Tennessee (and several other
states) could be treated as valid even if obtained in violation of the state
constitution or state rules of legislative procedure.221 Once a state legislature has transmitted a “duly authenticated” ratiﬁcation resolution to the
U.S. Secretary of State, the Court suggested, federal judges should not look
behind the curtain.222 Separately, the Court also rejected a claim that the
Nineteenth Amendment was invalid because “so great an addition to the
electorate, if made without the State’s consent, destroys its autonomy as a
political body.”223 The Court noted that this theory, if accepted, would also
invalidate the Fifteenth Amendment, which “ha[d] been recognized and
acted on for half a century.”224 And that proposition, whatever its legal
merits, simply “cannot be entertained.”225

216. See Kyvig, supra note 141, at 238, 245.
217. A trial court also granted an injunction prohibiting the governor from certifying
the ratiﬁcation vote to Washington, but the injunction was quashed by the Tennessee
Supreme Court. See Clements v. Roberts, 230 S.W. 30, 36 (Tenn. 1921).
218. See Kyvig, supra note 141, at 238.
219. Jones & Byrnes, supra note 214, at 286.
220. 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
221. Id. at 137.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 136. For a comprehensive summary of arguments made against the substantive validity of the Nineteenth Amendment, which the Court briskly brushed aside in Leser,
see Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism,
and the Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 997–1006 (2002).
224. Leser, 258 U.S. at 136.
225. Id.
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The Twenty-First Amendment226

The Twenty-First Amendment, “repeal[ing]” Prohibition,227 is the
only amendment in U.S. history ratiﬁed by state conventions rather than
state legislatures. That choice sprang from a lingering feeling, intensiﬁed
by Hawke, that ratiﬁcation of the Eighteenth Amendment had not accurately reﬂected public opinion.228 Conventions would allow for a more
direct appeal to the people. As a result, the Twenty-First Amendment
brought up a host of new legal questions that have never been deﬁnitively
resolved or adjudicated.
The threshold question was whether Congress or the states should set
the rules governing the formation and operation of the conventions. Many
members of Congress, the bar, and the academy expressed the view that
Congress had the power to set these rules if it wished, although this view
was by no means unanimous.229 But Congress never really had to bother.
226. We are not aware of any novel challenges to the validity of the Twentieth
Amendment, which moved up the dates of the presidential inauguration and the beginning
of the congressional term to shorten the lame-duck period. Presumably, this reﬂects the
larger lack of controversy over the amendment: Within about a year after being proposed
by Congress, it became the ﬁrst amendment to be unanimously ratiﬁed by the states on the
ﬁrst pass. See Kyvig, supra note 141, at 274 (“To say that the states welcomed the lame duck
amendment would be an understatement.”); Edward J. Larson, The Constitutionality of
Lame-Duck Lawmaking: The Text, History, Intent, and Original Meaning of the Twentieth
Amendment, 2012 Utah L. Rev. 707, 734 (“Because the states acted so quickly and with
virtually no dissent, there was often little debate in the state legislatures.”). The House’s
proposed version of the amendment included a provision requiring that “ratiﬁcation shall
be by legislatures, the entire membership of at least one branch of which shall have been
elected subsequent to [the] date of submission.” 75 Cong. Rec. 4059 (1932). That provision
was removed by the conference committee when the House and Senate versions of the
amendment were reconciled, but it serves as an interesting precedent for building novel
conditions of ratiﬁcation (beyond deadlines) into the text of proposed amendments. See
infra notes 377–380 and accompanying text.
227. U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 1.
228. See Ratiﬁcation of the Twenty-First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States: State Convention Records and Laws 3 (Everett Somerville Brown ed., 1938)
[hereinafter Ratiﬁcation of the Twenty-First Amendment] (“Much of the criticism of the
Eighteenth Amendment was based on the claim that its ratiﬁcation had not properly
reﬂected the opinion of the people of the country.”). Deﬁance of Prohibition was widespread. As Pauline Sabin, the head of a Prohibition reform organization, put it: Proponents
“thought they could make prohibition as strong as the Constitution, but instead they have
made the Constitution as weak as prohibition.” Sean Beienburg, Prohibition, the
Constitution, and States’ Rights 229 (2019).
229. For summaries of these debates, see Clement E. Vose, Constitutional Change:
Amendment Politics and Supreme Court Litigation Since 1900, at 111–12 (1972)
[hereinafter Vose, Constitutional Change]; Abraham C. Weinfeld, Power of Congress Over
State Ratifying Conventions, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 473, 474–75 (1938). The states themselves were
also in disagreement. California petitioned Congress to pass a law regulating the conventions. See Ratiﬁcation of the Twenty-First Amendment, supra note 228, at 515. New Mexico,
on the other hand, declared that any rules from Congress would be “null and void” and that
state officers were “authorized and required to resist to the utmost any attempt to execute
any and all such congressional dictation and usurpation.” Id. In the end, twenty-one states
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By the time Congress proposed the amendment, twenty-nine states were
already in the process of legislating how their conventions would take
place.230
Many of the choices made by states in establishing these conventions
were contentious and challenged at the time.231 “The widespread use of atlarge districts,” for instance, “disregarded both historical precedent and
the advice of legal and constitutional experts commissioned to make recommendations.”232 Indeed, even though more than half the states used atlarge elections, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that this practice
violated Article V.233 A number of states required delegates to vote in
accord with whatever position they had pledged to support when elected
or in accord with the result of a statewide referendum.234 This, too, was
controversial, because it broke with the historical understanding of a convention as an authentically deliberative body. As one leading scholar put
it, “a delegate must be free to decide how he individually will vote, to ratify
or not to ratify,” and “he must not be subject to any legal process either to
compel him to vote in a given way or to punish him if he does not so
vote.”235 The Maine high court agreed.236 The Alabama Supreme Court
came out the opposite way, upholding a law requiring delegates to pledge
that they would abide by the result of a statewide referendum on the
ground that a convention is “more truly representative when expressing
the known will of the people.”237
In the end, the lawsuits challenging the ratiﬁcation process did not
carry the day. But the U.S. Supreme Court never weighed in.238 And the
included “escape hatch” provisions in their state convention laws, providing that any federal
law would take precedence if passed. Id.
230. Clement E. Vose, Repeal as a Political Achievement, in Law, Alcohol, and Order:
Perspectives on National Prohibition 97, 112 (David E. Kyvig ed., 1985).
231. See Vose, Constitutional Change, supra note 229, at 121–26 (describing litigation
ﬁled by opponents of repeal).
232. Thomas F. Schaller, Democracy at Rest: Strategic Ratiﬁcation of the Twenty-First
Amendment, Publius, Spring 1998, at 81, 88; see also Noel T. Dowling, A New Experiment
in Ratiﬁcation, 19 A.B.A. J. 383, 384 (1933) (“Election at large, for all delegates, involves a
break-away from prior notions concerning the composition of conventions. The idea of local
representation permeates our political thinking and possibly is to some extent imported
into the Constitution by the term ‘convention.’”).
233. In re Opinion of the Justices, 167 A. 176, 179 (Me. 1933) (“[W]e do not deem it
permissible for the state, under the terms of article 5 of the Federal Constitution, to organize
a convention wherein the delegates entitled to participate are all elected at large.”).
234. Everett S. Brown, The Ratiﬁcation of the Twenty-First Amendment, 29 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 1005, 1013–14 (1935).
235. Dowling, supra note 232, at 385.
236. In re Opinion of the Justices, 167 A. at 180 (“A convention is a body or assembly
representative of all the people of the state. The convention must be free to exercise the
essential and characteristic function of rational deliberation.”).
237. In re Opinion of the Justices, 148 So. 107, 111 (Ala. 1933).
238. See Vose, Constitutional Change, supra note 229, at 121 (“No great cases resulted
and none ever reached the United States Supreme Court.”). In addition to the Alabama
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litigation did little to settle or clarify what constraints Article V might
impose on the process of ratiﬁcation by state conventions.239
J.

The Twenty-Second Amendment

The Twenty-Second Amendment codiﬁed the unwritten norm, which
President Franklin Roosevelt had transgressed, against presidents serving
more than two terms.240 From a procedural point of view, the most striking
thing about the amendment is the ﬁnal vote tally in the House of
Representatives: 81 to 29.241 The size of the House, then as now, was 435
members.242 A quorum therefore required at least 218 members, and twothirds of a quorum required at least 146 members. How was the TwentySecond Amendment sent to the states with so few “yeas”—less than a ﬁfth
of the total House membership?
The answer comes from the House Rules. As the Supreme Court has
observed, the “Constitution has prescribed no method” for determining
the presence of a quorum, “and it is therefore within the competency of
the house to prescribe any method which shall be reasonably certain to
ascertain the fact.”243 The “method” the House has settled on is to presume
the presence of a quorum unless the fact is challenged.244 Furthermore,
the Speaker of the House determined in 1890 that all members present in
the House would count toward a quorum, even if they did not vote.245 The
and Maine cases discussed above, the high courts of Missouri and Ohio held that acts establishing their convention procedures did not have to be submitted to a referendum like other
laws. See State ex rel. Tate v. Sevier, 62 S.W.2d 895, 898 (Mo. 1933); State ex rel. Donnelly
v. Myers, 186 N.E. 918, 918–19 (Ohio 1933).
239. Cf. Recent Cases, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 126, 130 (1933) (observing that “[t]he opposing
views of [the Alabama and Maine] decisions indicate the lack of both authority and satisfactory analogies” regarding how ratiﬁcation of Article V amendments by convention is supposed to work).
240. See Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 65
UCLA L. Rev. 1430, 1435–37 (2018) (describing the Twenty-Second Amendment as a classic
example of an imperiled norm being “displaced by law”).
241. 93 Cong. Rec. 2392 (1947).
242. See Determining Apportionment, U.S. House of Representatives Hist.,
Art & Archives, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Apportionment/DeterminingApportionment/ [https://perma.cc/S94V-XW4X] (last visited Aug. 5, 2021).
243. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 6 (1892).
244. See Charles W. Johnson, John V. Sullivan & Thomas J. Wickham, Jr., House
Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents, and Procedures of the House 756 (2017) (“A
quorum is presumed to be present unless a point of no quorum is entertained and the Chair
announces that a quorum is in fact not present or unless the absence of a quorum is disclosed by a vote or by a call of the House.”). The Court has implicitly blessed this method
in a separate context. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 553 (2014) (“Senate rules
presume that a quorum is present unless a present Senator questions it.”).
245. See Johnson et al., supra note 244, at 760. The Speaker made this change to defeat
the obstructionist “disappearing quorum” tactic, by which minority-party members would
prevent a quorum by refusing to vote. See Josh Chafetz, Unprecedented? Judicial
Conﬁrmation Battles and the Search for a Usable Past, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 96, 112–14 (2017).
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upshot is that the House can pass a bill—or apparently an amendment—
with fewer than half of its members voting, as long as no one questions
whether a quorum is present.246
That is what happened with the Twenty-Second Amendment. The
House passed by a vote of 285 to 121 an initial version of the proposed
amendment that would have prevented anyone from being elected
President who had served any part of two terms.247 The amendment was
then reworked in the Senate into its current form, which provides that
someone who serves as President for less than two years of another’s term
may still be elected twice.248 This was clearly a “material change,”249 requiring a new vote in the House. The new vote, approving the Senate version,
was 81 to 29.250 One representative “object[ed] to the vote on the ground
a quorum is not present.”251 But he subsequently withdrew his objection
without explanation, and a count never took place.252
While the ﬁnal vote seems to have been effective under House rules,
there is reason to be skeptical. Even if one is willing to accept that a bare
quorum may vote on a constitutional amendment, the idea that a handful
of representatives could propose an amendment in the absence of an
actual quorum may be a bridge too far. The ﬁnal House vote on the
Twenty-Second Amendment severely strained both the text (“two thirds of
both Houses”) and the supermajoritarian spirit of Article V. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has given added reason for skepticism. In the National
Prohibition Cases, the Court approved the application of the general
quorum rule to constitutional amendments, but it advised: “The two-thirds
vote in each house which is required in proposing an amendment is a vote
of two-thirds of the members present—assuming the presence of a
quorum.”253 The Court did not say two-thirds of the members present and
voting. Perhaps this was a slip-up by the Court, but the Twenty-Second

246. See Thomas J. Wickham, Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual, and Rules of the House
of Representatives 83 (2019) (“The majority required to pass a constitutional amendment . . . is two-thirds of those Members voting either in the affirmative or negative, a
quorum being present, and Members who only indicate that they are ‘present’ are not
counted in this computation.”).
247. See Stephen W. Stathis, The Twenty-Second Amendment: A Practical Remedy or
Partisan Maneuver?, 7 Const. Comment. 61, 67 (1990).
248. Id. at 68; see U.S. Const. amend. XXII.
249. 93 Cong. Rec. 2389 (1947) (statement of Rep. Michener).
250. Id. at 2392.
251. Id. (statement of Rep. Forand).
252. See Corwin & Ramsey, supra note 96, at 192–94.
253. 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920). A half-century earlier, Senator Lyman Trumbull had put
the point similarly on the ﬂoor of Congress: “[I]t was decided” during debates on the
Corwin Amendment, he said, that “two thirds of the Senators present, a quorum being present, was sufficient to carry a constitutional amendment.” Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess.
1642 (1869) (emphasis added).
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Amendment emphatically did not receive a vote of two-thirds of a present
quorum.254
To be clear, we are not suggesting that judges (or anyone else) today
could or should disregard the Twenty-Second Amendment, which has
been an entrenched feature of our constitutional order for more than
seventy years. As with the Sixteenth Amendment, courts would almost
certainly dismiss any lawsuit challenging the Twenty-Second Amendment
without reaching the merits.255 But the amendment’s current status as part
of the Constitution is not due to painstaking, or even particularly
conscientious, adherence to the rules of Article V.
K.

The Twenty-Seventh Amendment?256

The Twenty-Seventh Amendment brings this story full circle. It was
proposed by Congress in the early days of the republic, but it is the most
recent amendment to have gained entry to the Constitution . . . if indeed
it did gain entry. The fact that leading constitutional scholars still refer to

254. We have not been able to ascertain whether those who voted on the Twenty-Second
Amendment were the only members present in the House, in which case there was not a
quorum, or whether there was in fact a quorum present in the House (in keeping with the
presumption in the House Rules) and the amendment failed to obtain a “vote of two-thirds
of the members present.” Nat’l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. at 386. Either way, Article V
would not be satisﬁed per the rule announced by the Court in 1920.
255. See supra notes 185–188 and accompanying text.
256. We are not aware of signiﬁcant novel challenges to the Twenty-Third through
Twenty-Sixth Amendments. These “modest” amendments were “narrowly drawn reforms
that produced only marginal change.” Kyvig, supra note 141, at 349. The Twenty-Third
Amendment contained, for the ﬁrst time, a ratiﬁcation time limit in the resolution proposing the amendment rather than in the text of the amendment itself. See Allison L. Held,
Sheryl L. Herndon & Danielle M. Stager, The Equal Rights Amendment: Why the ERA
Remains Legally Viable and Properly Before the States, 3 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 113,
126 (1997). The validity of this time limit was never tested, however, because the amendment (which authorized presidential electors for the District of Columbia) was ratiﬁed
within a year. See Michael J. Garcia, Caitlain Devereaux Lewis, Andrew Nolan, Meghan
Totten & Ashley Tyson, Cong. Rsch. Serv., The Constitution of the United States of America,
S. Doc. No. 112-9, at 40 n.15 (2017). When the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was certiﬁed as
part of the Constitution, President Lyndon Johnson signed the certiﬁcation, although
apparently only as a witness. See Certiﬁcation of Amendment to Constitution of the United
States, 32 Fed. Reg. 3287, 3287–88 (Feb. 25, 1967); Remarks at Ceremony Marking the
Ratiﬁcation of the Presidential Inability (25th) Amendment to the Constitution, 1 Pub.
Papers 217–18 (Feb. 23, 1967); Stephen W. Stathis, Presidential Disability Agreements Prior
to the 25th Amendment, 12 Pres. Stud. Q. 208, 212 (1982). The Twenty-Sixth Amendment,
which was the “most quickly ratiﬁed constitutional amendment in our history,” Tex.
Democratic Party v. Abbott, 978 F.3d 168, 186 (5th Cir. 2020), featured a reprise of the
debate in Tennessee over whether a state constitution could validly require an intervening
election before the legislature ratiﬁed the amendment. The Tennessee Supreme Court held
this state constitutional limitation invalid. See Walker v. Dunn, 498 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn.
1972); supra notes 214–225 and accompanying text.
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it as the “purported”257 or “alleged”258 Twenty-Seventh Amendment highlights how many questions about Article V have remained open in the two
centuries between its proposal and ratiﬁcation.
What is now regarded as the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, which prohibits a congressional salary increase from taking effect before an intervening election, was proposed as the second of twelve amendments sent to
the states in 1789 (the third through twelfth were the Bill of Rights). By
the time the Bill of Rights was ratiﬁed in 1791, only six states had ratiﬁed
the so-called Congressional Pay Amendment, and it fell into a long state
of dormancy.259 About a hundred years later, the Ohio legislature voted to
ratify the amendment to protest the “Salary Grab” Act of 1873, in which
Congress gave itself a large and retroactive salary increase.260 But that was
an isolated maneuver, and the concomitant introduction in Congress of
numerous proposals for a new congressional pay amendment suggests that
many regarded the original version as dead.261 Nonetheless, the
Congressional Pay Amendment was resurrected a century later, owing to
the dogged efforts of a University of Texas undergraduate and public displeasure at congressional salary increases.262
Maine and Colorado ratiﬁed the amendment in 1983 and 1984. News
coverage of those ratiﬁcations prompted a Wyoming legislator to report
that his state had also ratiﬁed the amendment in 1977—a fact that had
somehow escaped notice in the nation’s capital.263 After that, it was off to
the races. By 1992, forty-one states had ratiﬁed.264
Since 1984, the Archivist of the United States has been assigned the
statutory responsibility to “publish[]” new amendments.265 The Archivist
sought the advice of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC). OLC opined that there was no time limit on ratiﬁcation, brushing
aside the Supreme Court’s contrary language in Dillon as “dictum,” and
257. E.g., Sanford Levinson, Authorizing Constitutional Text: On the Purported
Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 11 Const. Comment. 101, 101 (1994) [hereinafter Levinson,
Authorizing Constitutional Text]; Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 606, 636 (2008).
258. E.g., Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 4, at 1046 n.3; Michael J. Perry, What
Is “the Constitution”? (And Other Fundamental Questions), in Constitutionalism:
Philosophical Foundations 99, 133 n.1 (Larry Alexander ed., 2001).
259. See Bernstein, supra note 25, at 532–33.
260. Id. at 534.
261. Id.
262. See Kyvig, supra note 141, at 464–65; Bernstein, supra note 25, at 536–39.
263. Kyvig, supra note 141, at 465; Bernstein, supra note 25, at 537.
264. Bernstein, supra note 25, at 539. The ratiﬁcation of Idaho raised a variant of an old
problem: whether the state could require that a proposed amendment be submitted to the
people in a referendum prior to ratiﬁcation. The Idaho Attorney General opined that such
a requirement was unconstitutional, but following a favorable referendum vote, the
legislature ratiﬁed anyway. Id.
265. Pub. L. No. 98-497, § 107(d), 98 Stat. 2280, 2291 (1984) (codiﬁed at 1 U.S.C.
§ 106b (2018)).
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that the Congressional Pay Amendment had been validly ratiﬁed.266 OLC
also opined that Congress has no role in proclaiming an amendment part
of the Constitution, despite the contrary views of seven Justices in
Coleman.267 In keeping with OLC’s advice, the Archivist “certif[ied]” in the
Federal Register that the “Amendment has become valid, to all intents and
purposes, as a part of the Constitution of the United States.”268
Congressional leadership was “stunned.”269 Several members took to
the ﬂoor to reassert Congress’s primacy in judging the validity of an
amendment. Senator Robert Byrd, for instance, invoked the “ﬁrm historical understanding . . . that the Executive’s function with regard to certifying constitutional amendments is purely ministerial” and insisted that
“Congress should have the opportunity to decide substantive questions”
of amendment validity.270 Numerous members of Congress expressed concern about whether ratiﬁcation of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment would
furnish a precedent for reviving other seemingly lapsed amendments.271
Nevertheless, in the end Congress voted overwhelmingly for a resolution
validating the Twenty-Seventh Amendment.272
Yet even as countless pocket Constitutions and textbooks have ﬂown
off the presses since 1992 with the Twenty-Seventh Amendment included,
“there is, at least at this time, no consensually agreed-upon, positivistic
‘given’ that allows us to say that we are simply engaging in description
when granting the amendment the status of ‘law.’”273 Two of the foremost
266. Cong. Pay Amendment, 16 Op. O.L.C. 85, 97 (1992). The Court in Dillon, recall,
had unanimously described the idea that the Congressional Pay Amendment might still be
ratiﬁed “quite untenable.” Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921); see supra note 23.
267. Cong. Pay Amendment, 16 Op. O.L.C. at 99.
268. Certiﬁcation of Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Relating to
Compensation of Members of Congress, 57 Fed. Reg. 21,187, 21,188 (May 19, 1992).
269. Bernstein, supra note 25, at 540.
270. 138 Cong. Rec. 11,654 (1992) (statement of Sen. Byrd); see also, e.g., id. at 11,779
(statement of Rep. Fish) (“Where . . . there may be lingering concerns as to the validity of
the amendment, it is appropriate for Congress to resolve such doubts . . . .”); id. at 11,860
(statement of Sen. Grassley) (“[T]he Supreme Court made clear in 1939 in the Coleman
decision that Congress has the authority to say whether the timeliness standard has been
met.”); id. at 11,871 (statement of Sen. Roth) (stating that “the functions of” the Archivist
“are ministerial only: To count the number of ratiﬁcations of an amendment and not to act
as a constitutional tribunal to ‘decide doubtful questions’ of law”).
271. See, e.g., id. at 11,655 (statement of Sen. Byrd) (“I do not intend our action with
regard to this amendment to serve as a precedent or model for any other amendment . . . .”); id. at 11,780 (statement of Rep. Edwards) (“The House . . . should be clear
that this is an exception, not a precedent.”). Although one senator stated that the Senate
had “decided to declare that four [sic] other proposed and pending amendments . . . were
to be considered to have lapsed,” id. at 11,870 (statement of Sen. Sanford), neither the
Senate nor the House took formal action on that question. Senator Jesse Helms provided
the more accurate assessment: “I regret that some questions are left unanswered.” Id. at
11,871.
272. Id. at 11,869 (Senate); id. at 12,052 (House).
273. Levinson, Authorizing Constitutional Text, supra note 257, at 113.
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academic authorities on the amendment process, Dellinger and Prakash,
maintain that the amendment is not part of the Constitution.274 Justice
Scalia stated at a public event that he is inclined to agree.275 Ackerman has
written that “the so-called twenty-seventh amendment should be treated
as a bad joke by sensible citizens.”276 A unanimous Supreme Court,
including Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis, suggested
that the amendment was unrevivable a century ago.277 On the other hand,
eminent constitutional scholars such as Amar, Michael Stokes Paulsen,
and Laurence Tribe have taken the opposite position.278 Perhaps the best
an editor of the Constitution can do is to adopt the approach suggested by
William Van Alstyne: Include the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, but with
an asterisk.279
In light of the history of legal contestation and confusion recounted
above, an asterisk would be a ﬁtting way for the written Constitution to
end.
L.

The Twenty-Eighth Amendment?

Or maybe that is not quite the end. Supporters of other amendments
proposed by Congress over the years claim that these amendments, too,
have already become part of the canonical document. As a matter of
Article V law, it is not clear that all of these claims are wrong.
1. Article the First. — The very ﬁrst amendment proposed by Congress,
denominated “Article the First” in the same package of amendments that
contained the Bill of Rights and the putative Twenty-Seventh, involved the
size of the House of Representatives.280 The ratiﬁcation history is obscure,
274. See Prakash, Of Synchronicity, supra note 16, at 1283; Paul M. Barrett & David
Rogers, A Timely Measure Gains Ratiﬁcation After Two Centuries, Wall St. J., May 8, 1992,
at A10 (quoting Dellinger).
275. Tribe, The Invisible Constitution, supra note 10, at 4.
276. Ackerman, We the People, supra note 7, at 490 n.1.
277. See Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921).
278. See Amar, America’s Constitution, supra note 49, at 457; Paulsen, A General
Theory, supra note 50, at 682–83; Laurence H. Tribe, The 27th Amendment Joins the
Constitution, Wall St. J., May 13, 1992, at A15.
279. William Van Alstyne, What Do You Think About the Twenty-Seventh Amendment?,
10 Const. Comment. 9, 15 (1993).
280. See Resolution of Congress Proposing Amendatory Articles to the Several States,
in Documentary History, supra note 103, at 321, 321–22. Article the First would have set an
initial minimum number of representatives based on population, until the national population reached a certain number, at which point it would have mandated a minimum of 200
representatives and a maximum of one per ﬁfty thousand. Id.; see also Amar, The Bill of
Rights, supra note 94, at 1143–45. The language is convoluted enough that unless one
adopts some sort of “scrivener’s error” theory, its meaning is misrepresented on the Senate’s
official website. See Congress Submits the First Constitutional Amendments to
the States, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/
Congress_Submits_1st_Amendments_to_States.htm [https://perma.cc/8TNE-QG55] (last
visited Aug. 5, 2021) (claiming that if Article the First were adopted, the House “would today
have more than 6,000 members”). A possible source of confusion is that a congressional
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but it appears to have fallen just short.281 Of the states that voted to add
the Bill of Rights to the Constitution, only Delaware declined to ratify
Article the First, probably because, as a small state, its power would shrink
in a larger House.282 This left the amendment one state shy of ratiﬁcation.
And the failure of Massachusetts and Connecticut to ratify not only this
amendment but also the Bill of Rights “poses something of a mystery.”283
In Massachusetts, the two houses of the legislature approved slightly different sets of amendments, and a joint committee never reconciled the
differences.284 In Connecticut, the lower house of the legislature apparently approved eleven of twelve proposed amendments in 1789, including
Article the First, but the upper house tabled the issue until the next session.285 At the next session, the upper house approved all twelve amendments, but the lower house only approved the Bill of Rights (and maybe
the Congressional Pay Amendment—the journal contradicts itself).286 The
two houses could not reconcile their resolutions, so no notice of
ratiﬁcation was ever sent to the capital.
A recent pair of lawsuits, however, alleges that Connecticut did ratify
Article the First. The basic claim is that the ratiﬁcation was effective
conference committee at the eleventh hour “inexplicably” changed “less” to “more” in the
ﬁnal clause, converting a minimum to a maximum and introducing a “technical glitch[]”
into the formula. Amar, The Bill of Rights, supra note 94, at 1143.
281. See Amar, The Bill of Rights, supra note 94, at 1143. As Amar explains, numerous
historians have bungled this ratiﬁcation count in a variety of ways. Id. at 1143 n.52.
282. For the ratifying states, see Virginia Ratiﬁcation Resolution (Nov. 4, 1791), in
Documentary History, supra note 103, at 377, 385; Vermont Ratiﬁcation Resolution (Oct.
27, 1790), in Documentary History, supra note 103, at 371, 373–74; New Jersey Ratiﬁcation
Resolution (Aug. 3, 1790), in Documentary History, supra note 103, at 325, 327; Rhode
Island Ratiﬁcation Resolution (June 15, 1790), in Documentary History, supra note 103, at
363, 364; New York Ratiﬁcation Resolution (Mar. 27, 1790), in Documentary History, supra
note 103, at 357, 358; New Hampshire Ratiﬁcation Resolution (Jan. 25, 1790), in
Documentary History, supra note 103, at 345, 346; South Carolina Ratiﬁcation Resolution
(Jan. 19, 1790), in Documentary History, supra note 103, at 340, 341; North Carolina
Ratiﬁcation Resolution (Dec. 22, 1789), in Documentary History, supra note 103, at 335,
337; Maryland Ratiﬁcation Resolution (Dec. 19, 1789), in Documentary History, supra note
103, at 330, 331. Pennsylvania ﬁrst rejected the amendment, Pennsylvania Ratiﬁcation
Resolution (Mar. 11, 1790), in Documentary History, supra note 103, at 352, 353, but then
ratiﬁed on September 21, 1791, Pennsylvania Ratiﬁcation Resolution (Sept. 21, 1791), in
Documentary History, supra note 103, at 367, 369. “The ﬁles of the Department of State
contain no notices of ratiﬁcation from the legislatures of Connecticut, Georgia, or
Massachusetts.” Denys P. Myers, Massachusetts and the First Ten Amendments to the
Constitution, S. Doc. No. 74-181, at 7 (1936) [hereinafter Myers, Massachusetts and the First
Ten Amendments]; see also Ames, supra note 55, at 320.
283. Alan P. Grimes, Democracy and the Amendments to the Constitution 28 n.40
(1978).
284. Id.; Myers, Massachusetts and the First Ten Amendments, supra note 282, at 11–
12.
285. Thomas H. Le Duc, Connecticut and the First Ten Amendments to the Federal
Constitution, S. Doc. No. 75-96, at 3 (1937).
286. Id.; see also Grimes, supra note 283, at 28 n.40.
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because both houses approved Article the First, albeit during two different
legislative sessions, and that any state rule requiring approval by both
chambers during a single session is superseded by Article V.287 Both lawsuits, unsurprisingly, were dismissed on standing and political question
grounds.288 But the legal arguments they press are by no means untenable
on the merits.
2. The Titles of Nobility Amendment. — The so-called Titles of Nobility
Amendment, proposed by Congress in 1810, has had a similarly checkered
legal history.289 It fell short of the necessary number of state ratiﬁcations.
But confusion about its status persisted for years. In an official 1815 compilation of the laws of the United States, published with the authorization
of Congress, the Titles of Nobility Amendment appeared in the
Constitution as the Thirteenth Amendment.290 The editors of the compilation explained that there had “been some difficulty in ascertaining”
whether it had been ratiﬁed, because the “evidence to be found in the
office” of the Secretary of State was “defective.”291 The editors “considered
[it] best” to include the supposed “thirteenth” amendment with that prefatory note.292 The official edition of the Constitution printed for the
Fifteenth Congress also contained the amendment.293 Secretary of State
John Quincy Adams, in a letter from 1817, seemed to be under the impression that the amendment was part of the Constitution.294 Even today, historians give conﬂicting accounts of how close the amendment was to
ratiﬁcation.295

287. See LaVergne v. House of Representatives, 392 F. Supp. 3d 108 (D.D.C. 2019)
(three-judge court).
288. LaVergne v. Bryson, 497 F. App’x 219, 221–23 (3d Cir. 2012); LaVergne, 392 F.
Supp. 3d at 117–19.
289. This proposed amendment provides in full:
If any citizen of the United States shall accept, claim, receive or retain any
title of nobility or honor, or shall, without the consent of Congress, accept
and retain any present, pension, office or emolument of any kind
whatever, from any emperor, king, prince or foreign power, such person
shall cease to be a citizen of the United States, and shall be incapable of
holding any office of trust or proﬁt under them, or either of them.
Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (Nov. 27,
1809), in Documentary History, supra note 103, at 452, 452.
290. See 1 Laws of the United States of America 74 (John Bioren & W. John Duane eds.,
1815).
291. Id. at ix.
292. Id.
293. See Ames, supra note 55, at 188; Silversmith, supra note 100, at 587 (citing 31
Annals of Cong. 530–31 (1817)).
294. Silversmith, supra note 100, at 587 n.62. Adams later corrected himself. Id.
295. Compare, e.g., Bernstein with Agel, supra note 16, at 176 (“one state short”), and
Kyvig, supra note 141, at 117 (one state short), with Silversmith, supra note 100, at 595–96
(“[I]t was never a single ratiﬁcation short . . . .”). Silversmith appears to have the better of
the argument.
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Throughout the early to mid-1800s, “the general public continued to
think that [the Titles of Nobility] amendment had been adopted.”296 The
amendment frequently appeared in official state codes, in printed editions
of the Constitution, and in textbooks.297 By the end of the nineteenth century, it was “commonly recognized” that the Titles of Nobility Amendment
had failed.298 But the whole episode conﬁrms once again that the constitutional text is constituted to a signiﬁcant extent by public attitudes and
that those attitudes can become detached from Article V.
3. The Equal Rights Amendment. — The ﬁnal, and in our view strongest,
contender to be the twenty-eighth amendment is the ERA, which would
prohibit the denial or abridgement of “[e]quality of rights under the
law . . . by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”299 The
odyssey of the ERA recapitulates many of the uncertainties already canvassed above.300 It was proposed by Congress in 1972, and the accompanying resolution set a ratiﬁcation deadline of seven years.301 As that deadline
approached, only thirty-ﬁve states (of thirty-eight needed) had ratiﬁed,
and several of those had purported to rescind their ratiﬁcations,302 so
Congress voted by simple majority to extend the ratiﬁcation deadline by
three years.303 President Jimmy Carter signed the resolution extending the
deadline while disclaiming that it was constitutionally necessary.304 No

296. Ames, supra note 55, at 188–89.
297. See Gideon M. Hart, The “Original” Thirteenth Amendment: The Misunderstood
Titles of Nobility Amendment, 94 Marq. L. Rev. 311, 366–67 & nn.302–316 (2010)
(collecting sources).
298. Silversmith, supra note 100, at 593; accord Hart, supra note 297, at 367. This has
not stopped certain “extremist” groups from claiming that the amendment was ratiﬁed and
then suppressed by unscrupulous lawyers. Silversmith, supra note 100, at 580–81.
299. Proposed Amendment to the United States Constitution, 92 H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d
Cong., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972).
300. For a broad overview of the legal and political ﬁght for the ERA from the early
1900s to the present, see Julie C. Suk, We the Women: The Unstoppable Mothers of the
Equal Rights Amendment (2020) [hereinafter Suk, We the Women].
301. Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
Relative to Equal Rights for Men and Women, H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 86 Stat. 1523
(1972).
302. Ratiﬁcation of the Equal Rights Amendment, 44 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 6–7 & nn.6–
8 (Jan. 6, 2020). Four state legislatures voted to rescind their ratiﬁcations, and one passed a
resolution providing that its ratiﬁcation would be withdrawn if the ERA was not ratiﬁed during the seven-year period. Id. at 7 & n.8. Further complicating matters, the acting governor
of Kentucky vetoed the state’s purported rescission while the governor was on vacation.
Acting Governor Vetoes Kentucky Rights Reversal, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1978, at 20. A sixth
state, North Dakota, recently passed a joint resolution “clarifying” that its initial ratiﬁcation
expired in 1979. S. Con. Res. 4010, 67th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2021).
303. Joint Resolution Extending the Deadline for the Ratiﬁcation of the Equal Rights
Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 638, 95th Cong., 92 Stat. 3799 (1978).
304. Jimmy Carter, U.S. President, Speech at a Ceremony Commemorating the
Extension of the Ratiﬁcation Deadline of the Equal Rights Amendment: Remarks on
Signing H.J. Res. 638, 2 Pub. Papers 1800 (Oct. 20, 1978).
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additional states ratiﬁed before the expiration of the new deadline. Beginning in 2017, however, Nevada, Illinois, and Virginia each ratiﬁed, pushing
the total number of ratiﬁcations over the three-fourths line if one counts
the states that later rescinded.305 OLC opined in January 2020 that the ERA
had expired and was no longer pending before the states.306 But the House
of Representatives passed a resolution the next month eliminating the
deadline, and Senators Ben Cardin and Lisa Murkowski have introduced
a similar measure in the Senate.307 Meanwhile, a number of lawsuits
regarding the status of the ERA are pending at this writing.308
There is a credible argument that the ERA is already part of the
Constitution based on Article V. To start, many officials and scholars have
taken the view that purported rescissions are ineffective, given, among
other things, the value of ﬁnality and the textual commitment to states of
the power to “ratif[y]” only.309 Several nineteenth-century treatise writers
advised that rescissions were ineffective.310 And “[e]very state legislature
that passed a resolution rescinding a prior ratiﬁcation of the ERA did so
under the cloud of an express opinion that such an action would be a legal
nullity.”311 As for Congress’s attempt to impose a deadline, that too was
arguably invalid. After all, as OLC observed in 1992, “the plain language
of Article V contains no time limit on the ratiﬁcation process.”312 It is at
least arguable, then, that Congress has no power to create a ratiﬁcation
time limit through a resolution that does not itself go through the Article
V process.313
305. See Timothy Williams, Virginia Approves the E.R.A., Becoming the 38th State to
Back It, N.Y. Times (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/15/us/era-virginiavote.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
306. Ratiﬁcation of the Equal Rights Amendment, 44 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 1–2, 12–24.
307. See Patricia Sullivan, U.S. House Removes ERA Ratiﬁcation Deadline, One
Obstacle to Enactment, Wash. Post (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
legal-issues/us-house-removes-era-ratification-deadline-one-obstacle-to-enactment/2020/
02/13/e82aa802-4de5-11ea-b721-9f4cdc90bc1c_story.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review).
308. See, e.g., Complaint, Alabama v. Ferriero, No. 7:19-CV-02032-LSC (N.D. Ala. ﬁled
Dec. 17, 2019), 2019 WL 6894418; see also Kentiya Orange, In the Know: Equal Rights
Amendment Lawsuits, League of Women Voters (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.lwv.org/
blog/know-equal-rights-amendment-lawsuits [https://perma.cc/9BAS-PXJU] (summarizing
lawsuits).
309. See, e.g., Dellinger, Legitimacy of Constitutional Change, supra note 16, at 421–
24; John R. Vile, Permitting States to Rescind Ratiﬁcations of Pending Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution, Publius, Spring 1990, at 109, 115–20 (reviewing ﬁve “basic arguments . . .
against a state’s right to rescind amendments”). But see Vile, supra, at 113–15 (reviewing
counterarguments).
310. Dellinger, Legitimacy of Constitutional Change, supra note 16, at 423 & n.177.
311. Id. at 423.
312. Cong. Pay Amendment, 16 Op. O.L.C. 85, 88 (1992).
313. See, e.g., Danaya C. Wright, “Great Variety of Relevant Conditions, Political, Social
and Economic”: The Constitutionality of Congressional Deadlines on Amendment
Proposals Under Article V, 28 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 45, 77–92 (2019); Mason Kalfus,
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The Supreme Court did state in Dillon that Congress has the power
“to ﬁx a deﬁnite period for” ratiﬁcation.314 But this statement rested
(again, arguably) on the logically prior conclusion that Article V requires
that “ratiﬁcation must be within some reasonable time after the proposal.”315 That conclusion did not survive the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment, at least in the view of Congress and the executive branch.316
Moreover, even if one believes that Congress has an implied power to control ratiﬁcation deadlines and that the ERA’s deadline has expired, it may
be that retroactively extending such a deadline is a permissible exercise of
this power. Not only that, it may be Congress’s exclusive prerogative under
Coleman to judge whether its extension of the deadline is valid.317 For now,
of course, the ERA does not appear in printed copies of the Constitution.
But the story may not be over, especially given recent shifts in power in
Washington.
M. An Article V Convention?
A brief coda: Our focus has been on the Article V “track” of congressionally initiated amendments, because that is how every amendment in
U.S. history has been passed. There is also the separate and unused track
of amendments proposed by a federal convention. Article V is “strikingly
vague” on how such a convention would be triggered and how, if triggered, it would operate.318 Over the years, the states have sent hundreds of
Comment, Why Time Limits on the Ratiﬁcation of Constitutional Amendments Violate
Article V, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 437, 446–67 (1999); cf. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.
417, 445–46 (1998) (holding that Congress cannot change by statute the constitutional process for enacting legislation). It is also notable that the ERA’s time limit was worded differently than prior time limits. The resolution proposing the ERA stated that it would be valid
“when ratiﬁed . . . within seven years,” whereas prior limits had stated that the proposed
amendment would be “inoperative unless,” or valid “only if,” ratiﬁed within a certain time
period. Suk, We the Women, supra note 300, at 177 (emphasis added). In light of this contrast, the ERA’s time limit was arguably just hortatory.
314. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375–76 (1921). It is debatable whether this issue was
properly before the Court in Dillon, given that the Eighteenth Amendment had been ratiﬁed
well within the deadline set by Congress. In addition, the deadline was in the text of the
proposed amendment itself, not in the accompanying resolution. Dillon is therefore “dubious” authority at best for the validity of the ERA’s limit. Robert Hajdu & Bruce E.
Rosenblum, Note, The Process of Constitutional Amendment, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 106, 126
n.75 (1979); see also Virginia v. Ferriero, 525 F. Supp. 3d 36, 57 (D.D.C. 2021) (noting that
whether Congress may impose a deadline by resolution “is a question of ﬁrst impression”).
315. Dillon, 256 U.S. at 375.
316. See Prakash, Of Synchronicity, supra note 16, at 1226 (“While the Supreme Court
once claimed that the states had to ratify proposed amendments within a reasonable period
of time after their receipt, the political branches later decided otherwise.”).
317. See Daniel Hemel, Some Thoughts on the 28th Amendment, Medium (June 5,
2018),
https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/some-thoughts-on-the-28thamendment-fc4d8372ab14 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
318. Laurence H. Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting Congress to Call a Constitutional
Convention to Propose a Balanced Budget Amendment, 10 Pac. L.J. 627, 632 (1979); see
also Michael B. Rappaport, Reforming Article V: The Problems Created by the National
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applications to Congress for an Article V convention. Some are limited to
a particular subject; some are unrestricted or “general.”319 Paulsen, after
tabulating all of the applications that had arrived by 1993, concluded that
“there are, at present, forty-ﬁve states with their lights ‘on’ for a general
convention.”320 In other words, “Congress is obliged to call a constitutional
convention and has been for some time.”321
Paulsen’s conclusion rests on some questionable premises about how
to count state applications. Based on his belief that Article V permits only
unrestricted conventions for proposing amendments, he puts applications
that are limited to a certain subject, but not conditioned on a convention
adopting such a limit, into the “general” column.322 Even so, the fact that
there is a colorable argument that recent Congresses have been obliged to
call a constitutional convention—all of the rules of which would have to
be invented more or less from scratch—is another vivid illustration of how
little is settled about the law of Article V.
IV. LIVING WITH ARTICLE V AMBIGUITY: JUDGING CONTESTED
AMENDMENTS
The vast majority of Article V amendments, as Part III shows, have
faced credible challenges to their validity.323 This Part ﬁrst explains why
Convention Amendment Method and How to Fix Them, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1509, 1517 (2010)
(“Although the Constitution speciﬁes that an amendment may be drafted by a national convention, it unfortunately does not clearly answer various questions about this amendment
method.”).
319. See Paulsen, A General Theory, supra note 50, at 765–89 (compiling convention
applications as of 1993).
320. Id. at 756.
321. Id.; see also Robert G. Natelson, Counting to Two Thirds: How Close Are We to a
Convention for Proposing Amendments to the Constitution?, 19 Federalist Soc’y Rev. 50,
53–60 (2018) (arguing that Congress is one state application short of being obliged to call
a convention to propose a balanced budget amendment); Walker Hanson, Note, The States’
Power to Effectuate Constitutional Change: Is Congress Currently Required to Convene a
National Convention for the Proposing of Amendments to the United States Constitution?,
9 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 245, 258 (2011) (“Even when considering the rescissions of Oregon,
North Dakota, and Wyoming as valid, those three rescissions combined with the rescissions
of the other eight states since 1993 leave a total of thirty-four states with valid applications
before Congress calling for an Article V convention . . . .”). Colorado recently rescinded its
outstanding applications for an Article V convention. H.J. Res. 21-1006 (Colo. Apr. 27,
2021).
322. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Count to Thirty-Four: The Constitutional Case
for a Constitutional Convention, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 837, 839–55 (2011) (detailing
his methodology). In this 2011 essay, Paulsen concluded that the number of states with
“lights on” for a general convention had dropped from forty-ﬁve to thirty-three—just below
the two-thirds threshold—on account of post-1993 rescissions. Id. at 856–58.
323. More speciﬁcally, Part III shows that these challenges were credible in terms of the
interpretive conventions used by mainstream constitutional lawyers. We take no position in
this paper on the ultimate persuasiveness of the challenges in their day or on the appropriateness of the conventions. This synoptic approach means that we do not apply any particular interpretive method in depth; we have not, for example, attempted any sort of
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such challenges are likely to keep arising, given this history and the extent
of legal uncertainty that persists. It then asks how, as a matter of institutional design, disputes over Article V compliance might best be resolved
in the future.
A.

The Highly Incomplete Liquidation of Article V

The standard view of constitutional lawyers today is that at most a
“handful” of amendments, above all the Reconstruction Amendments,
have raised any meaningful legal difficulties.324 And these difficulties can
be dismissed as outliers, not only because of their statistical rarity but also
because of the extraordinary upheaval wrought by the Civil War and the
“ﬂuky” circumstances of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment.325 We hope we
have turned this standard picture upside-down and shown that just about
every recognized amendment suffers from a credible defect under Article
V. Even the ﬁve relatively modest amendments that did not (as far as we
know) face contemporaneous legal challenges built on questionable past
practices such as quorum rules and the absence of presidential
presentment.326
The fact that amendments have generated signiﬁcant legal controversy in the past would not necessarily matter much in the present if, over
time, the law of Article V had become progressively clearer. Many underdeterminate provisions of the Constitution have spawned rich bodies of
case law interpreting their terms or otherwise had their meaning “liquidated” and settled by practice.327 But for the most part, as Part III illustrates
rigorous investigation into the original public meaning of Article V or into originalist theories of constitutional construction for resolving Article V underdeterminacies.
324. Prakash, Of Synchronicity, supra note 16, at 1270 n.267.
325. Strauss, Irrelevance of Amendments, supra note 42, at 1486.
326. Presidential presentment did not occur for the Twentieth Amendment or the
Twenty-Third through Twenty-Sixth Amendments. See supra note 21. The House votes on
the Twentieth Amendment, 75 Cong. Rec. 5027 (1932), Twenty-Third Amendment, 106
Cong. Rec. 12,570–71 (1960), and Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 111 Cong. Rec. 15,216 (1965),
and the Senate vote on the Twenty-Third Amendment, 106 Cong. Rec. 12,858 (1960), were
all taken without recording yeas and nays, so it is entirely possible that these amendments
received only two-thirds of a quorum, not two-thirds of the whole membership of each chamber. In the case of the Twenty-Third Amendment, for example, the Congressional Record
reports that, “[i]n the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds of the Senators present and voting . . .
voted in the affirmative.” Id. at 12,858. The Congressional Record does not indicate how
many senators were “present and voting.” Senator Everett Dirksen had “suggest[ed] the
absence of a quorum” immediately before the vote, but the quorum call was rescinded by
unanimous consent in response to a request from Senator Lyndon Johnson. Id. In the
House, the Twenty-Third Amendment passed by “two-thirds,” but an earlier roll call had
revealed that only 325 members were present. Id. at 12,562, 12,571. Two-thirds of 325 is well
under the 290 members that would constitute two-thirds of the full membership. The lack
of clarity on the ﬁnal votes for these amendments reﬂects that the quorum rules were taken
for granted.
327. See generally David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution (2010) [hereinafter
Strauss, The Living Constitution] (describing the large role played throughout U.S. history
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in detail, this has not happened with Article V. Recurring contestation over
amendment validity has not yielded anything like a robust body of
congressional, executive, or judicial precedent on the key questions raised
by Article V. A large proportion of the interpretive puzzles that section II.A
identiﬁes—many of which go to the core of the amendment project—have
never been resolved.
The Supreme Court has directly addressed the meaning of Article V
only a handful of times. To recapitulate: In Hollingsworth v. Virginia, Justice
Chase asserted during oral argument that the President “has nothing to
do with the proposition, or adoption, of amendments to the
Constitution.”328 Over 120 years later,329 in Hawke v. Smith (No. 1), the
by a “common law approach to constitutional interpretation”); William Baude,
Constitutional Liquidation, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2019) (describing liquidation); Caleb
Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519, 547 (2003)
(arguing that the Founding generation “expected subsequent practice to liquidate [constitutional] indeterminacy” and thereby “produce a ﬁxed meaning for the future”).
328. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 381 n.* (1798); see also Hawke v. Smith (No. 1), 253 U.S. 221,
229 (1920) (citing only Hollingsworth for the statement that “[a]t an early day this court
settled that the submission of a constitutional amendment did not require the action of the
President”); supra notes 117–130 and accompanying text.
329. We are not aware of any Supreme Court decisions about the amendment process
in the long interval between Hollingworth and Hawke. In Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
1 (1849), which concerned the validity of a new purported state constitution in Rhode
Island, the Court suggested in dicta that questions regarding the amendment process may
be nonjusticiable. Id. at 53. In White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646 (1872), the Court
likewise suggested that the validity of the Reconstruction Amendments was nonjusticiable.
Id. at 649. In Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915), which concerned the constitutionality
of Maryland’s “Grandfather Clause,” several parties raised constitutional objections to the
Fifteenth Amendment. The attorney defending the state’s law—named, oddly enough,
William Marbury—argued that the Fifteenth Amendment was unconstitutional as applied
to Maryland under the Equal Suffrage Clause, because Maryland had never ratiﬁed the
amendment. In openly racist terms, Marbury submitted that “compelling” states to expand
the franchise to non-whites “would be in substance and effect depriving the original
State . . . of all representation in the Senate.” Vose, Constitutional Change, supra note 229,
at 39 (quoting Brief for Plaintiff in Error, Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915)). An
amicus brief also rehearsed procedural objections to the passage of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. Id. at 40–41. The Court did not address these arguments in its
unanimous opinion in Myers, nor in another case decided the same day about Oklahoma’s
Grandfather Clause, Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). There is an intriguing
hint, however, that the arguments may have gotten some internal traction at the Court.
Marbury’s son later recounted in a letter to Justice Felix Frankfurter that Justice James Clark
McReynolds—an “intimate” of Marbury who joined the Court while Myers was pending—
told Marbury that “the Fifteenth Amendment election cases had been the subject of a
terriﬁc controversy.” Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court
and Race in the Progressive Era, Part 3: Black Disfranchisement From the KKK to the
Grandfather Clause, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 835, 867 (1982) (quoting Letter from William L.
Marbury, Jr. to Felix Frankfurter (Sept. 25, 1958)). Marbury’s son went on: “Apparently,
Justice Lurton had prepared a dissenting opinion in which he followed my father’s
argument in the Myers case. This so scandalized the Chief Justice that he suggested that
Lurton resign. When Lurton refused to do this the majority of the court held up a decision
until his death.” Id. Justice Frankfurter passed the letter on to Alexander Bickel, though
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Court held in a “shocking[]”330 decision that a state could not require a
proposed amendment to be submitted to a popular referendum after
being ratiﬁed by the state legislature.331 In the National Prohibition Cases,
the Court concluded, in an unreasoned summary opinion, that Congress
does not need to declare that an amendment is “necessary” when it proposes an amendment; that the two-thirds vote in each chamber “is a vote
of two-thirds of the members present—assuming the presence of a
quorum”; and that the Prohibition Amendment was “within the power to
amend reserved by Article V of the Constitution.”332 In Dillon v. Gloss, the
Court stated in dicta that ratiﬁcation of an amendment “must be within
some reasonable time after its proposal” and that Congress could ﬁx “a
deﬁnite period for ratiﬁcation . . . as an incident of its power to designate
the mode of ratiﬁcation.”333 In Leser v. Garnett, the Court held that a state
could not place limits on its legislature’s power to ratify a federal amendment in its state constitution and that “official notice” of ratiﬁcation from
a state to the U.S. Secretary of State “was conclusive upon him” and “upon
the courts.”334 In United States v. Sprague, the Court held that, as between
state legislatures and state conventions, the “choice . . . of the mode of ratiﬁcation, lies in the sole discretion of Congress.”335 Finally, in Coleman v.
Miller,336 which the next section discusses in more detail, a splintered
Court determined that “the effect both of previous rejection and of
noting his “heavy doubts about its accuracy.” Id. (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to
Alexander Bickel (Sept. 23, 1959)).
330. The Amendment Stands, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1920, at 10.
331. 253 U.S. 221, 231 (1920); see supra notes 202–208 and accompanying text. In
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 576 U.S. 787
(2015), the Court suggested in dicta that Hawke extended to the governor’s role in the
amendment process. Id. at 808 (“In the context of ratifying constitutional amendments, in
contrast, ‘the Legislature’ has a different identity, one that excludes the referendum and
the Governor’s veto.”). On the other hand, Justice William Rehnquist, in a solo opinion
denying a stay, wrote that the question whether the word “Legislatures” in Article V
“encompasses the voters of a State who have power to enact laws by initiative” is “by no
means settled.” Uhler v. AFL-CIO, 468 U.S. 1310, 1311 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers)
(discussing the meaning of the word “Legislatures” in the Application Clause).
332. 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920); see supra notes 210–211 and accompanying text.
333. 256 U.S. 368, 375–76 (1921); see supra notes 196–198 and accompanying text. On
why this statement is dicta, see Cong. Pay Amendment, 16 Op. O.L.C. 85, 92–93 (1992).
334. 258 U.S. 130, 136–37 (1922); see supra notes 214–225 and accompanying text. The
Court also rejected the argument that the Nineteenth Amendment was invalid because it
made “so great an addition to the electorate . . . without the State’s consent.” Leser, 258 U.S.
at 136. The Court did not explain its reasoning, other than to say that the argument would
also render the Fifteenth Amendment invalid. Id.
335. 282 U.S. 716, 730 (1931); see supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text.
336. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). Coleman concerned the ratiﬁcation of an amendment proposed by Congress in 1924 that would have empowered Congress to regulate “the labor of
persons under eighteen years of age.” Id. at 435 n.1 (quoting Child Labor Amendment, 43
Stat. 670 (1924)). The proposed amendment fell short of ratiﬁcation. See John R. Vile,
Child Labor Amendment, in Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments, Proposed
Amendments, and Amending Issues, 1789–1995, at 47, 48–49 (1996).
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attempted withdrawal” and “whether [an] amendment had been adopted
within a reasonable time” were political questions, “not subject to review
by courts.”337
These opinions cover relevant ground, but not all that much
ground—only a fraction of the landscape of interpretive puzzles canvassed
in section II.A. And the extent to which the Court has settled even the
questions it has purported to answer is far from clear. Nearly half of the
above-listed statements on Article V are dicta, unreasoned ipse dixits, or
both. Few if any of the opinions are widely respected by constitutional
lawyers, and questions such as the President’s role in the amendment
process and the meaning of Hollingsworth remain the subject of debate, at
least in law reviews.338 Several opinions have been blatantly contradicted
by subsequent practice: The Twenty-Second Amendment was approved by
the House without “a vote of two-thirds of the members present,” as was
said to be necessary in the National Prohibition Cases;339 the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment mocks the Dillon Court’s contention that it was “quite
untenable” to think an amendment proposed in 1789 was still pending in
1921;340 and states have continued to experiment with direct democracy in
the ratiﬁcation process, Leser notwithstanding.341 Among the
uncontradicted opinions, most just label certain issues as political or
nonjusticiable, casting no light on their merits.342
337. 307 U.S. at 449, 454 (opinion of Hughes, C.J.). The quotations are taken from
Chief Justice Hughes’s “Opinion of the Court,” which was joined by Justices Harlan Fiske
Stone and Stanley Forman Reed. Id. at 435. Justice Hugo Black, writing for himself and
three other Justices, would have ruled that “Congress has sole and complete control over
the amending process, subject to no judicial review.” Id. at 459 (Black, J., concurring). The
Court subsequently conﬁrmed that in Coleman it had “held that the questions of how long
a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution remained open to ratiﬁcation, and what
effect a prior rejection had on a subsequent ratiﬁcation, were committed to congressional
resolution and involved criteria of decision that necessarily escaped the judicial grasp.”
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214 (1962). OLC has questioned the authoritativeness of both
Coleman opinions. Cong. Pay Amendment, 16 Op. O.L.C. 85, 93 n.11, 99–102 (1992).
338. See generally, e.g., Black, On Article I, supra note 21; Tillman, A Textualist
Defense, supra note 119; Joshi, supra note 130; Mike Rappaport, Does the Constitution
Require Constitutional Amendments to Be Presented to the President?, Law & Liberty
(Jan. 17, 2013), https://lawliberty.org/more-on-lincoln-signing-the-13th-amendment
[https://perma.cc/V3BQ-LAVY].
339. 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920) (citing Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919));
see supra section III.J.
340. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921); see supra section III.K.
341. See, e.g., Uhler v. AFL-CIO, 468 U.S. 1310, 1311–12 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers); Kimble v. Swackhamer, 439 U.S. 1385, 1385 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers).
342. The case law in the lower federal courts is similarly sparse. And given the de facto
repudiation of Article V principles announced by the Supreme Court, one would expect any
lower court precedent to be even less stable. The two most signiﬁcant lower court cases both
involve the ERA. The ﬁrst is Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (three-judge
court), an opinion authored by then-Judge John Paul Stevens about ratiﬁcation of the ERA
in Illinois. The court held that state legislatures were free to set their own voting and
quorum rules for ratifying federal constitutional amendments, but that a state constitution
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It would be fair, of course, to say that some questions have been
resolved by a combination of Article V’s text, judicial doctrine, and historical tradition. No amendment would be rejected at this point for lack of
presidential presentment (although the rise of textualism and originalism
as interpretive methods may make the practice of nonpresentment
increasingly awkward).343 Nor would an amendment be rejected for receiving only two-thirds of a quorum of both houses, rather than two-thirds of
the entirety of both houses (although it is conceivable that a member of
Congress could persuade colleagues with such an objection).344 But few
and far between are the Article V practices that have been “open, widespread, and unchallenged since the early days of the Republic,”345 and it
seems to us that the unsettled questions substantially exceed the settled
ones in both number and signiﬁcance.
Perhaps the simplest response to anyone who nonetheless maintains
that history has resolved most of the important puzzles in Article V is to
point to the two most prominent recent amendment efforts and the legal
tumult each has occasioned. While the controversies over the TwentySeventh Amendment and the ERA have idiosyncratic elements, the procedural issues they raise are strikingly basic.346 They highlight just how little
the law of Article V has developed since the Founding. If controversy over
the Twenty-Seventh Amendment has quieted a bit in recent years, this
probably has more to do with the amendment’s relative unimportance and
the unlikelihood that Congress would ever contravene it than with considered acceptance of its validity.347
*

*

*

In sum, the Supreme Court’s unanimous pronouncement that a
“mere reading demonstrates” that “Article V is clear in statement and in

could not specify a supermajority requirement that would bind a state legislature acting on
such an amendment. Id. at 1306–08. The second is a district court decision from Idaho
holding that states could rescind prior ratiﬁcations and that Congress’s attempt to extend
the ERA ratiﬁcation deadline was invalid. Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107, 1150–54 (D.
Idaho 1981), vacated as moot sub nom. Carmen v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982). The Supreme
Court granted certiorari before judgment, but the new ratiﬁcation deadline expired while
the case was pending, so the Court vacated the district court’s decision as moot.
343. See supra section III.B; supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the view
that nonpresentment is incompatible with clear constitutional text).
344. See supra section III.C (discussing the plausibility of the view that a two-thirds vote
of the full chamber is required).
345. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 572 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (describing the sorts of practices that “should guide [the Court’s] interpretation
of an ambiguous constitutional provision”).
346. See supra sections III.K, III.L.3.
347. See Strauss, Irrelevance of Amendments, supra note 42, at 1486–87 (describing the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment as having “no signiﬁcant effect” and “remarkable for [its] relative lack of importance”).
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meaning, contains no ambiguity, and calls for no resort to rules of construction”348 seems to us exactly backward. As Part II illustrates, a mere
reading demonstrates that Article V is shot through with ambiguities and
calls for constant resort to rules of construction. As Part III shows, this
ambiguity is borne out by, and persists through, 230 years of history.
Americans tend to take the text of the Constitution as a given and to regard
constitutional interpretation as something that operates on that text. But
if our descriptive arguments thus far have been sound, then there is no
constitutional text that precedes interpretation. To identify what is or is
not “in” the constitutional text is itself a complex act of constitutional
interpretation. And given the amount of legal uncertainty that continues
to enshroud the Article V process, one can expect all but the most uncontroversial new amendments to elicit credible challenges to their validity in
the years ahead.
B.

Revisiting Coleman

If we are right that controversy over the validity of amendments is
likely to persist for the foreseeable future, then it behooves us to reﬂect on
our system for resolving such disputes. When some groups in the polity
insist that an attempted amendment has satisﬁed the rules of Article V and
others disagree, with both sides advancing credible legal arguments, who
should decide whether the amendment has become part of the
Constitution? We submit that the degree of ongoing Article V ambiguity
documented in this paper lends new support to the Coleman Court’s
inclination to leave such matters to Congress, while also suggesting possible institutional innovations.
In Coleman v. Miller, a splintered Supreme Court determined in 1939
that Congress has the ultimate authority to promulgate or proclaim an
amendment after ratiﬁcation by the states.349 Chief Justice Hughes, writing
for himself and Justice Harlan Fiske Stone in what was styled the “Opinion
of the Court,” found that Congress has “control over the promulgation of
the adoption of [an] amendment.”350 He further found that the two questions before the Court—the effect of a state’s prior rejection of an amendment on a subsequent ratiﬁcation, and whether too long a period had
elapsed between proposal and ratiﬁcation—were political questions not ﬁt
for judicial review.351 Justice Hugo Black penned a concurrence, joined by
Justices Felix Frankfurter, Owen Roberts, and William O. Douglas. He
similarly suggested that it was Congress’s role to “proclaim[]” an
amendment part of the Constitution, and he would have held that all

348.
349.
350.
351.

United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 730 (1931).
307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939).
Id.
Id. at 450–54.
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questions related to the amendment process were “political” and beyond
the purview of the courts.352
Coleman’s reference to a congressional “promulgation” or “proclamation” power has been criticized on the ground that Article V makes no
reference to any role for Congress after the initial proposal of an amendment. The text instructs that an amendment is “valid . . . when ratiﬁed by
the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States,” not when promulgated by Congress following the ﬁnal state ratiﬁcation.353 And the Supreme
Court has in fact adjudicated a number of disputes about the amendment
process, albeit infrequently, going all the way back to Hollingsworth,354
which predates Marbury.355
These criticisms of Coleman have some force, but they slight a prudential rationale for the Court’s ruling that the Court itself did not articulate
but that this paper’s historical account helps to reinforce.356 On account
of the underdeterminacy of Article V and the momentousness of formal
constitutional change, there is a strong possibility that signiﬁcant conﬂicts
over the validity of amendments will arise and yield no clear answers, only
“political questions.”357 Partly for this reason, the Court has avoided reaching the merits of an Article V dispute for over ninety years.358 There is a
consequent interest in enabling some nonjudicial institution to resolve
authoritatively whether the Constitution has been amended.
The ongoing saga of the ERA exempliﬁes this concern. At least three
pending lawsuits allege, not at all frivolously, that the ERA is already part
of the Constitution.359 Meanwhile, proponents of the ERA are pressing
Congress to retroactively extend the ratiﬁcation deadline, which, if done,

352. Id. at 457–58 (Black, J., concurring).
353. U.S. Const. amend. V.
354. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798); see also supra notes 328–337
and accompanying text (cataloging cases).
355. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For prominent criticisms of
Coleman along these lines, see Cong. Pay Amendment, 16 Op. O.L.C. 85, 99–105 (1992);
Dellinger, Legitimacy of Constitutional Change, supra note 16, at 397–405; Paulsen, A
General Theory, supra note 50, at 709–18.
356. Cf. Pozen & Samaha, supra note 69, at 732–33, 775–76 (explaining that “prudential” arguments in constitutional law tend to emphasize system-level considerations of
administrability, workability, and the like).
357. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (listing factors that indicate the presence of a “political question”). In some Article V disputes, not just one or two but all six of
the Baker factors may arguably be triggered. See Thomas E. Baker, Towards a “More Perfect
Union”: Some Thoughts on Amending the Constitution, 10 Widener J. Pub. L. 1, 7–8 (2000)
(“The Article V amendment power bears all the constitutional hallmarks of a nonjusticiable
or political question . . . .”); Thomas Millet, The Supreme Court, Political Questions, and
Article V—A Case for Judicial Restraint, 23 Santa Clara L. Rev. 745, 763–66 (1983)
(analyzing the applicability of the Baker factors to Article V cases).
358. The last such ruling was United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931), issued in
February 1931. See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
359. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
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would immediately raise a difficult new Article V question.360 No one can
predict with any conﬁdence whether or how the constitutional fate of the
ERA will be determined, as all three branches of government continue to
vie for interpretive supremacy with regard to Article V361 and many lawyers
now ﬂatly deny the precedential value of Coleman.362
The status quo of second-order uncertainty about how to resolve ﬁrstorder Article V uncertainty does not necessarily reﬂect any sort of crisis in
self-government or the rule of law. Policentric decisionmaking procedures
can generate deliberative and participatory beneﬁts as well as stable political equilibria under certain conditions, including on questions of constitutional interpretation.363 In contrast to the “juricentrism” that
characterizes much of contemporary constitutional culture,364 a more ﬂuid
form of departmentalism has prevailed in the Article V context throughout U.S. history. We could keep muddling through.
Yet even if the status quo is defensible, it carries signiﬁcant costs in
terms of predictability, efficiency, and popular responsiveness. The ERA
example is, again, instructive, as countless hours of legal and political
mobilization have been devoted not only to the question whether we
should have an ERA but also to the question whether we do have an ERA—
with no clear end to the legal wrangling in sight and the very real possibil-

360. See supra note 307 and accompanying text. On whether Article V allows Congress
to retroactively extend the ERA’s deadline, compare Held et al., supra note 256, at 128–31
(yes), and Gerard N. Magliocca, Buried Alive: The Reboot of the Equal Rights Amendment,
71 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 633, 644–50 (2019) (yes), with Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107,
1150–54 (D. Idaho 1981) (no), vacated sub nom. Carmen v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982), and
Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, 44 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 24–37 (Jan. 6, 2020)
(no).
361. See supra notes 265–272 and accompanying text.
362. See Kalfus, supra note 313, at 445 (“Many scholars have concluded that the Court’s
reformulation of political question analysis, coupled with Coleman’s conﬂict with Court
precedent, render Coleman ‘dead.’”).
363. See, e.g., Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability,
84 Va. L. Rev. 83, 103 (1998) (arguing that “judicial exclusivity” over constitutional decisionmaking “encourages acrimony, not cooperation”); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the
Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L.J. 1943, 2023–37 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel,
Legislative Constitutionalism] (defending a model of “policentric constitutional interpretation” for Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). The term “policentric” refers to “the
distribution of constitutional interpretation . . . across multiple institutions, many of which
are political in character,” and is distinct from the term “polycentric,” which describes
“problems that contain multiple and interdependent solutions.” Post & Siegel, Legislative
Constitutionalism, supra, at 2022–23.
364. See David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 Colum. L.
Rev. 2047, 2055–56 (2010); see also Nikolas Bowie & Daphna Renan, The Separation-ofPowers Counterrevolution, 131 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 22–46) (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing the “juristocratic” understanding of separation
of powers disputes that has prevailed since Reconstruction).
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ity that the ERA will fail without creating any precedent on Article V outside the executive branch.365 Most worrisome, in a nation with one of the
most demanding amendment criteria and lowest formal amendment rates
in the world,366 the absence of any clear Article V dispute-resolution mechanism makes it harder to revise the constitutional text by perpetuating
legal uncertainty and proliferating institutional veto points. Even after
supermajorities of both chambers of Congress and the state legislatures
have approved a change to this text, legal objections from any one of the
federal legislative, executive, or judicial branches may be enough to derail
an attempted amendment. It is for these sorts of reasons that many theorists of constitutional design, from Madison in 1787 to the Venice
Commission in 2009, have advised that confusion regarding the amendment rules themselves “ought to be as much as possible avoided.”367
If, in line with this view, one of the existing organs of government
ought to be assigned primary responsibility for resolving disputes over
amendment validity, Congress seems best suited to the task.368 The basic
reasons are straightforward. Unlike the judiciary, Congress is not bound
by a case or controversy limitation. It can take years for a case to wend its
way up to the Supreme Court, and many amendments do not give rise to
365. Within the executive branch, OLC recently issued a substantial opinion concluding
that the ERA is dead. See Ratiﬁcation of the Equal Rights Amendment, 44 Op. O.L.C. (Jan.
6, 2020) (slip opinion). The opinion immediately drew ﬁerce criticism and pledges of deﬁance. See, e.g., Garrett Epps, Bill Barr Doesn’t Get to Decide What’s in the Constitution,
Atlantic (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/trump-dojera-constitution/605047/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that ERA advocates
“reject [OLC’s] arguments” and quoting Reva Siegel for the view that “[t]he Justice
Department does not have authority to decide the legal validity of the ERA”); Press Release,
Rep. Carolyn B. Maloney, Maloney Statement on OLC Response to Archivist on ERA
Ratiﬁcation (Jan. 8, 2020), https://maloney.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/
maloney-statement-on-olc-response-to-archivist-on-era-ratiﬁcation
[https://perma.cc/72WA-UQ96] (“I do not believe that the OLC has the ﬁnal word to
dictate how Congress or the states proceed in amending the Constitution.”).
366. See Richard Albert, American Exceptionalism in Constitutional Amendment, 69
Ark. L. Rev. 217, 225–31 (2016) (reviewing comparative evidence and explaining that,
among democracies, “the United States ranks in the three lowest average annual revision
rates”); Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in Responding to
Imperfection, supra note 1, at 237, 260–61 (ﬁnding that the U.S. Constitution has the
world’s “second most difficult amendment process,” behind only the now-defunct Yugoslav
Constitution).
367. 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 89, at 630 (James
Madison); see also supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
368. To say that the validity of contested amendments is a “political question” entrusted
primarily to Congress is not necessarily to deny any role for the judiciary. It may be that
judicial review is appropriate for “plainly ultra vires action”—for instance, if Congress were
to assert that thirty-ﬁve was three-fourths of ﬁfty. Richard H. Fallon Jr., Political Questions
and the Ultra Vires Conundrum, 87 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1481, 1490 n.36 (2020) (citing Laurence
H. Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97
Harv. L. Rev. 433, 433 (1983)). In addition, the prudential argument for congressional primacy may be weaker in the case of an amendment proposed by an Article V convention or
an amendment that reforms Congress itself.

2021]

PUZZLES AND POSSIBILITIES

2381

justiciable controversies at all. Should an Article V controversy be entertained, the Court’s precedents are sparse and not well ordered in this area.
Congress, on the other hand, can act promptly to assess the validity of an
amendment as soon as the ﬁnal state has purportedly ratiﬁed. More
important, questions about the Article V process will often involve highly
charged, legally underdetermined judgments, which risk taxing the
Court’s institutional competence and compromising its institutional
clout.369 These separation of powers concerns become all the more acute
when Article V has been activated in order to overturn the Court’s own
constitutional rulings.370 The sociological legitimacy of amendments, this
paper shows, has never had a tight relationship with their procedural
propriety.371 As the most geographically representative, deliberatively
transparent, and electorally accountable branch, Congress will in general
be best positioned to determine whether an amendment has gained broad
social acceptance and to generate additional political support once such a
determination has been made.372
Relative to the Court, the executive branch also has stronger democratic credentials and the ability to act with greater dispatch. But the text
of Article V makes no mention of the executive. And one of the very few
propositions of Article V law that historical practice has settled is that the
President has no legal role in proposing an amendment to the states.373 In
light of this practice, which dates back to the Bill of Rights, it is odd to

369. Cf. Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 Harv. L.
Rev. 2240, 2250–54 (2019) (book review) (explaining how politically divisive rulings can
undermine the Court’s sociological legitimacy). Of course, the Court could bring more
determinacy to the law of Article V by weighing in on more Article V questions. But the
history of widespread disapproval and even deﬁance of the Court’s pronouncements on
Article V, see supra notes 338–341 and accompanying text, gives reason to doubt that the
Court could ever deﬁnitively clear up this body of law when motivated majorities object to
its conclusions.
370. See Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a
Restrained Judicial Role, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 444–45 (1983).
371. See supra Part III.
372. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 Duke L.J.
1335, 1363 (2001) (“Society needs a democratic mandate rather than a judicial one for some
decisions . . . . Impeachment, war powers, and the decision whether a constitutional amendment has been ratiﬁed are some examples.”); Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism,
supra note 363, at 2030 (“If the Court has particular strengths in explicating the
Constitution as a rule of law, Congress is especially well-situated to respond to changes in
constitutional culture.”); see also Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1377 n.80 (1997) (explaining that “a
single national legislature” like the U.S. Congress may be best positioned to fulﬁll an
“authoritative settlement function” for certain constitutional issues, including political
questions). Insofar as Congress, in resolving speciﬁc Article V disputes, is more likely than
the Court to leave some play in the joints of Article V law, we believe this is a virtue rather
than a vice. See infra section V.C.
373. See supra sections III.A–.B.
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think that the President would play any sort of signiﬁcant role at the conclusion of the Article V process.374 It is odder still to think that such a role
would be played by subordinate executive officers such as the Archivist of
the United States, who currently has the statutory duty to “publish[]” an
amendment upon receiving “official notice” that it has been adopted.375
That said, Congress is less than ideal as an arbiter of Article V validity
in a number of respects. Rising levels of polarization within each chamber
increase the risk of raw partisan conﬂict, gamesmanship, and perceptions
of bias. Congress’s popular approval rating currently sits near a historic
low.376 And in some instances, a disputed amendment might affect
Congress itself in ways that call into question its members’ ability to assess
the amendment’s constitutional status in good faith, as when the
Seventeenth Amendment fundamentally changed the Senate by introducing direct election of senators. This section has suggested that the Coleman
Court was correct to conclude that, for settling whether an amendment
has satisﬁed Article V, Congress will typically be the least bad option
among the branches of government. Might there be any other options?
There are no silver bullets, but potentially useful subconstitutional
moves can be made within the Coleman framework. One possibility is a
national referendum. Beginning with the Eighteenth Amendment’s time
limit,377 Congress has on several occasions built a ratiﬁcation condition
into the text of an amendment. In a similar spirit, Congress could include
a provision in future proposed amendments stating that they will be inoperative unless validated in a certain sort of post-ratiﬁcation referendum,
thereby effectively precommitting Congress to “proclaim” validated
amendments despite any procedural objections that might arise along the
374. One could perhaps argue, on some sort of division of power grounds, that the
exclusion of the President from the “proposal” stage makes it all the more appropriate that
the President be given a decisive role at the “promulgation” stage. Cf. Black, On Article I,
supra note 21, at 899 (maintaining that Hollingsworth should not be extended “one inch”).
But it would create a textually as well as functionally bizarre asymmetry to read Articles I and
V to exclude presidential presentment on the front end of the amendment process while
requiring it on the back end. And given the extraordinary amount of national consensus
already required by the amendment process, there are powerful democratic reasons not to
introduce yet another hard veto point.
375. See supra note 265 and accompanying text. This duty used to be performed by the
Secretary of State. See Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 80, § 2, 3 Stat. 439; Bernstein, supra note 25,
at 540 n.218 (explaining that Congress transferred responsibility for certifying amendments
from the Secretary of State to the Administrator of General Services in 1951 and then to the
Archivist in 1984). We have not found any evidence suggesting that Congress intended to
delegate to the Archivist the authority to resolve the status of contested amendments. It is
perfectly consistent with the statutory text to regard a congressional proclamation of an
amendment’s ratiﬁcation as the relevant “official notice” that triggers the Archivist’s duty
of publication.
376. See Harry Enten, Congress’ Approval Rating Hasn’t Hit 30% in 10 Years. That’s a
Record., CNN (June 1, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/01/politics/poll-of-theweek-congress-approval-rating [https://perma.cc/QP8P-6BR7].
377. See supra notes 196–198 and accompanying text.
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way.378 Alternatively, Congress could reserve for itself or for each chamber
separately the authority, through a simple majority vote, to call for a
national referendum on an amendment’s validity after the amendment
has—in the view of the members calling for the referendum—attained a
sufficient number of ratiﬁcations.379 Another possibility is for Congress to
convene, either through the ordinary legislative process or through the
Article V mechanism just described, a special commission to issue a nonbinding opinion on the validity of a disputed amendment and the steps
that would be required, if any, to cure legal defects. Congress could form
such a commission today to help it assess the status of the ERA and build
bipartisan buy-in for whatever position it ultimately adopts.380
The above discussion provides only a skeletal sketch of these options,
which would take a whole other paper to elaborate in full. The key point,
for present purposes, is that ongoing confusion over how to decide Article
V disputes creates an opportunity to innovate in limited, pragmatic ways
that honor Coleman’s prudential wisdom while moderating some of the
risks of relying on Congress. By enlisting the assistance of a referendum or
commission, Congress can remain in the driver’s seat when it comes to
judging Article V amendments without necessarily serving as the exclusive
or even the ﬁnal decisionmaking body.

378. See Amar, America’s Constitution, supra note 49, at 418. Amar, recall, has argued
that a national referendum may be used to bypass Article V altogether. See supra notes 4, 7,
58 and accompanying text. The proposal here could be seen as a hybrid between Amar’s
much bolder proposal and the existing Article V process. Any such referendum would add
another step, and another effective veto point, to what is already an arduous amendment
process. But we expect that a referendum would be very unlikely to fail if the amendment
in question had already plausibly navigated the hurdles of Article V—and that a successful
referendum would put immense, productive pressure on Congress to accept the result forthwith. Consider, by way of analogy, the pressure that the Brexit referendum exerted on the
U.K. Parliament. See Meg Russell, Brexit and Parliament: The Anatomy of a Perfect Storm,
74 Parliamentary Affs. 443, 448 (2021) (“[T]he clear reservations of many parliamentarians
about the Brexit decision were overshadowed by the referendum result, with most MPs on
both the government and opposition side accepting that it must be respected. Parliament
hence actively, if reluctantly, ceded its sovereignty to the public on the principle of Brexit.”).
In moving to submit a potential amendment directly to the American people for an advisory
referendum, one U.S. Senator argued to his colleagues in 1861 that the people’s “sentiments and their opinions will be our safest guide upon this question, . . . disabled as we are
by our own distractions and divisions in Congress from acting upon it.” Cong. Globe, 36th
Cong., 2d Sess. 264 (1861) (statement of Sen. Crittenden).
379. This proposal might be challenged on Chadha grounds, see generally INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), but such a challenge would be undercut by building the
option to call a referendum into the text of the amendment itself. By doing this, the
referendum would already plausibly have navigated the Article V process by the time it is
initiated. See Amar, America’s Constitution, supra note 49, at 418.
380. Such a commission, in our view, would ideally be instructed by Congress to apply
some version of the Article V Thayerianism proposed infra section V.C.
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V. EMBRACING ARTICLE V AMBIGUITY: LESSONS FOR INTERPRETERS AND
REFORMERS
The dispelling of any notion that Article V supplies a straightforward
guide to amendment holds lessons for academics and advocates as well as
government officials. That descriptive undertaking is, again, the heart of
this paper, and space constraints require us to be brief in this ﬁnal Part.
Here, we ﬁrst argue that our account of Article V ambiguity complicates
two prominent debates in constitutional theory.381 We then close by
considering how it could open up new possibilities for constitutional
change.
A.

Originalism and Textualism

One of the most sweeping developments in constitutional law over the
past several decades, as countless commentators have observed, has been
the rise of originalism and its close cousin textualism as a preferred mode
of interpretation.382 With the conﬁrmation of Justice Amy Coney Barrett,
there are now multiple “self-avowed originalists” on the Court.383 Scholarly
interest in originalism shows no signs of abating.
Originalism is a complex phenomenon, more a cluster of related
methodologies than a single, well-deﬁned one.384 But an important normative justiﬁcation for all its variants has been the idea that it is the interpretive approach most consistent with a commitment to popular

381. Our account also has potential implications for more general debates in legal theory. For instance, scholars “typically assume that bright-line rules are more constraining on
judicial and administrative decisionmakers than context-saturated standards.” Connor N.
Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study
of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1727, 1812
(2010). The Article V ambiguity and ﬂexibility documented in these pages challenge that
assumption. As a formal matter, the key terms in Article V are much more rule-like than
standard-like: There are no references in the text to reasonableness, equity, all-thingsconsidered balancing, or anything of the sort. It is partly for this reason, we suspect, that
Article V is believed by many to be more constraining than it really is.
382. See generally Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A
Life Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1819, 1844–47 & n.63 (2016) (summarizing originalism’s academic and political development since the 1970s and collecting
citations to intellectual histories).
383. Ilan Wurman, What Is Originalism? Debunking the Myths, Conversation (Oct. 24,
2020),
https://theconversation.com/what-is-originalism-debunking-the-myths-148488
[https://perma.cc/R7CD-W679] (listing Justices Amy Coney Barrett, Neil Gorsuch,
Clarence Thomas, and—more controversially—Brett Kavanaugh in this category).
384. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations and
Constitutional Originalism, 18 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 49, 54 (2020) (describing originalism
as “a family of constitutional theories” united by certain ideas about the ﬁxity and constraining force of the constitutional text).
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sovereignty.385 The original meaning of the constitutional text, on this
view, “is both binding and uniquely legitimate” because of the way the text
was ratiﬁed through the special supermajoritarian procedures laid out in
the Constitution.386 The rules of Article V play a crucial role in this picture.
They not only determine which amendments have become part of the
canonical document but also, once satisﬁed, endow the communicative
content of these texts with a legal authority that never fades over time,
unless and until a new Article V amendment comes along and overrides
them.387 “The Article V amendment process and originalism,” in John
McGinnis’s words, “march under a single banner.”388
This paper’s descriptive account helps reveal a new sense in which this
picture of Article V as arbiter and embodiment of the sovereign will may
be too simple. The vast majority of recognized amendments have not been
adopted in clear compliance with Article V.389 All but one has been
adopted in clear deﬁance of a requirement of presidential presentment
that, as a textual matter, plausibly applies to the Article V process.390 The
single most transformative set of amendments, many believed at the time
of their adoption and still believe today, amounted to a “naked violation[]
of Article V.”391 And ever since the Founding, the meaning of Article V has
been continually contested without, on many signiﬁcant questions, reaching any resolution. Nothing in the language or law of Article V tells us
deﬁnitively, for instance, that the Twenty-Seventh Amendment is part of
the Constitution while the ERA is not. In U.S. constitutional culture, the
degree to which an attempted amendment has complied with a discrete
set of legal rules has always had an attenuated connection to its ultimate
constitutional fate. What is and is not “in” the Constitution is ultimately
385. See Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93
Va. L. Rev. 1437, 1440 (2007) (stating that “popular sovereignty and the judicially enforced
will of the people” is “the most common and most inﬂuential justiﬁcation for originalism”).
386. Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 479, 514 (2013); see also Colby, supra note 150, at 1631–38 (summarizing the standard “popular sovereignty” argument for originalism).
387. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 551 (1994) (“The central premise of originalism . . . is that the
text of the Constitution is law that binds each and every one of us until and unless it is
changed through the procedures set out in Article V.”); cf. Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism
as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 817, 820–21 (2015) (“What originalism requires of legal change is that it be, well, legal; that it be lawful, that it be done according
to law. This is a requirement of procedure, not substance.”).
388. John O. McGinnis, Protecting the Originalist Constitution, 42 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 81, 85 (2019). “And what does that banner read? It says, ‘We the People,’ and not ‘We
the Elite Judges.’” Id.
389. See supra Part III.
390. See supra section III.B; supra note 21 and accompanying text.
391. Ackerman, We the People, supra note 7, at 111; cf. Colby, supra note 150, at 1630–
31, 1662–66 (suggesting “the possibility that the shortcomings in the framing of the
Fourteenth Amendment could seriously undermine the normative appeal of originalism
more generally”).
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determined by a complex, ongoing, and not especially predictable dialectic between formal government actions and popular and political beliefs
and perceptions. Provocatively put, the Constitution is not so much a collection of texts that have passed through a unique legitimating process as
a collection of texts that Americans agree to regard as the Constitution,
despite wide variations in and serious questions about the manner in
which they were added.392
If this is right, it calls into question the legal and empirical basis for
the popular sovereignty justiﬁcation of originalism. There are no clear
rules to indicate, in many cases, whether an attempted act of sovereign
constitutional authorship meets the criteria laid out in the Constitution.
Nor do the details of how any given piece of purported constitutional text
was created—including both the forms that were followed and the degree
to which the overall process could be characterized as supermajoritarian—
seem to determine its sociological legitimacy in any mechanical manner.
The process of formal constitutional change has always been less legalistic
and more chaotic than standard originalist narratives about Article V seem
to presume.
None of this necessarily upends “the great debate” between originalism and living constitutionalism or indicates that originalism is less democratic than alternative approaches.393 Critics have pointed out numerous
other difficulties with the popular sovereignty case for originalism.394 And
proponents of originalism have offered numerous other justiﬁcations that
do not depend on the character of the process that led to the text’s enactment. Prakash, for instance, defends originalism as a logical entailment of
the hermeneutic enterprise while expressly “contest[ing] the interpretive
assertion that . . . originalism is a legitimate means of making sense of the
Constitution merely or primarily because of the manner in which the
Constitution was ratiﬁed and amended.”395 William Baude and Stephen
Sachs have launched a defense of originalism as “our law” on openly presentist, positivist grounds, with no direct connection to Article V or VII.396
Our intervention in the debate is simply to suggest that the popular sover-

392. There is an interesting parallel, which we do not have space to pursue, to the historical processes through which certain texts are canonized as part of sacred scripture while
others are denied that status in a given theological tradition. See Frank Kermode, The
Canon, in The Literary Guide to the Bible 600 (Robert Alter & Frank Kermode eds., 1987).
The Constitution itself can be thought of as a kind of canon in this sense.
393. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism:
The Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1243 (2019).
394. See Colby, supra note 150, at 1662–63 (summarizing difficulties).
395. Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Misunderstood Relationship Between Originalism and
Popular Sovereignty, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 485, 486 (2008).
396. See, e.g., William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Grounding Originalism, 113 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 1455 (2019); William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 2349
(2015). For an elegant rebuttal, see Richard Primus, Is Theocracy Our Politics?, 116 Colum.
L. Rev. Sidebar 44 (2016).
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eignty case for originalism is subject not only to the standard counterarguments about the dubious democratic bona ﬁdes of an ancient text but also
to a new counterargument about the dubious legal bona ﬁdes of nearly
every provision of that text.
B.

Amendment Inside and Outside Article V

A foundational debate in constitutional theory concerns whether and
how the written or big-C Constitution may legitimately be updated outside
the procedures speciﬁed in Article V.397 The “outsider” position is most
closely associated with Amar and Ackerman.398 According to Amar, the
Constitution is best read to preserve for the people an unenumerated right
to amend its terms through something akin to a national referendum.399
According to Ackerman, the Reconstruction Amendments were adopted
in violation of Article V but were nonetheless legally legitimate because
their adoption conformed to the true, unwritten criteria for higher
lawmaking.400 Conversely, the Twenty-Seventh Amendment was adopted
in conformity with Article V but is nonetheless illegitimate because it
violated those unwritten criteria.401 The “insider” position is the
conventional view—the view that Article V supplies the exclusive route to
formal constitutional change, that “[n]othing new can be put into the
Constitution except through the amendatory process.”402
Our account collapses some of the space between these two positions.
Given the long history of procedural creativity and the pervasive legal
uncertainty that we document, there is no clear line demarcating what is
“inside” or “outside” Article V. Ackerman labors heroically to show that
the Reconstruction Amendments were valid additions to the Constitution
even though brought into existence in a manner that is very plausibly
inconsistent with Article V. We do not disagree with Ackerman’s
conclusion; we disagree with the premise that the Reconstruction
Amendments were quite so extraordinary in this regard. Within broad
boundaries, the degree to which an attempted amendment stays inside the
four corners of Article V has not been decisive in determining whether it
397. The unwritten or small-c constitution has been updated many times over by judicial
decisions, framework statutes, and other developments that have little to do with Article V.
See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. The focus here is on the more radical proposition that the constitutional text itself may be changed outside Article V.
398. Cf. James E. Fleming, We the Unconventional American People, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1513, 1540 (1998) (book review) (“In recent years, some constitutional scholars have noted
the emergence of a ‘Yale school’ of constitutional theory, by which they refer to Ackerman’s
and Amar’s theories of amending the Constitution outside Article V.”).
399. See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 3, at 462–94; Amar, Philadelphia
Revisited, supra note 4, at 1044–76.
400. See Ackerman, We the People, supra note 7, at 99–252.
401. Id. at 490 n.1.
402. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956); see also supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
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becomes accepted by Americans as part of the written Constitution. All
constitutional amendment, in this sociological sense, takes place “outside”
Article V.
That being the case, it is notable how little headway Amar’s relatively
straightforward proposal has made in convincing Americans that they can
amend the Constitution through a national referendum established by
and employing a simple majority vote. Especially in light of the constitutional order’s steady shift toward greater nationalism and majoritarian
democracy ever since the Civil War, his proposal strikes us as no less plausible as a matter of constitutional text, structure, and “spirit”403 than the
notion that an Article V amendment could (like the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment) remain pending for more than two centuries before being
ratiﬁed. Yet, even though the law of Article V is so unsettled and so many
amendments have questionable Article V credentials, the assumption that
all revisions to the written Constitution must be pursued through the
Article V process continues to hold a powerful sway on the U.S. legal and
political community, at least among elites.404 This persistent combination
of Article V obscurity and Article V exclusivity suggests that the two may
reinforce one another: If determined majorities had not found Article V
to have such play in the joints, its status as the exclusive gateway to the
constitutional text may well have proved unsustainable long ago.405
These observations may also hold a clue as to how Article V exclusivity
could unravel in the future. If Amar’s proposal is just as constitutionally
coherent as numerous amendments that are accepted as part of the document, then the same sort of political mobilization that potentiated those
amendments may be sufficient to potentiate amendment-by-referendum

403. Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 3, at 460–61.
404. See Sanford Levinson, The Political Implications of Amending Clauses, 13 Const.
Comment. 107, 114 (1996) (remarking that “Amar’s method” of amending the Constitution
by popular referendum “is not only untried but also, for most Americans, I suspect
unthinkable”).
405. Cf. Philippe Nonet & Philip Selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Toward
Responsive Law 76–79 (Routledge 2d ed. 2017) (1978) (discussing the tension that all legal
institutions face between the need to limit discretion and discipline decisionmaking, on the
one hand, and the need to remain responsive to new pressures and contingencies, on the
other). Article V’s status as the exclusive gateway to the constitutional text may also have
proved unsustainable if the Court had not, over time, been so accommodating of legal and
social change outside the Article V process. See Strauss, The Living Constitution, supra note
327, at 115–16 (arguing that “[s]ome form of living constitutionalism is inevitable” in light
of the difficulty of formal amendment).
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as well.406 At least for those willing to look past its novelty,407 Amar’s proposal is not necessarily more legally outlandish than any number of things
that have been done in the name of Article V. The constitutional text,
accordingly, is not the principal problem for Amar; constitutional culture
is.408 Perhaps calling attention to just how fast and loose Americans historically have played with Article V, as this paper has done, will conduce to
greater cultural openness to experimenting with other legally plausible (if
unavoidably problematic) modes of updating the constitutional text in the
service of deepening democracy. But in case Amar’s argument is destined
to remain off-the-wall in our lifetimes, we close with a more modest reform
proposal of our own.
C.

Loosening the Constitutional Cage Through Article V Thayerianism

For all of the ambiguities we have identiﬁed, the hard core of Article
V remains. Unless a ﬁrst-ever Article V convention is called, those who
would revise the written Constitution need to convince others that twothirds of both chambers of Congress have approved, and three-quarters of
the states have ratiﬁed, an amendment. There are many different ways to
count to two-thirds and three-fourths, as we emphasize throughout Parts
II and III, but a plausible double-supermajoritarian showing of some sort
must be made. In comparison with the approaches taken by other
democracies, this is an exceptionally difficult amendment process. And
the actual rate of amendment in the United States has been exceptionally
low.409 As many have argued, the practical difficulty of revising the written
Constitution invites judges to update supreme law through creative

406. See Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions, supra note 3, at 160–61
(“[C]onstitutions are always subject to amendment by changes—amendments—in the practices of a citizenry, in the practices of its officials, and in the practices of its judges.”). The
precise mechanisms and pathways through which constitutional orthodoxies change over
time remain “enigmatic,” Pozen & Samaha, supra note 69, at 792, but potential contributors
presumably include social movements, partisan politics, and judicial appointments as well
as academic argument.
407. Cf. Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 Duke L.J. 1407, 1427–65 (2017)
(criticizing the view that “novelty” is evidence of a constitutional problem in the legislative
context).
408. See 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 109–10 (3d ed. 2000)
[hereinafter Tribe, American Constitutional Law] (observing that the sociological legitimacy of a non-Article V amendment would ultimately depend upon “social and cultural
practices,” but expressing doubt that such an amendment could succeed anytime soon); see
also Richard Albert, The Case for Presidential Illegality in Constitutional Amendment, 67
Drake L. Rev. 857, 873–75 (2019) (discussing, with reference to examples from other countries, how “the sociological and moral force” of a successful yet “illegal” constitutional referendum could compel “the legal and political elite to recognize the validity of this
unconventional change to the U.S. Constitution”). See generally Peter Suber, The Paradox
of Self-Amendment: A Study of Law, Logic, Omnipotence, and Change (1990) (describing
various modes of amending an amendment process).
409. See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
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readings and undermines even the possibility of genuine collective selfrule410—leaving our democracy “trapped inside the Article V cage.”411
Yet without exiting the cage altogether, as an Amarian referendum or
a true revolution would have us do, perhaps we might loosen its bars.
When one combines the classic democratic case against Article V’s “obduracy”412 with this paper’s new account of Article V’s ambiguity, the promise
of what could be called Article V Thayerianism comes into focus. The label
refers to James Bradley Thayer’s famous proposal that judges should defer
to a coordinate legislative branch on constitutional questions except when
the latter has made a “very clear” mistake.413 Thayerianism is typically
advocated today as a means of respecting the constitutional judgment and
authority of the legislature and thereby limiting the countermajoritarian
character of constitutional law414—virtues that become all the more significant under conditions of high-level interpretive uncertainty.415 This argument transposes readily to the Article V context, where
countermajoritarian concerns are especially acute and legal uncertainty is
especially rife. If it were to take hold, Article V Thayerianism would neutralize the potential chilling effects of this uncertainty and promote institutional innovation in the amendment process. Simply put, Article V
Thayerianism would make it easier to amend the Constitution, at least at
the margins.
Article V Thayerianism could be operationalized in more or less
ambitious ways. A narrow version would have judges refrain from blocking
amendment proposals by Congress or amendment ratiﬁcations by state
legislatures on Article V grounds, unless the actions are seen as “clearly”
inconsistent with Article V. Given Coleman’s nonjusticiability ruling, this
version would not necessarily mark any observable advance on the status
quo—though Coleman’s precedential status is far from secure and could

410. See, e.g., John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism,
81 Tex. L. Rev. 1929, 1954 (2003) (discussing “the standard critique” that “the obduracy of
Article V acts to suppress the people’s voice in our constitutional affairs, and thus is either
ﬂatly undemocratic, or at least more antidemocratic than we would like”); David Singh
Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, The Original Theory of Constitutionalism, 127 Yale L.J. 664, 668,
679 (2018) (book review) (arguing that “the Article V amendment procedure [has come]
perilously close to choking off further sovereign action by the people,” producing “a political community that is at once committed to ruling itself and unable to do so”).
411. Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes
Wrong (and How We the People Can Correct It) 20–21 (2006) [hereinafter Levinson, Our
Undemocratic Constitution] (capitalization omitted).
412. Ferejohn & Sager, supra note 410, at 1954.
413. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 144, 154–55 (1893).
414. Cf. G. Edward White, Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny, 57 S.C. L. Rev. 1, 48–50 (2005)
(explaining that Thayer himself did not defend the clear-mistake rule, as “[m]odern commentators tend to,” in terms of “countermajoritarian constraints”).
415. See Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty, supra note 14, at 230–88.

2021]

PUZZLES AND POSSIBILITIES

2391

use buttressing.416 A more expansive version, which we favor but which
raises additional complications, would be internalized by legislative and
executive officials as well as by judges. Members of Congress, on this
approach, would likewise apply a rule of clear mistake when called on to
resolve the validity of contested steps forward that are taken in the amending process. The hard core of Article V would not be affected. Aspiring
amenders would still need to persuade two-thirds of Congress and threefourths of the states in a constitutionally credible manner. But the fuzzy
edges around that core would become more permeable, zones of permission and experimentation rather than additional vetogates on the path to
constitutional change.
As with all versions of Thayerianism, just how permissive Article V
Thayerianism would prove may vary depending on who is applying it.
Those who see more clarity in the law of Article V will tend to ﬁnd more
clear mistakes in need of correction. In principle, however, the Thayerian
proposal is potentially compatible with any interpretive approach, as it says
nothing about the method of constitutional interpretation that is to be
used—only about what is to be done when that method generates an
uncertain legal conclusion. Originalism could lead to an especially permissive version of Article V Thayerianism, given how little light was shed on
the workings of Article V during its drafting and ratiﬁcation417 and the
growing recognition among originalists that constitutional decisionmakers must rely on normative judgment in situations where the communicative content of the constitutional text is too vague or ambiguous to fully
determine a legal result.418
What would Article V Thayerianism look like in practice? Most immediately, the ERA would be recognized as part of the Constitution as soon
as Congress so declares.419 As Part III discusses, the Article V objections to
the ERA are substantial but not “clearly” fatal, especially if Congress takes
new action to extend the ratiﬁcation deadline.420 Accordingly, if Congress
416. See supra section IV.B.
417. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
418. See Pozen & Samaha, supra note 69, at 777–78; see also Lawrence B. Solum,
Originalist Methodology, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 269, 295 (2017) (noting that one approach
originalists might take in situations of textual underdeterminacy is to adopt “a Thayerian
default rule of deference to democratic institutions”).
419. As Julie Suk details in a forthcoming article, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s writings and
testimony before becoming a judge support a primary role for Congress in resolving the
current status of the ERA. See Julie C. Suk, The Procedural Path of Constitutional Inclusion:
Justice Ginsburg’s Cautious Legacy for the Equal Rights Amendment, 110 Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 2022) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
420. See supra section III.L. A recent district court opinion called the question whether
Congress “may revive the ERA” a “difficult issue” and did not resolve it. Virginia v. Ferriero,
525 F. Supp. 3d 36, 61 (D.D.C. 2021). In its 2020 opinion ﬁnding the ERA to be dead, OLC
acknowledged that Congress’s authority to “modify” a ratiﬁcation deadline presents a
“difficult question.” Ratiﬁcation of the Equal Rights Amendment, 44 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at
3 (Jan. 6, 2020).
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were to pass a joint resolution retroactively waiving the deadline and
directing the Archivist of the United States to publish the ERA as the
Twenty-Eighth Amendment, the Archivist should promptly do so.421 More
generally, Article V Thayerianism might empower aspiring amenders to
take advantage of quorum rules, to consider amendments passed by one
chamber in the other chamber during subsequent legislative sessions,422 to
demand a supermajority vote for rescissions of amendment proposals and
ratiﬁcations, to hold binding or advisory state referenda on ratiﬁcation,423
and so on and so forth.424
Perhaps the most promising avenue of Thayerian experimentation
would involve ratiﬁcation through conventions. Congress could, for
instance, propose an amendment and provide for at-large elections of state
convention delegates on a single day. Doing so would effectively create an
amendment “Election Day” and convert each state vote into a referendum
421. A middle option, which we ﬁnd appealing, would be for Congress to retroactively
extend the deadline while at the same time providing that it will treat rescissions as effective.
See Magliocca, supra note 360, at 635; Hemel, supra note 317. This would be a departure
from strict Thayerianism, in the sense that it would not read Article V in the most permissive
fashion possible. But such a departure may be prudentially warranted in light of the unique
circumstances of the ERA (speciﬁcally, the multiple rescissions and twofold extension of the
ratiﬁcation deadline), and it would return the ratiﬁcation process to the state legislative
arena for a ﬁnal push. Cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1003 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that the efficacy of rescission “‘might be answered
in different ways for different amendments’” (quoting Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1302
(N.D. Ill. 1975) (three-judge court))).
422. For an arguable limit case, the House in 1969 passed a constitutional amendment
abolishing the Electoral College and providing for direct election of the President, but the
Senate did not follow suit. See 115 Cong. Rec. 26,007–08 (1969). Is it clear, as a matter of
Article V law, that the Senate could not revive this proposed amendment? See Seth Barrett
Tillman, Noncontemporaneous Lawmaking: Can the 110th Senate Enact a Bill Passed by
the 109th House?, 16 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 331, 345 n.31 (2007) (arguing that the House
and Senate need not act contemporaneously in the amendment process).
423. Unless it is overturned or deﬁed, Hawke v. Smith (No. 1), 253 U.S. 221 (1920),
would prevent a state from holding a referendum undercutting ratiﬁcation after legislative
approval. But a state could still, consistent with Hawke, hold a referendum prior to legislative
consideration and choose to bind itself to the result.
424. Article V Thayerianism is a heuristic to adjudicate present and future disputes over
the validity of amendment efforts, such as the ERA. For disputes about past amendment
efforts, we believe it makes sense for systemic stare decisis reasons to defer to longstanding
social and official consensus about the textual content of the Constitution. As William Baude
has suggested to us, one might call this the “pocket constitution method”: Copies of the
Constitution in general circulation and carried around by people are presumptively correct,
absent a clear inconsistency with Article V. Hence, while there may be a colorable argument
that Article the First, on congressional apportionment, satisﬁed the requirements of Article
V, see supra section III.L.1, that argument is not so clearly correct as to upset the overwhelming consensus spanning more than two centuries that the amendment was never adopted.
Conversely, while the Titles of Nobility Amendment appeared for a time in (some) pocket
constitutions, see supra section III.L.2, its noncompliance with Article V was clear. The
Twenty-Seventh Amendment is an intermediate case. Despite the controversy surrounding
its initial promulgation, it has appeared in pocket constitutions for three decades now and
is not clearly in violation of Article V. See supra section III.K.
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on the proposed amendment. Congress could even include a provision in
the proposed amendment stipulating that it will be inoperative unless
approved by a majority of all voters on Election Day. In addition to increasing the democratic legitimacy of the resulting amendment, this maneuver
would streamline the Article V process in two ways: It would require only
a single electoral victory in each state, rather than a victory in both houses
of bicameral state legislatures,425 and it would circumvent partisan
gerrymandering in those legislatures.
More radical possibilities are also imaginable. Consider the ﬁnal
clause in Article V providing “that no State, without its Consent, shall be
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”426 For those who believe the
two-senators-per-state rule to be inconsistent with the value of political
equality, this clause reﬂects “a truly extraordinary” and grossly undemocratic “instance of dead-hand control.”427 As Robert Dahl once lamented,
“those ﬁfteen words end all possibility of amending the constitution in
order to reduce the unequal representation of citizens in the Senate.”428
But is this so clear? Many workarounds to the Equal Suffrage Clause have
been proposed over the years, from an amendment repealing the clause
paired with another amendment changing the Senate apportionment formula,429 to an amendment preserving the Senate in name but “relocating”
its powers to a new body,430 to the proposition that the one-person-onevote equal protection principle announced in Reynolds v. Sims should be
understood to apply to the Senate,431 to the centuries-old argument that
the clause has never been legally operative.432 These proposals vary in their
degree of legal boldness; depending on one’s general approach to constitutional interpretation and one’s speciﬁc views on the Equal Suffrage

425. Cf. Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 355, 361 (1994) (assuming “that a unicameral legislative process is one half as
difficult as a bicameral one”).
426. U.S. Const. art. V.
427. Michael J. Klarman, The Framers’ Coup: The Making of the United States
Constitution 627 (2016).
428. Robert A. Dahl, How Democratic Is the American Constitution? 145 (2d ed. 2003).
429. See, e.g., Tribe, American Constitutional Law, supra note 408, at 111–12; Lynn A.
Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has Gone, 13 J.L. &
Pol. 21, 67–70 (1997).
430. Amar, America’s Constitution, supra note 49, at 293.
431. See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, Senate Democracy: Our Lockean Paradox, 68 Am. U. L.
Rev. 1981, 1999–2009, 2071–75 (2019) (offering a detailed version of this proposal, implementable by statute). The Reynolds Court expressly declined to apply the one-person-onevote principle to the Senate, citing the Senate apportionment formula’s “ingrained [status]
in the Constitution” and the “unique historical circumstances” attending its creation. 377
U.S. 533, 574 (1964).
432. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.

2394

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:2317

Clause, some may seem clearly impermissible. But most are “at least thinkable” as a matter of orthodox constitutional interpretation.433 For those
who ﬁnd such proposals not just legally thinkable but legally credible,
Article V Thayerianism and the principle of popular sovereignty that
underwrites it counsel openness to reform.
Even more important than its direct effects on the legal environment
for attempted amendments, however, may be Article V Thayerianism’s
indirect effects on the cultural environment. A striking ﬁnding from the
comparative constitutional literature is that the procedural difficulty of a
country’s formal amendment rule is not strongly correlated with its rate of
amendment.434 Some countries with stringent amendment rules rewrite
their constitutions frequently; some countries with lax amendment rules
rewrite their constitutions only rarely. More consequential than the
amendment rule itself, it seems, is the prevailing “amendment culture.”435
In the United States, Jackson suggests that perceptions of the difficulty of
satisfying Article V not only tend to be “overstated” but also have become
“self-fulﬁlling” by deterring political actors from trying to pursue
amendments.436 The determinants of amendment culture are enigmatic,437 so we cannot say with any conﬁdence what the precise effects of
interpretive reform would be, in the United States or any other system.
There is also an endogeneity complication because, just as the embrace of
Article V Thayerianism might change U.S. amendment culture, a change
in U.S. amendment culture might be needed for Article V Thayerianism
to gain traction. Cultural change has to start somewhere, however, and it
does not seem far-fetched to think that growing appreciation for just how
many questions the law of Article V does not clearly resolve, combined with
growing levels of scholarly support for Article V Thayerianism, could

433. Sanford Levinson, There Is a Way, but Will There Ever Be a Will?: Comments on
Eric Orts’s Senate Democracy, 69 Am. U. L. Rev. Forum 159, 164 (2020); see also David B.
Froomkin & A. Michael Froomkin, Fixing the Senate: A User’s Guide 67 (Univ. of Mia.,
Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 3797782, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3797782
[https://perma.cc/YG6R-B4ZC] (“[T]he Entrenchment Clause presents a less substantial
obstacle to reform than is sometimes imagined . . . .”).
434. See Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule
Matter at All? Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment
Difficulty, 13 Int’l J. Const. L. 686, 711 (2015) (“[A]mendment culture is more important
than institutional constraints in explaining amendment practices.”); Bjørn Erik Rasch,
Rigidity in Constitutional Amendment Procedures, in The Constitution as an Instrument of
Change 111, 121 (Eivind Smith ed., 2003) (noting that the “empirical relationship between
rigidity and amendment is . . . not very robust”).
435. Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 434, at 699–701, 708–13.
436. Jackson, The (Myth of Un)Amendability, supra note 30, at 584–90, 602–05; see also
Vicki C. Jackson, Democracy and Judicial Review, Will and Reason, Amendment and
Interpretation: A Review of Barry Friedman’s The Will of the People, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 413,
433–52 (2010) (book review) (discussing and critiquing “amendophobia” in contemporary
U.S. constitutional culture).
437. See Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 434, at 687, 701.
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nudge the U.S. “legal complex”438 in a more amendment-friendly direction. Above and beyond any discrete arguments we have advanced, we
hope this paper contributes to such a shift.
CONCLUSION
A written constitution’s rules for its own amendment help “deﬁne its
very essence.”439 Our ambition in this paper has been to explore the
“essence” of the U.S. Constitution through a critical study of how the rules
of Article V have been developed and applied over time. The standard
account of Article V depicts it as all but freezing our constitutional text, if
not our democracy as well.440 Yet for all of Article’s V ostensible “clarity”441
and “rigidity,”442 the picture that emerges from this study is one of
persistent legal contestation, confusion, and innovation.
Descriptively, we have tried to offer a robust empirical showing of the
underdeterminacy of the American rule of recognition for constitutional
enactments. Prescriptively, we have suggested that this showing holds
untapped promise for those who wish to revise the Constitution. Ever since
the Founding, the bars of “the Article V cage”443 have been signiﬁcantly
looser than the conventional wisdom appreciates. And still to this day, the
law of Article V remains remarkably unsettled not just on minor
technicalities but on fundamental questions of substance and procedure.
Recovering the full story of Article V adventurism, and recognizing the full
scope of legal discretion left in its wake, are important tasks for enriching
our understanding of constitutional history and theory. They may also be
necessary ﬁrst steps toward unfreezing the constitutional text today.

438. See Lucien Karpik & Terence C. Halliday, The Legal Complex, 7 Ann. Rev. L. &
Soc. Sci. 217, 220, 233–34 (2011) (explaining that “constitutional politics invariably are
embedded within a politics of the legal complex,” deﬁned as “a cluster of legal actors,”
including academics, “related to each other in dynamic structures and constituted and
reconstituted through a variety of processes”).
439. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 4, at 1102 n.208.
440. For the freezing metaphor, see Daniel Lazare, The Frozen Republic: How the
Constitution Is Paralyzing Democracy (1997); see also Albert, Constitutional Amendments,
supra note 113, at 96 (collecting similar statements by leading scholars).
441. E.g., Albert, Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude, supra note 14, at 1035; Harrison,
supra note 14, at 459, 461; Paulsen, A General Theory, supra note 50, at 761.
442. E.g., Heather K. Gerken, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical
Response to Our Undemocratic Constitution, 55 Drake L. Rev. 925, 938 (2007); Aziz Z. Huq,
The Function of Article V, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, 1168–69 (2014).
443. Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution, supra note 411, at 20.
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